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Abstract
Literary investigations of copyright have generally taken a retrospective view of British eighteenth-century
copyright law. Influenced by the assumptions and methods of historical materialism, and aiming to critique
romantic notions of authorship, such projects have sought in the eighteenth century a narrative of the 'rise of
the romantic author.' Though productive, this approach has sometimes obscured other influential strains of
thought about authorship, interpretation, and literary property that were widespread in the eighteenth
century. This dissertation seeks to shift focus away from the historical materialist critique of romantic
authorship--part of a debate that has its roots in the nineteenth century--and towards a related but
characteristically eighteenth-century debate between innatism and empiricism. Roughly speaking, this debate
was over whether 'ideas' (however defined) are innate, present in the human mind from birth, or are acquired
exclusively through experience. Discussions of literary property in the eighteenth century concerned
themselves with this debate precisely in so far as literature may be said to involve the production, transmission,
or consumption of ideas. To reexamine the rise of copyright law in Britain within the frame of this debate, this
dissertation examines court records and other legal documents that discussed copyright law and the related
notion of a property in ideas; philosophical tracts that attempted to define the term 'idea' and explain the
origin of ideas; and literary works that problematized the production, transmission, consumption, and
interpretation of literary ideas. Read alongside one another, these texts reveal a proliferation of models
through which to understand the novel concept of literary property. To explore the question of whether the
ideas in a text could be communicated without being made common, these texts drew on a wide range of
metaphors--political sovereignty, land ownership, marriage, mathematical proof, and sentimental exchange--to
serve as models of communication. Each of these models had different implications for the concept of literary
property, and many of them were compatible with literary property, while remaining incompatible with
romantic notions of authorship. The association between copyright and romantic authorship, then, is not
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ABSTRACT 
NOVEL PROPERTIES: COMMUNICATION. COPYRIGHT, 
AND THE BRITISH NOVEL, 1710-1774 
Scott Enderle 
Michael Gamer 
Literary investigations of copyright have generally taken a retrospective view of 
British eighteenth-century copyright law. Influenced by the assumptions and methods of 
historical materialism, and aiming to critique romantic notions of authorship, such 
projects have sought in the eighteenth century a narrative of the 'rise of the romantic 
author.' Though productive, this approach has sometimes obscured other influential 
strains of thought about authorship, interpretation, and literary property that were 
widespread in the eighteenth century. This dissertation seeks to shift focus away from 
the historical materialist critique of romantic authorship)—part of a debate that has its 
roots in the nineteenth century—and towards a related but characteristically eighteenth-
century debate between innatism and empiricism. Roughly speaking, this debate was 
over whether 'ideas" (however defined) are innate, present in the human mind from 
birth, or are acquired exclusively through experience. Discussions of literary property in 
the eighteenth century concerned themselves with this debate precisely in so far as 
literature may be said to involve the production, transmission, or consumption of ideas. 
iv 
To reexamine the rise of copyright law in Britain within the frame of this debate, this 
dissertation examines court records and other legal documents that discussed copyright 
law and the related notion of a property in ideas; philosophical tracts that attempted to 
define the term 'idea' and explain the origin of ideas; and literary works that 
problematized the production, transmission, consumption, and interpretation of literary 
ideas. Read alongside one another, these texts reveal a proliferation of models through 
which to understand the novel concept of literary property. To explore the question of 
whether the ideas in a text could be communicated without being made common, these 
texts drew on a wide range of metaphors—poltical sovereignty, land ownership, 
marriage, mathematical proof, and sentimental exchange—to serve as models of 
communication. Each of these models had different implications for the concept of 
literary property, and many of them were compatible with literary property, while 
remaining incompatible with romantic notions of authorship. The association between 
copyright and romantic authorship, then, is not necessary but contingent, subject to 
transformation by the accidents of history. 
V 
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Introduction: 
Copia and Copyright 
The word 'copy' comes from the Latin copia. 'Cornucopia' and 'copious' are 
derived form the same root, which means 'abundance.' The term was applied to texts in 
the classical Latin phrases habere copiam legendi and facere copiam describendi, 
meaning "to have the ability to read" and "to give the power to transcribe,"1 and was 
used by Cicero and Quintihan in their discussions of rhetoric. These meanings crossed 
over into Medieval Latin; in 1511, Erasmus wrote On Copia oj Words and Ideas, a 
rhetoric handbook that aimed to cultivate "'abundance,' 'richness,' 'fullness'"4 of 
expression in students. 
At least as late as the seventeenth century, the anglicization of copia, 'copy," 
could also signify abundance. However, its more specific meaning, 'transcript.' was 
already present in Middle English, and 'copy' could also signify, somewhat 
ambiguously, the source of a transcript: "Be it trwe, or be it fals,/Hyt is as the coopy 
was.'° This second meaning was amplified by seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
booksellers, who came to use the word 'copy" not to denote one of many duplications, 
' Tom Mc. Arthur, ed., The Oxford Companion to the English Language (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 264. 
" Desiderius Erasmus, Collected Works, v. 24 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), xxxv. 
J
 De Utraque Verborum ac Rerum Copia, literally "on both words and matters abundant," based on a 
phrase from Quintilian (ibid. xxxv). 
Ibid. xxxv. 
' Edward E. Foster, ed., Three Purgatory Poems (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Medieval Institute Publications, 
2004), lines 2382-83. 
nor even to denote a particular source copy to be duplicated, but rather to denote the 
right to duplicate a particular text. They spoke of purchasing "Copies for valuable 
considerations" from authors, and insisted that this purchase was not merely of any one 
physical copy, but of the right to copy. In modern English usage, we generally append 
'-right' to this formation, maintaining at least some emphasis on the fundamentally 
social and political nature of copyright. But in the seventeenth and into the eighteenth 
century, this emphasis was often missing. At least among printers and publishers, 
'copy' was a simple, straightforward noun denoting something that could be possessed, 
bought, sold, inherited, and so on—in short, a thing. 
By transforming the right to copy into a thing, booksellers achieved what looks 
like—from a modern perspective—a startling inversion. Though there may be many 
'copies' of a text, and though there can even be many sources from which to make new 
copies, there can be only one right to copy a text.7 When reified, this right begins to 
look less like a social convention and more like a mine or wellspring—a productive, 
unique, and impossible-to-duplicate resource to be tapped and exploited by its owner. 
'Copy' becomes the unique source from which all copies of a text arise; 'copy' in this 
sense is not a copy, nor even a source, but rather the source—or, the original, 'original' 
being a word that in the eighteenth-century was still sometimes understood as a 
synonym for 'origin.' The word 'copy' could therefore be used to denote, variously, 
6
 The Case of the Booksellers and Printers Slated (1638), rpt. in English Publishing, the Struggle for 
Copyright, and the Freedom of the Press, ed. Stephen Parks (New York: Garland. 1975). 
7
 This follows from the assumption that there is only one text—a problematic assumption, but one that 
most forms of copyright law cannot easily do without. 
8
 For example, the subtitle of the first chapter of the second book of Locke's Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding is "Of Ideas in general, and their Original."' 
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the sheer abundance of language; a particular instance of that abundance produced by 
transcription; the less-common original that a transcription duplicates; or the 
phenomenally scarce, costly, and perhaps fictional, origin of all such transcriptions. 
As paradoxical as it may seem, however, this conjunction of meanings runs 
parallel to the two usages of copia stated above: "to have the ability to read" and "to 
give the power to transcribe." In early usage, and even into the eighteenth-century, 
under both the term 'copy' and its etymon copia, the consumption and the production of 
linguistic abundance were semantically yoked. This is not to say that to read and to 
transcribe were considered precisely the same thing, but simply that they were seen as 
two closely-related activities within a category of broadly similar behaviors. To read 
and to transcribe were both to partake of the abundance of language. They could be 
distinguished, but they were not fundamentally different from one another. 
This dissertation starts from the premise that the systematization of copyright 
law in the eighteenth century demanded and motivated the articulation of a stark and 
well-developed distinction between reading a text and transcribing a text. To create a 
sufficiently general copyright law, it became necessary to conceptualize the right to 
transcribe a text as a private, exclusive, and assignable right, while maintaining the 
public and general nature of the right to read texts. I argue that doing so required 
eighteenth-century jurists, authors, printers and readers to rethink the nature and aims of 
communication. In prior models of communication, 1 argue, to publish a text was to 
make public all aspects of that text, rendering it common. To keep private the right to 
transcribe a text, while simultaneously rendering common the right to read that text, a 
4 
new model of communication was required. 
Indeed, many new models of communication arose. Although I argue that earlier 
models conceptualized communication as a wholesale making-common, no single 
model of communication was hegemonic prior to the eighteenth century, and no single 
model of communication arose to replace prior models. Instead, a proliferation of new 
models arose, each of which attempted to give an account of what is communicated 
when a text is published, what is not communicated, and why. Most importantly, for my 
purposes, these models had things to say not only about how texts are produced, but 
about how texts are, or ought to be, consumed. Reading, after all, involves copying. 
Whether we think about it from a twenty-first century neuroscientific point of view (in 
which the text is copied by the retina and processed by the brain) or an eighteenth-
century point of view (in which memorization of texts was seen as crucial to 
understanding texts), reading can be seen as a form of copying. Given such a view of 
reading, a law that outlawed any kind of copying a text without permission of the author 
would outlaw reading the text. In short, I argue that to account for this new, partially 
privatized mode of communication, the nature of interpretation had to be rethought. 
Throughout the seventeenth and arguably well into the eighteenth century, there 
persisted an influential neo-platonic understanding of communication, which held that 
certain ideas are innate, and exist within the minds of all humans. Communication, 
according to this view, is not the transmission of ideas from one individual to another, 
but is rather the activation of ideas that are already present in the minds of an audience, 
and everyone else as well. This view of ideas as innate is troublesome for any copyright 
5 
law that attempts to make private property out of an idea, for how could one make 
private property out of something that everyone already possesses? This was a central 
question in the debates over copyright that took place between the enactment of the first 
copyright statute in 1710 and the decision of Donaldson v. Beckett in 1774. The 1710 
statute, commonly known as the Statute of Anne, made little attempt to differentiate 
between physical copies, abstract works, and rights to copy, using the ambiguous term 
'copy7 to refer to all three at various points. Alexander Pope was involved in an 
important case, Pope v. Curll (1741), which concerned the property status of letters: did 
the writer or the receiver of the letter retain the copyright? This case established the 
possibility of incorporeal property in a text, but left many questions about the nature of 
this property, as evidenced by the presiding justice Lord Hardwicke's equivocal 
phrasing: "I am of opinion that it is only a special property in the receiver, possibly the 
property of the paper may belong to him; but this does not give a license to any person 
whatsoever to publish them to the world, for at most the receiver has only a joint 
property with the writer." The question of whether this was a property in ideas, in 
some other incorporeal thing, or strictly in the manuscript itself, remained unanswered. 
Other important cases include Tonson v. Collins (1761), in which William Blackstone 
articulated an influential account of copyright as a bona-fide property in ideas, but 
which was eventually thrown out because the plaintiffs and defendants were found to be 
in collusion, hoping to set a precedent in favor of stronger copyright law; Millar v. 
9
 For the full text of the law, see Ronan Deazley, On The Origin of the Right to Copy (Portland, Oregon: 
Hart, 2004), 233-238. 
Quoted in Deazley, 71 (my emphasis). 
6 
Taylor (1769), which led to a ruling in favor of a property in ideas, but was also one of 
only a handful of cases brought before the Court of King's Bench in the 1760s to 
produce a dissenting opinion; and Donaldson v. Beckett {111A), which overturned -
Millar v. Taylor, ruling against a property in ideas, but in a fashion so muddled and 
confusing that the case has been consistently misinterpreted for more than two 
centuries.1' The question of whether copyright could be defined as a bona-fide property 
in ideas—or in any kind of Platonic abstraction—had no definitive legal answer until 
the nineteenth century. 
The Anti-Platonism of Copyright 
Scholars discussing copyright have often concerned themselves with the 
relationship between copyright and the Platonic philosophical tradition. However, most 
commentary has seen the Platonic tradition as largely complicit with the rise of 
copyright law. With its emphasis on originality, uniqueness, attribution, and fixity, 
copyright has often been understood as a codification of romantic notions of authorship, 
and, more broadly, as a continuation of a western tradition of essentially Platonic 
logocentrism that privileges the presence of the author, or, barring that, privileges the 
authentic and authenticated text precisely insofar as it is an expression of its author's 
" Deazley, 191-210. See also Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 154. 
12
 These early cases moved towards, but did not explicitly articulate, a distinction between 'idea" and 
"expression." This distinction was finally formalized in a series of cases over the course of the nineteenth 
century, with the final outcome that only an 'expression" of an 'idea," and not the "idea' itself, could be 
copyrighted. These cases culminated, in the U.S.. with the oft-cited Baker v. Setden (1879). Among many 
commentators, however, this distinction remains a contentious one: see, for example, Richard H. Jones. 
"The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law.'" Pace Law Review 10.3 (Summer 
1990). 551-607. 
7 
will. One of the key arguments of this dissertation is that by emphasizing the romantic 
and logocentric aspects of copyright law, scholars have failed to appreciate the ways in 
which the rise of copyright law entailed a radical departure from certain fundamental 
Platonic tenets. 
The nature of this departure is illustrated in the opening pages of Jacques 
Derrida's Limited Inc. Even as he offers an anti-Platonic critique of the notion that an 
utterance or inscription can be traced back and attributed to one source, Derrida asks a 
strikingly Platonic question: 
Had I asserted a copyright, "for saying things that are obviously false,"' 
there could have been no doubt as to its appropriateness. But that John R. 
Searle should be so concerned with his copyright, for saying things that 
are obviously true, gives one pause to reflect upon the truth of the 
copyright and the copyright of the truth... if Searle speaks the truth when 
he claims to be speaking the truth, the obviously true, then the copyright 
is irrelevant and devoid of interest: everyone will be able, will in 
advance have been able, to reproduce what he says. 
Here Derrida moves away from his discussion of the problems of authorship, origin, 
and attribution, and turns his attention to "everyone"': neither to some sovereign author, 
nor to some anonymous collective responsible for producing (or re-reproducing) a text, 
but to those responsible for consuming it. And in this moment, suddenly the logic of 
copyright seems not pro- but anti-Platonic, asserting a private property in what by any 
,J
 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston. Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 30. 
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straightforward flavor of Platonism would seem to be freely available to all: the truth. 
If we attend to the effects of copyright law on notions of readership, on notions 
of reception, interpretation, consumption, the rise of copyright law begins to look less 
like a staid continuation or amplification of the metaphysics of presence, and more like 
a startling break. Insofar as concepts such as inspiration and original genius are 
deployed in support of copyright law, their corollary is that the most fundamental 
meanings of authors are forever unavailable to readers, because copyright law expressly 
concerns itself with that which is not made public when a text is published. Perhaps the 
illusion remains that we could and should seek out the intended meanings of the author; 
but the logic of copyright, at least when taken to its greatest extreme, dictates that those 
meanings will always be unavailable to readers. 
That fact may be taken to have both 'positive' and 'negative' consequences for 
the consumers of texts. On the one hand, by elevating the creative productions of the 
sovereign author beyond the ken of mere readers, the logics of copyright and of 
romantic authorship produce an asymmetry of power and a corresponding hierarchy of 
author and reader. On the other hand, the very same logics—perhaps inadvertently— 
make available a conception of reading as necessarily productive of new meanings. 
Pushed to their limit, these logics dictate that the aim of reading is no longer to seek out 
the true meanings and fundamental forms at the heart of a literary work, but to take the 
literary work as a starting point for producing new meanings and new forms. 
Innatism and Copyright 
This shift of emphasis from producer to consumer calls for a parallel shift in 
methodology. Discussions of copyright in the eighteenth century have often focused 
the economic forces at work in its formation. Mark Rose, for example, describes 
copyright as "a specifically modern formation produced by printing technology, 
marketplace economics, and the classical liberal culture of possessive individualism' 
while Martha Woodmansee insists that 
the 'author' in its modern sense is a relatively recent invention. 
Specifically, it is the product of the rise in the eighteenth century of a 
new group of individuals: writers who sought to earn their livelihood 
from the sale of their writings to the new and rapidly expanding reading 
public... in an effort to establish the economic viability of living by the 
pen, these writers set about redefining the nature of writing. 3 
Without denying that economic forces were the primary motivating factor in the 
development of copyright law, I argue that an emphasis on economic factors 
threatens to obscure other central concerns of eighteenth-century participants in 
the copyright debates. Much recent commentary on eighteenth-century 
copyright law has been part of a broader scholarly reaction against what Jerome 
McGann famously termed The Romantic Ideology—another debate, if you will, 
between influential strains of romanticism and historical materialism. Whereas 
romantic notions of authorship hold that literary works are the unique and fixed 
14
 Rose. 142. 
15
 Martha Woodmansee, '"The Genius and the Copyright," Eighteenth Century Studies 17.4 (Summer 
1984). 426. 
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products of genius and inspiration, and expressions of a sovereign poetic will, 
historical materialism posts an alternative view of literary works as the fluid 
and mutable creations of multiple collaborators, filtered through many divided 
consciousnesses, and misprinted on fragile slips of paper. However, both of 
these notions of authorship draw heavily from philosophical views that only 
reached their maturity in the nineteenth century. A view of the rise of copyright 
in the eighteenth century through either of these two lenses is therefore a 
necessarily retrospective view that partially obscures its object. 
Considering eighteenth-century copyright within the frame of this debate 
between romanticism and historical materialism, one might expect that 
arguments for and against copyright would line up neatly with these two 
understandings of authorship. People in favor of stronger copyright protection 
would want to think of the literary work as a Platonic abstraction, fixed and 
eternal, produced by inspiration rather than labor, and linked to one individual; 
while people against stronger copyright protection would prefer to see the work 
as the temporary product of temporal labor—a fleeting eddy in an endless flow 
of reduplicated communicative matter. But in eighteenth-century courtrooms, 
this neat correspondence did not hold. For example, almost as often as not, 
supporters of copyright were happy to see works as mere physical books 
produced by corporeal labor, while critics of copyright were more inclined to 
view works as collections of eternal and fixed ideas that existed prior to any 
labor. To understand what was happening in those courtrooms—to understand 
how copyright developed—and to understand the relationship between copyright 
and literary production in the eighteenth cenury—I aruge that we should place 
these two figures of authorship in brackets. Instead, we should interpret the rise 
of copyright law in terms of a different debate—a debate between empiricism 
and innatism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
This debate, which was part of a broader debate between empiricism and 
rationalism, is in some ways comparable to the debate between materialism and 
romanticism. However, the questions asked in these debates were different. 
Most notably, whereas a Materialist might first ask what the material conditions 
of reading and writing are or were, an empiricist would be more likely to ask 
what the experiential conditions of reading and writing are. Certainly 
empiricism is compatible with materialism, but it did not automatically entail 
materialism.16 At the same time, while many rationalists would sympathize with 
a Romantic view of writing as an expression of something innate within the 
writer, rationalists would concern themselves more with universal reason than 
with individual inspiration in the writing process. By looking at copyright within 
the context of this debate, it becomes much clearer why critics of copyright 
sound so platonic, and why supporters of copyright sound at times like modern 
materialists. 
16
 According to John Locke, this is a matter about which an empiricist may have to remain agnostic: " 
have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere 
material Being thinks, or no... GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking." An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 540-541. 
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Laboratories for Reification: Copyright and the Novel 
To trace the contours of eighteenth-century debates over copyright, and their 
relationship to the underlying philosophical conflict between empiricism and innatism, I 
begin by comparing the philosophical roots and the legal outgrowths of this conflict, 
broadly conceived, between empiricism and innatism, paying special attention to the 
ways they articulate competing models of communication. These competing models of 
communication, I argue, both serve fundamentally the same purpose: the reification of 
social relations. Innatism, and the neo-platonism of which it partakes, posits as the 
foundation for communication certain things called "ideas," which are universal, 
eternal, and in the possession of all individuals. Empiricism also explains the social 
activity of communication in terms of "ideas," but posits that these ideas are not eternal 
or universal, but are local and temporal, existing within the isolated minds of 
individuals. In essence, I argue that any model of communication serves to reify social 
relations, and the difference between innatist and empiricist models of communication 
is primarily that the latter reifies social relations in a manner amenable to propertization, 
while the former does not. With that in mind, I argue that the eighteenth-century novel 
was (among many other things) a laboratory for reification—an experimental space in 
which new models of communication were proposed and tested.17 Each of the novelists 
I analyze here sets forth a new model of communication—or more precisely—they each 
turn to a different mode of social interaction, using that mode as a figure through which 
to concretize the abstractions of language in a less Platonic and more propertizable way. 
I choose the novel because it, arguably more than any other form in the eighteenth century, developed 
alongside and even depended upon the financial incentive that copyright law provided to authors. 
13 
Fielding, I argue, uses the figure of politics and sovereignty; Richardson, the figure of 
marriage and domestic relations; and Sterne, the figure of gift-giving and sentimental 
exchange. 
My dissertation begins with the philosophical and legal discourse around 
communication and copyright, considering the legal actions that took place between 
1739 and 1774 and the philosophical prejudices and assumptions deployed therein. My 
first chapter, "Innateness and Experience in the Eighteenth-Century Copyright Debates; 
or, What Is Reading?" argues that the debates turned on a philosophical disagreement 
about the innateness of ideas and the possibility of their communication. To resolve this 
disagreement, booksellers began to construct a concept that would come to be known as 
"expression" by combining a version of Platonic innatism—a view of ideas as the 
product of innate genius—with a Lockean anti-innatism—a view of ideas as the product 
of labor. However, as I argue, the concept of expression also preserves some of the 
ambivalence of its philosophical forebears about the possibility of a natural or perpetual 
property in ideas. On one hand, Platonic innatism has historically emphasized the 
universality of ideas, and hence the literal pre-possession of literary ideas by both 
author and reader; on the other, Lockean models of communication draw attention to 
the labor not only of authors, but also of readers. Copyright must therefore be 
understood as one component of a collaboration between networks of writers and 
readers—as well as printers, manufacturers, and booksellers. 
To consider the political properties of these collaborative networks, my second 
chapter, "Henry Fielding and the Sovereign Author," shows how metafictional 
14 
frameworks in Fielding's novels structure, and are structured by, author-reader 
relations. At one point in Tom Jones, Fielding declares himself the "Founder of a new 
Province of Writing" and the framer of laws that "my Readers, whom I consider as my 
Subjects," must obey.1 The irony of this declaration is not lost on Fielding: any 
sovereign's power (at the practical if not the theoretical level) arises from the loyalty of 
his or her subjects. Likewise, an author's property in a text depends on his or her 
readers' recognition of the claim. Fielding responds to the threat of unruly reading in a 
passage from his first novel, Joseph Andrews, in which he preemptively defends 
himself from charges of libel, claiming to write "not to expose one pitiful wretch ... but 
to hold the glass to thousands in their closets."' Threatened by readers' ability to 
accuse him of libel, Fielding recasts his novel as an instrument of social control, and in 
doing so, I argue, reiterates while partially transforming the views set forth in Thomas 
Hobbes' Leviathan. But as in Tom Jones, this literary instrument of control 
paradoxically relies on readers' own powers of self-control; only through the 
participation of readers can authors claim sovereignty over their texts. 
What happens when such readerly self-control fails? Chapter three, "Copyright 
and the Matter of Virtue in Clarissa," attempts to answer this question by taking as its 
starting point an act of piracy. In 1753, Samuel Richardson learned that the novel he 
had finished and partially printed, The History of Sir Charles Grandison, was being 
pirated by a group of Irish printers. Irish law gave Richardson no recourse, so he 
published two pamphlets denouncing the piracies. I argue that Richardson's 
18
 Henry Fielding, Tom Jones, Thomas Keymer and Alice Wakely eds. (New York: Penguin, 2005) 74. 
19
 Ibid, 240. 
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denunciation, even as it calls for stronger copyright protection, undermines the romantic 
view of authorship, positing instead a figure of literary virtue, and a corresponding form 
of literary property, modeled on domestic virtue. In this model, I argue, readers and 
authors enter into a covenant, the aim of which is to prevent illegitimate literary 
reproduction. 
The dissertation's fourth chapter, "Tristram Shandy and the Death of the Patron" 
reconsiders the relationship between readers and authors in the mid-century by focusing 
on a droll episode in Sterne's novel, in which the title character attempts to market a 
text. The eccentric Shandy does so not by selling his copyright to a bookseller, but 
instead by offering to dedicate the text—which already carries an idiosyncratic 
dedication to an unnamed patron—to the highest bidder. He transforms his potential 
patron from a powerful citizen-protector into an anonymous face in an auction crowd, 
dramatizing copyright law's potential to turn any reader into a patron of literature. 
Accordingly, Sterne encourages his readers to encounter the novel not as an ideal and 
fixed work under the protection of a patron, but as a material book to be manipulated, 
distorted and transformed at will by its readers. Most notably, this book is figured as a 
gift to Sterne's readers, an item of sentimental exchange. In the imaginative universe of 
Tristram Shandy, then, copyright does not protect the author's immaterial property in 
his text; rather, it protects the relationship between author and reader, materialized in 
the form of a book, from the intrusions of patronage. 
A Note On Material and Immaterial Texts 
16 
In this dissertation, I use the terms "material world" and "immaterial world" 
regularly. I do so because I take it for granted that these two worlds exist—if not on 
some plane of absolute truth, then at least on the plane of 18th-century discourse. The 
idea of a clear division between "material" and "immaterial" things is a difficult one to 
maintain; and yet much reasoning about copyright law proceeds from the assumption 
that such a division exists. In this dissertation, I use these terms in ways that recognize 
their deep philosophical lineages. The idea that the material world is but an echo or 
shadow of an eternal (and hence immaterial) world of forms is at least as old as Plato; 
and it still has its adherents, especially among mathematicians. It has been often 
suggested that most mathematicians are so-called platonists, who believe that 
mathematical abstractions such as numbers have existence independent of any 
representation we create.20 According to this view, five stones can be used to represent 
the number five, but the number five exists independently of the stones, and of any 
other possible material representation. It is a short step from there to conclude that the 
number five must be an immaterial entity. 
In many respects, the idealized texts that authors are said to own, and that 
copyright law attempts to protect, resemble such mathematical objects. Texts are 
constructed from strings of discrete symbols; those symbols may easily be encoded by 
natural numbers21; and those numbers may be concatenated into a single, very large 
number—which, as it happens, is precisely how computers represent texts. Every 
20
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possible unique text can be assigned a unique number in this way, and every possible 
number can be used to generate a unique text. 
This one-to-one correspondence between texts and numbers has an interesting 
consequence. If one believes that numbers in their most abstract form have an 
independent, immaterial existence, then it is not a great stretch to suggest that works of 
literature do as well, and even that their existence precedes their so-called "creation" by 
an author. The set of all natural numbers thus resembles the eponymous subject of 
Borges' short story "The Library of Babel," which contains all possible 410-page books. 
Raymond Queneau's A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems provides a concrete 
realization of a somewhat smaller library: by taking ten sonnets using precisely the 
same rhyme scheme, printing them, and slicing the pages between each line, Queneau 
made it possible to recombine the lines, resulting in, quite literally, a hundred thousand 
billion—possible—sonnets. Does each of these sonnets exist before being constructed 
by a user of the book? Should Queneau hold the copyright on every one? Or just the 
initial ten? Could another writer create a sonnet using only Queneau's book, publish it, 
and hold the copyright? One's answers to these questions may well reveal biases for or 
against mathematical Platonism. 
Queneau's example notwithstanding, the generation of every possible number in 
order to discover every possible text is an uneconomical method of literary production. 
We value authors' ability to search the Library of Babel for particular arrangements of 
words that please us, and such searching depends on material support of many kinds. 
This brings us from Plato to Marx—from the world of immaterial forms to the world of 
18 
material production. If we hold that numbers, and therefore texts, have existence prior 
to their physical creation, then the labor of authorship is no longer the labor of creation, 
but the labor of translation from one world to the next. This labor is inherently physical; 
isn't it strange, then, that it would be protected by property in an immaterial form? 
I do not intend to resolve problems such as these. The line of reasoning outlined 
above admits many qualifications, counter-arguments and defenses, none of which, I 
believe, yields a reliable conclusion, but many of which reduce to differences of opinion 
regarding the degree to which numbers, "forms" or "patterns" exist in the absence of 
material embodiments or representations. This latter assertion is one of the facts I hope 
to demonstrate—both in this chapter, and in my dissertation as a whole. Many of the 
contradictions and confusions apparent in the history of copyright law owe their 
existence to this deep, ancient and unresolved question: what is a form? 
19 
Chapter One: 
Innateness and Experience in the Eighteenth-Century Copyright Debates; or, 
What Is Reading? 
Amid the "pleasant and fertile field[s]" and "blooming spring[s]" that stand as 
metaphors for the bounty of genius in Edward Young's Conjectures on Original 
Composition (1759), there sprouts a puzzling caveat.22 After completing a 36-page 
encomium to the original creations of genius—articulating therein a system of literary 
value that would influence two generations of romantic authors—Young seems to feel 
that he has overstated his case. "A caution is necessary," he explains: 
In the Fairyland of Fancy, Genius may wander wild; there it has a 
creative power, and may reign arbitrarily over its own empire of 
Chimeras. The wide field of Nature also lies open before it, where it may 
range unconfined, make what discoveries it can, and sport with its 
infinite objects uncontrouled, as far as visible nature extends, painting 
them as wantonly as it will: But what Painter of the most unbounded and 
exalted Genius can give us the true portrait of a Seraph? He can give us 
only what by his own, or others eyes, has been seen; though that indeed 
infinitely compounded, raised, burlesqued, dishonoured, or adorned: In 
like manner, who can give us divine truth unrevealed? (38-39) 
~~ Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition, London, 1759. Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online. Gale (CW104998891), 9-10. Later references to this text are noted parenthetically. 
The initial pages of Young's Conjectures had attributed to literary genius an almost 
divine creative power, but here, suddenly, it appears that the creative powers of genius 
are confined to a mere "Fairyland," an "empire of Chimeras." Ex-nihilo creation is 
indeed the power of genius, subject only to the paradoxical restriction that the creations 
of genius cannot exist at all. Should genius attempt to escape the bounds of this 
fairyland of imagination and concern itself with truth—whether natural or divine—it 
must be content to imitate. 
The incongruity of these sentiments has much to do with their source; they were 
first expressed not by Young, but by Samuel Richardson, the commissioner and printer 
of the Conjectures. In a letter to Young prior to the publication of the Conjectures, 
Richardson suggested several additions, including much of the passage quoted above, 
which Young adopted with only a few minor alterations. It is tempting to analyze the 
Conjectures on its own terms, and ask just how original it is, insofar as it includes 
passages copied directly from another writer. However, it would be a mistake to regard 
even Richardson as the source of this passage, which consists largely of commonplaces 
drawn from eighteenth-century empiricism. When Richardson or Young speak of 
imitating Nature—when they claim an author can give us "only what by his own, or 
others eyes, has been seen"—they are repeating an epistemological claim developed by 
John Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). For Locke and his 
followers, such as David Hume, all human knowledge has its origin in sensory 
experience. Even the "empire of Chimeras" in the above passage would be treated by 
empiricists as the product of the recombination of simple ideas (taken from experience) 
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into complex ideas—a mechanical process that hardly resembles the organic, ex-nihilo 
process of creation that Young associates with genius in his Conjectures11, 
The empirical subtext of Richardson's interpolation conflicts with assumptions 
at the very heart of Young's essay, because the Conjectures are concerned with a 
power—genius—that cannot be acquired by experience. As Young puts it, "what, for 
the most part, mean we by Genius, but the Power of accomplishing great things without 
the means generally reputed necessary to that end?" (26). Skill acquired through 
experience and learning alone cannot be evidence of genius—indeed, it is precisely 
when experience and learning are absent that genius is most evident, and thus "to 
neglect of Learning, Genius sometimes owes its greater glory" (29). In short, genius is 
innate. Richardson's caveat therefore undermines Young's argument by suggesting that 
all literary creation must be rooted in experience. 
It is not clear that Richardson (or even Young) fully perceived this conflict 
between the implicit empiricism of Richardson's caveat and Young's innatist 
conception of genius. Richardson's primary motive for qualifying Young's praise of 
genius must have been religious; perhaps he feared that impressionable readers might 
confuse genius with outright prophesy, an understandable concern given Young's 
sometimes inflated rhetoric.24 But through his caveat, Richardson inadvertently drew 
the Conjectures into an epistemological debate between innatism and empiricism that 
had begun (in Great Britain) a century before, while simultaneously applying the terms 
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of that debate to a specifically literary question: what is a literary work? 
This chapter argues that a nearly identical debate unfolded in the courtrooms of 
mid-eighteenth-century Great Britain, and was applied to the very same question. This 
had become a legal question, in addition to a literary one, because its answer was of 
consequence in a series of mid-century lawsuits that, together with the Statute of Anne 
(1710), form the bedrock of modern Anglo-American copyright law. As critics and 
historians have long recognized, Locke's political philosophy played an important role 
in these lawsuits, offering a particular answer to the above question: a literary work, 
argued one side of the debate, is the product of an author's mental labor. What has been 
missed, and what I hope to show, is that Locke's epistemology played an equally 
important role, alongside that of his followers and their interlocutors. In their arguments 
supporting perpetual copyright protection, jurists such as William Blackstone explicitly 
referred to Locke's influential theory of property, most famously articulated in his 
Second Treatise of Government, but they also implicitly relied on the theory of ideas 
that Locke set forth in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and that fellow 
empiricists such as David Hume built upon through the course of the century. 
Locke's theory of ideas was congenial to supporters of perpetual copyright— 
copyright maximalists—because it held that ideas arise exclusively from individual 
experience, challenging previous theories that had instead claimed that certain ideas are 
innate and universal. Nathanael Culverwel, one of a group of philosophers now known 
as the Cambridge Platonists, had argued in 1652 that there exists a "sacred Manuscript... 
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writ by the finger of God himself in the heart of man." Everyone possesses the ideas 
that populate this universal manuscript, and they are therefore poor candidates for 
private appropriation. Locke rejected this view, insisting that all ideas are private 
property from their very inception, at least in one key sense: they arise from the specific 
experiences of private individuals: 
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all 
characters, without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence 
comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man 
has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the 
materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from 
experience. 
In Locke's theory, there is no "sacred Manuscript," no universal codex from which 
ideas arise. All ideas are acquired through experience—or, in the philosophical cant of 
Locke's day as well as our own, ideas are not innate but adventitious. 7 Therefore, to the 
degree that a work of literature is composed of ideas, we can find its radix in the private 
experience of nature. Or, to repeat the pithy phrase from Richardson's caveat, an author 
"can give us only what by his own, or others eyes, has been seen." 
Copyright maximalists such as Blackwell used a Lockean theory of ideas to 
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ground their arguments, and not surprisingly, their opponents tended to adopt a view of 
ideas more akin to Culverwel's. However, closer analysis shows that the alliance 
between copyright maximalism and Lockean empiricism was an uneasy one, as was the 
counteralliance between copyright minimalism and the Platonism of Culverwel, because 
neither side was able to fully explain what it might mean for an idea to be 
communicated. This chapter analyzes the complex interplay between these 
philosophical theories and the pragmatic legal arguments made by copyright 
maximalists and minimalists, arguing that the difficulties that confronted figures on 
both sides of the copyright debate ultimately arose from two fundamental questions: 
What is an idea? And what does it mean to communicate an idea? 
To consider how copyright maximalists and their opponents answered the first 
question, I first take up the philosophical discourse around ideas in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Britain, examining the views of the Cambridge Platonists and 
Locke's refutation. In the process, I show how Locke challenged the dogma that ideas 
are universally communicable, vitiating an important argument against perpetual 
copyright. I then analyze Edward Young's Conjectures to show how he attacks the very 
same argument, though in a very different way from Locke. In section two, I show the 
roles that Locke's and Young's positions played in Tonson v. Collins, the case in which 
"the basic shape of the literary-property debate was realized," limning the multiply 
divergent ways that jurists conjoined platonist and empiricist views of literary ideas, 
and arguing that copyright maximalists linked literary property to the 
28




Experience and its Contrary 
In 1739, David Hume wrote that "the principle of innate ideas... is now almost 
universally rejected in the learned world." ° As support for this sweeping claim, he 
offers one terse footnote: "See Mr. Locke; chapter of power." That Hume felt he need 
only invoke Locke's name with a vague citation31 to prove his point suggests a 
widespread knowledge of Locke's argument among Hume's readers. However, this 
widespread knowledge did not, in fact, result in near-universal assent. The doctrine of 
innate ideas was commonplace prior to Locke's rejection of it, and remained influential 
afterwards, especially among religious thinkers, who often used variations on the 
doctrine to defend the universality of moral judgments.32 
The immediate historical precedent for this association between the doctrine of 
innate ideas and British religious thought can be found in the mid-seventeenth century, 
when a loose group of Cambridge-educated divines took up various forms of the 
doctrine as part of their turn away from Aristotelian scholasticism. Though they drew 
from a wide range of philosophical strains, including new developments in the 
Readers familiar with current copyright law may find my emphasis on ideas misplaced given the 
importance of the dichotomy between idea and expression, especially in U S law. This objection does not 
directly affect my historical argument because the distinction between idea and expression was not fully 
articulated until the nineteenth century However, as 1 turn my discussion towards current copyright law, 1 
will address this objection by considering the ways information technology is increasingly rendering the 
difference between texts and large numbers both philosophically and legally insignificant, to defend the 
view that expressions are not ideas, then, one must take the position that large numbers are not ideas, a 
position difficult to square with any legally coherent definition of the term "idea " 
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emerging sciences, they all partook of some variety of Neoplatonism, and among 
historians of philosophy, they are collectively known as the Cambridge Platonists. 
Among the Cambridge Platonists were Benjamin Whichcote (1609-1683), Henry More 
(1617-87), Ralph Cudworth (1617-88), John Smith (1618-52) and Nathaniel Culverwell 
(1619-51), each of whom formulated some version of innatism in support of a rational 
theology. As John Smith put it in 1659, "there are some radical principles of 
knowledge... sunk into the souls of men,"34 principles that can only be fully perceived 
and understood by those who ''shut the eyes of sense, and open that brighter eye of our 
understandings, that other eye of the soul."35 For Smith, as for many of the other 
Cambridge Platonists. the inward sight of reason facilitated the individual pursuit of 
divine truth, which one might carry out independently of any worldly authority. 
Though their primary motivation was theological, several of the Cambridge 
Platonists constructed sophisticated epistemological frameworks to support their 
arguments. Henry More, in An Antidote Against Atheism (1653), laid out a theory of 
innate knowledge that drew liberally from Plato. "There is an active and actuall 
Knowledge in a man," More wrote, "of which... outward objects are rather the 
reminders then [sic] the first begetters or implanters."36 To elucidate this claim, he 
offers the following evocative metaphor: 
Suppose a skillful Musician fallen asleep in the field upon the grasse, 
" Sarah Hutton, "Lord Herbert of Cherbury and the Cambridge Platonists," Ronteclge Histoid of 
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during which time he shall not so much as dream any thing concerning 
his musicall faculty, so that in one sense there is no actuall skill or 
Notion nor representation of any thing musical in him, but his friend 
sitting by him that cannot sing at all himself, jogs him and awakes him, 
and desires him to sing this or the other song, telling him two or three 
words of the beginning of the song, he presently takes it out of his 
mouth, and sings the whole song upon so slight and slender intimation: 
So the Mind of man being jogg'd and awakened by the impulses of 
outward objects is stirred up into a more full and cleare conception of 
what was but imperfectly hinted to her from externall occasions; and this 
faculty I venture to call actuall Knowledge in such a sense as the 
sleeping Musicians skill might be called actuall Skill when he thought 
nothing of it.37 
More plays on two meanings of "actual" here: the first is roughly synonymous with 
"real" or "enacted" as opposed to "possible" or "potential," while the other is roughly 
synonymous with "active," describing things that arise from action—as in the 
theological distinction between original sin and actual sin, the latter being the product of 
individual action. In the sense of "actual" that is opposed to "potential." the sleeping 
musician does not have actual knowledge, only potential knowledge; but his knowledge 
is actual in that it is the product of mental activity, which occurs when the mind is 
"jogg'd and awakened" or "stirred up" by "outward objects." These outward objects do 
37 Ibid, 20-12. 
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not generate knowledge; they only activate it. To support this claim, More goes on to 
consider geometric figures such as circles and triangles, asking how it can be that we 
have knowledge of these figures if they do not exist in their perfect form anywhere in 
nature. The only possible answer, he concludes, is that our knowledge of these forms is 
innate, and precedes any experience of nature: "There are a multitude of Relative 
Notions or Ideas in the minde of Man, as well Mathematical as Logicall, which if we 
prove cannot be the impresses of any materiall object from without, it will necessarily 
follow that they are from the Soul her self, within, and are the naturall furniture of 
human understanding." More's description of outward objects as the "reminders" of 
pre-existing knowledge, his metaphorical account of sleeping knowledge "jogg'd and 
awakened," and his use of geometric figures as examples of this innate knowledge, each 
vividly recall arguments and metaphors found in Plato's dialogues and writings—most 
notably in the Meno, in which Socrates attempts to demonstrate that "all learning is but 
recollection" by walking an untutored boy through a geometric proof By the end of his 
demonstration, the youth understands the proof and agrees that it is valid, though 
Socrates has done nothing but ask him questions. Therefore, Socrates insists, "there 
have been always true thoughts" in the boy's mind, which "only need to be awakened 
into knowledge." 
The metaphor of "sleeping" knowledge is especially important because it 
suggests that both More and Plato3 are offering what historians of philosophy such as 
™ Ibid, 22. 
'
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John Yolton have called a dispositional account of innateness, in which innate ideas are 
not immediately present to the mind, but are rather part of the mind's implicit structure, 
ready to be called forth by a particular set of circumstances, or through some active 
intellectual process. In More's own words, "I doe not mean that there is a certain 
number of Ideas flaring and shining to the Animadversive faculty like so many Torches 
or Starves in the Firmament to our outward sight, or that there are any figures that take 
their distinct places, & are legibly writ there like the Red letters or Astronomical 
Characters in an Almanack'; rather, there is "an active sagacity in the Soul, or quick 
recollection as it were, whereby some small business being hinted unto her, she runs out 
presently into a more clear and larger conception.' Philosophers have continued to 
find dispositional accounts of innateness persuasive from time to time, although the 
alternative form of innatism that More caricatures here - today called occurrent 
innatism - has more the quality of a straw man. 
In his day, More was perhaps the most widely-known of the Cambridge 
Platonists, but for evidence of their abiding influence in the eighteenth century, I turn to 
the work of Ralph Cudworth. Only one of Cudworth's major treatises was published 
during his lifetime, and his reputation was partially secured by posthumous works such 
as his Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, which was published in 
(April 2006), 137-155. Among the many difficult questions to consider is the following: does the 
category of "dispositional innatism" include those theories of innatism that hold that ideas that are not 
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1731. The editor of the Treatise, Edward Chandler, wrote a preface positioning it as an 
important contribution to contemporary debates about ethical reasoning and moral 
certainty,42 and like the work of other Cambridge Platonists, the Treatise supported its 
claims with an innatist epistemological framework. Cudworth also had a more intimate 
connection to eighteenth-century philosophy through his daughter Damaris, who was a 
philosopher in her own right as well as a close friend and correspondent of Locke's; 
during the years before the publication of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
she and Locke discussed Smith's Select Discourses and other works by Cambridge 
Platonists.43 
Cudworth's writings remained influential throughout the eighteenth and into the 
nineteenth century. In addition to the publication of the Treatise, Cudworth's True 
Intellectual System of the Universe was reprinted twice in the eighteenth century, and 
both works were translated into Latin for publication in Germany (1733, 1773) and 
disseminated throughout Europe. They were also reissued in Britain in 1845, just a few 
years after another of Cudworth's manuscripts was first published as A Treatise of 
Freewill (1838). This abiding interest in Cudworth's works suggests that 
epistemological innatism formed a significant and persistent undercurrent in the 
intellectual world of eighteenth-century Britain. 
The innatism of Cudworth's Treatise is precisely stated; he largely discards the 
metaphorical language of Culverwel, Smith and More, opting instead for a somewhat 
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technical vocabulary. The soul possesses, as Cudworth repeats insistently, "an innate 
cognoscitive [i.e. cognitive] power... a power of raising intelligible ideas and 
conceptions of things from within itself.' Cudworth is careful to avoid using the term 
"innate" to refer to ideas themselves; rather, the mind actively generates certain ideas 
through an innate power, which it can exercise without the aid of external stimuli. 
Cudworth's formulation thus avoids certain ambiguities that attend More's metaphor of 
the sleeping musician, in which innate ideas must be "jogg'd and awakened by the 
impulses of outward objects," and in which, though they must be awakened, innate 
ideas are nonetheless all but fully formed beforehand, having been learned at some 
point in the past. Cudworth's account is therefore both more fully innatist, in that 
external stimuli are not a prerequisite for the formation of innate ideas, and more fully 
dispositional, in that innate ideas do not exist at all in the mind before the exercise of 
the innate power that enables their formation. D 
The works of the Cambridge Platonists provide much of the local historical 
context for Tocke's epistemological intervention. His Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding comprised four books, the first of which was entirely devoted to a 
closely argued refutation of the doctrine of innate ideas, which he summarizes as the 
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"Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain innate 
Principles; some primary Notions, KOIVOU ewoiai [Koinai ennoiai], Characters, as it 
were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being" 
(48). Locke's language here calls to mind both Nathaniel Culverwel's "sacred 
Manuscript... writ by the finger of God himself in the heart of man" 7 as well as those 
characters "legibly writ" in the mind that More disavows. In other words, Locke is 
describing an occurrent version of innatism, and it is against that form of innatism that 
his arguments are most successful. 
According to Locke, the fundamental argument in support of innatism is the 
argument "from Universal Consent"—the argument that "there are certain Principles... 
universally agreed upon by all Mankind" and that this universal agreement proves that 
these principles "must needs be the constant Impressions, which the Souls of Men 
receive in their first Beings" (49). Locke's attack on this argument is twofold. First, he 
argues that the phenomenon of universal consent could only support innatism if 
innatists could show that no other explanation of universal consent is possible. 
Second, in a rhetorically splendid inversion of his opponents' argument, he insists that 
the argument from universal consent actually defeats innatism, because no example of 
universal consent exists, as innatism appears to require. In other words, if some 
principles are truly innate, then all people would necessarily agree with them; but not all 
people do, as Locke attempts to demonstrate with a copious array of counterexamples. 
47Culverwel, 34. 
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For instance, at the beginning of his discussion, Locke observes that certain 
"speculative principles" (i.e. logical assertions) are not agreed with or even 
comprehended by ""Children, and Ideots" (49). Later, Locke considers a set of "practical 
principles" (i.e. moral precepts) that, as he argues, some societies reject wholesale. 
By offering numerous precepts that seem as though they should be universally 
accepted, but are not, Locke builds a persuasive case against occurrent innatism. 
However, his arguments against dispositional innatism are more ambiguous, amounting 
more to a shift of attention from the universal to the individual—a shift that would later 
prove useful to copyright maximalists. Locke introduces his discussion of dispositional 
innatism by asserting that "to imprint any thing on the Mind without the Mind's 
perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible... To say a Notion is imprinted on the 
Mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took 
notice of it, is to make this Impression nothing" (49-50). The only way to avoid this 
contradiction, Locke claims, is to assert that "all Propositions that are true, and the 
Mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the Mind... So the Mind is of 
all Truths it ever shall know." But that is a deceptive use of language, or, in Locke's 
terms, "a very improper way of speaking," because it simply restates Locke's own 
argument in different terms. This manner of speaking, Locke argues, 
whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from 
those, who deny innate Principles... If Truths can be imprinted on the 
Understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can 
50
 For a nuanced discussion of this line of argument, see Daniel Carey, "Hutcheson's Moral Sense and the 
Problem of Innateness," Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.1 (2000), 103-110. 
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be, between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing in respect of 
their Original: They must all be innate, or all adventitious: In vain shall a 
Man go about to distinguish them. (50) 
For Locke, the difference between any coherent dispositional innatism and Locke's own 
empiricism appears to reduce to a mere difference of terminology.51 
This line of reasoning forms the backbone of a number of Locke's arguments 
against specific versions of dispositional innatism; in each case, Locke argues that to be 
coherent, innatism must erase important distinctions in a self-defeating way. It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all of them in turn, but I will consider two 
brief examples to show the ambiguity implicit in Locke's argument. The most 
characteristic of the arguments for innateness that Locke attacks is the position that 
some principles are innate because "by the Use of Reason men may discover these 
Principles" (51)—an acceptable, if simplistic, approximation of the various forms of 
rationalism adopted by the Cambridge Platonists. Locke objects that if we hold that 
"whatever Truths Reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, 
those are all naturally imprinted on the Mind," then we can admit "no difference 
between the Maxims [i.e. axioms] of the Mathematicians, and Theorems they deduce 
from them: All must be equally allow'd innate" (51). In other words, the view that 
ascribes innateness to any idea or precept discoverable by reason quashes an important 
distinction between given and derived knowledge. Another of Locke's arguments 
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considers the position that some precepts are innate because "they are generally 
assented to, as soon as proposed, and the Terms they are propose'd in, understood" 
(56); but because this is true of statements such as "Yellowness is not Sweetness" (57), 
Locke argues that this requires us "to suppose all our Ideas of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, 
Figures, etc. innate" (58), a position Locke views as manifestly absurd, since such ideas 
are paradigmatic examples of adventitious ideas for Locke. 
The problem for both of these arguments is that many of Locke's opponents are 
happy to adopt the positions that he ascribes to them. In answer to Locke's objection 
that rationalist innatism renders axioms and theorems equally innate, one could point 
out that Socrates takes that very position in Plato's Meno; he intends his conversation 
with the boy to demonstrate the innateness of a theorem of geometry. The Cambridge 
Platonists followed Plato's lead in this respect, as did other seventeenth-century 
philosophers: as Samuel Rickless observes, "all of Locke's dispositionalist opponents 
(including most notably Descartes) took for granted (and not unreasonably) that the 
innateness of mathematical axioms entails the innateness of mathematical theorems."s2 
Similarly, the position that ideas of color, sound, taste, and the like are innate, which 
Locke considers untenable, is just the position that Ralph Cudworth takes in his 
Treatise: 
the soul having an innate cognoscitive power universally... it must needs 
be granted that it hath a potential omniformity in it... The mind being a 
kind of notional or representative world, as it were a diaphanous and 
-Rickless, 44. 
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crystalline sphere, in which the ideas and images of all things existing in 
the real universe may be reflected or represented." 
These orrmiform minds "have not the actual ideas of all things... yet they have them all 
virtually and potentially comprehended in that one cognoscitive power" (77). The 
innateness of this representational "omniformity" immediately entails that the content of 
sense impressions must also be considered innate, for otherwise, experience would be 
required to achieve this omniformity, and it would no longer be innate at all.53 This 
passage from Cudworth also serves as an answer to Locke's primary objection that if 
we consider dispositional innatism to be a coherent position, then ideas must "all be 
innate, or all adventitious." According to both Locke and Cudworth, dispositional 
innatism is precisely the view that (in Locke's words) "the Mind is of all Truths it ever 
shall know" (50). Such omniformity is for Cudworth the very essence of mind. Worse 
for Locke, we could imagine Cudworth responding that in Locke's theory, all ideas are 
adventitious, and therefore his theory falls prey to the very same critique that he levels 
against dispositional innatism. Like Cudworth's, Locke's account of ideas eliminates 
the distinction between innate and adventitious ideas entirely by claiming that there is 
only one kind of idea. 
These structural parallels between Cudworth's position and Locke's lend some 
^ As Cudworth loquaciously puts it, the mind contains a "potential omniformity whereby it is enabled as 
occasion serves and outward objects invite, gradually and successively to unfold and display itself in a 
vital manner, by framing intelligible ideas or conceptions within itself of whatsoever hath any entity or 
cogitabihty " In other words, anything that exists or is possible—"whatsoever hath any entity or 
cogitabihty*'—can be represented by the mind Cudworth sees a kinship between this potential 
omniformity and the biological mechanisms of reproduction, which actualize structures that are latent 
within all living things "As the spermatic oi plastic power doth virtually contain within itself, the forms 
of all the several organical parts of animals, and displays them gradually and successively, framing an eye 
here and an ear there " (77) 
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credence to the notion that their positions are indeed opposite but equal, and that the 
difference between them is simply one of terminology. And yet that difference makes a 
difference for Locke: as he puts it, dispositional innatists have adopted "a very improper 
way of speaking," one that introduces discord where there is none. This is a perplexing 
claim given that Locke is, philosophically speaking, the newcomer on the scene—surely 
he is the one introducing discord. Locke appears to fault his opponents for a difference 
in terminology that he himself introduced. I argue that Locke took this somewhat 
strained rhetorical stance because he wished to place greater emphasis on the active role 
of individual minds in the formation of ideas. Cudworth and other Cambridge Platonists 
often spoke of the active nature of mind; but as religious thinkers hoping to establish a 
stable foundation for theology in a time of often violent religious strife, they were far 
more concerned with demonstrating what they saw as the universal aspects of ideation 
and cognition. Locke sought to change the focus of epistemological inquiry by 
underscoring the importance of what one might call the private mental labor of 
individuals—a concept that would come to be vital for copyright maximalists.54 
Two passages in the first book of the Essay clearly show Locke's concern with 
mental labor. He initially raises the issue in the midst of an argument against the view 
that ideas discoverable by reason are innate. Holders of this view, he claims, 
Will not be forward to affirm. That the Knowledge of the Maxim, That it 
is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, is a deduction of our 
Reason. For this would be to destroy that Bounty of Nature, they seem so 
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fond of, whilst they make the Knowledge of those Principles to depend 
on the labour of our Thoughts. For all Reasoning is search, and casting 
about, and requires Pains and Application. And how can it with any 
tolerable sense be suppos'd, that what was imprinted by Nature, as the 
Foundation and Guide of our Reason, should need the Use of Reason to 
discover it? (52) 
In an argument that calls to mind discussions of private property in his Second Treatise 
of Government, Locke draws a sharp contrast between ideas acquired by individual 
pains and labor, and ideas acquired through the bounty of nature—a kind of cognitive 
commons. The claim that ideas developed through reason are merely part of this natural 
bounty ignores the essential contribution of individual labor to their development. In a 
discussion of mathematical reason a few pages later, Locke implicitly raises the same 
issue. For the innatist, he argues, 
all Mathematical Demonstrations as well as first Principles, must be 
received as native Impressions on the Mind: which, I fear they will 
scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a Proposition, 
than assent to it, when demonstrated. And few Mathematicians will be 
forward to believe. That all the Diagrams which they have drawn, were 
but Copies of those innate Characters, which Nature had ingraven upon 
their Minds (60). 
Locke does not explicitly refer to pains or labor in this passage, but he foregrounds the 
difficulty of generating mathematical proofs and contrasts that difficulty with the ease 
of understanding a given proof. This contrast between ease and difficulty runs parallel 
to the above contrast between ideas produced by labor and ideas given by nature, and 
Locke's line of reasoning in both cases is roughly the same: the doctrine of innate ideas 
obscures the fact that individual mental labor is necessary for the formation of ideas. 
Although Locke does not directly explain why mathematicians would be unwilling to 
believe that their diagrams are simply copies of "innate Characters," the implication is 
clear enough: such claims diminish the value of mathematicians' work, since they 
suggest that generating proofs involves no more labor than understanding them. 
The above passages show Locke associating the doctrine of innate ideas with a 
kind of intellectual laziness, a slothful conviction that some ideas require no work to 
develop, and no effort to defend. Locke maintains this association throughout the 
remainder of the essay, although it never again takes so central a role in his argument. 
Instead, Locke embeds it in a series of rhetorical flourishes, through which he 
repeatedly implies that his opponents shirk the intellectual labor that Locke and his 
sympathetic readers virtuously undertake. This rhetorical strategy is visible from the 
first paragraph of the essay: "The Understanding," Locke suggests, "like the Eye, 
whilest it makes us see, and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of it self: And it 
requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own Object" (43). A few 
pages later Locke directly accuses his opponents of laziness, stating that they "take not 
the pains to examine even what they themselves say" (51); twice afterwards, he 
reemphasizes the virtuous diligence of those who "take the Pains" (52, 58) to carefully 
observe and reflect upon mental processes. These rhetorical touches culminate in the 
40 
claim, at the end of Book One, that the doctrine of innate ideas arose precisely because 
"it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopp'd the enquiry of the doubtful, 
concerning all that was once stiled innate" (101). Related assertions appear throughout 
the following three books of the essay.55 
Truth is not the only casualty of such laziness. Locke insists at the end of Book 
One that "we may as rationally hope to see with other Mens Eyes, as to know by other 
Mens Understandings. So much as we our selves consider and comprehend Truth and 
Reason, so much we possess of real and true Knowledge" (101). But the effect of the 
doctrine of innate ideas and principles upon its followers is "to take them off from the 
use of their own Reason and Judgment, and put them upon believing and taking them 
[i e. purportedly innate principles] upon trust, without farther examination: In which 
posture of blind Credulity, they might be more easily governed" (102). In addition to 
being false, then, the doctrine of innate ideas has pernicious political effects, enabling 
those with "the Authority to be the Dictator of Principles, and Teacher of 
unquestionable Truths... to make a Man swallow that for an innate Principle, which may 
serve to his purpose, who teacheth them" (102).^ Here, Locke recognizes a direct 
connection between structures of power and structures of knowledge, and suggests that 
his epistemological framework protects against abuses by privileging, over all other 
sources of knowledge, the private mental labor of individuals. 
"Any one may easily observe this in his own Thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them'' 
(147), see also 181,291,596,650 
1,6
 What Locke does not mention is that his rhetorical references to the "pains' of reflection achieve a 
similar result Anyone who does take the necessary pains will inevitably peiceive the phenomena of 
which he speaks, and therefore anyone who does not perceive them must not be putting in enough 
reflective effort Locke's position is more compatible with the Protestant ethic than the innatist position, 
but it does not entirely equalize the asymmetric power relation between Locke and his readers 
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The following books of Locke's essay offer an exceptionally detailed account of 
how ideas arise in the minds of individuals. Locke offers what has been described as a 
"corpuscular" or atomic theory of ideas, in which simple ideas, which are the direct and 
indivisible products of experience, combine to form complex ideas - compounds 
formed of simpler elements - which Locke further taxonomizes. Locke also subdivides 
experience into two "Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we have, or 
can naturally have, do spring" (104), which he names "sensation" and "reflection." 
Sensation denotes experience of the physical world through the senses, while reflection 
denotes what might be called inward experience - the perception of one's own mental 
processes. 
The claim that all ideas arise from either sensation or reflection has an important 
ramification for any discussion of copyright: ideas are strictly private. This immediately 
follows from the fact that one can only directly access one's own sensory experiences, 
and one can only reflect on one's own mental processes (since the experience of others' 
mental processes can only be had through sense perception). That ideas are private leads 
Locke to some unusual conclusions about language, conclusions that Locke hints at 
early in his discussion of ideas, saying "if it should happen that any two thinking men 
should really have different ideas, I do not see how they could discourse or argue one 
with another" (180). According to Locke, no ideas are communicated by language at 
all; he elucidates this position at length later in the Essay. 
Where does this leave the notion of communication? The concept of innate ideas 
provided the Cambridge Platonists with a ready-made theory of communication, a 
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theory that seemed so straightforward and obvious that they hardly needed to articulate 
it at all.57 Innate ideas expedite the construction of linguistic infrastructures, giving 
speaker and writer, listener and reader access to the same cognitive scaffolding. To 
understand the meaning of a text, readers need only seek within themselves the ideas 
under discussion; the ideas remain the same, no matter whose mind they appear in. But 
perhaps this theory of communication is too strong: if everyone already has access to 
exactly the same ideas, then why is communication necessary at all? Keeping in mind 
Locke's emphasis on the labor required to produce ideas, one might argue that 
communication is necessary precisely because some ideas are not really innate. 
If the Platonists' theory of communication was too strong, perhaps Locke's was 
too weak. His rejection of the universality and innateness of ideas suggested that 
communication is not as straightforward a process as his precursors had assumed, and at 
times in the Essay, he even doubts the possibility of communication. He does eventually 
offer an account of communication based on universal ideas, but these ideas are 
universal not in a necessary, but only in a practical, sense: their universality is 
predicated on the assumed uniformity of human experience and human physiology. 
Should parties to a conversation have different ideas, whether because they have 
radically different experience, or radically different physiology, that universality fails, 
and with it fails any attempt at meaningful communication. 
These were central issues for eighteenth-century copyright law because cases 
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such as Tonson v. Collins and Millar v. Taylor turned on the question of what a book 
communicates from author to reader—and what a book does not communicate. The 
term "communicate" comes from the Latin communicare, to make common; to succeed 
in court, then, copyright maximalists had to argue for a failure of communication, a 
sense in which the publication of ideas does not make them common. Locke's account 
of ideas appears more congenial to copyright maximalism than the Cambridge 
Platonists' account insofar as it theorizes the possibility of communicative failure; and 
for that reason, I will argue later in this chapter, copyright maximalists took the 
Lockean view. However, I first want to underscore that turning to Locke was not the 
only option copyright maximalists had. It was also possible to imagine a version of 
innatism that entails a similar communicative failure: the innatism that Edward Young 
espoused in his Conjectures. 
The Innateness of Genius 
Young's Conjectures on Original Composition has often been regarded as a 
seminal text in the history of authorship. Through his articulations of the notions of 
originality and genius, Young influenced the course of romanticisms in both Great 
Britain and Germany, and in doing so, he strengthened the case for authorial copyright. 
As Martha Woodmansee has argued, ideas popularized by Young's essay (which was 
translated into German the year of its publication) bolstered a growing demand for 
copyright legislation among German authors of the romantic era. Likewise, Mark 
58
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Rose finds Young's thoughts congenial to the ascent of proprietary authorship in Great 
Britain, insofar as they anticipate "the organic analogy of the romantics."59 Crucially, 
both Rose and Woodmansee associate Young with copyright law by reading the 
Conjectures as a proto-romantic text, and hence both their arguments must re-
contextualize Young's essay geographically or temporally. When one reads the 
Conjectures in the immediate context of its publication, however, a very different 
picture of Young's relation to copyright emerges. Forty years before Wordsworth took 
up the "organic analogy" at the heart of Young's essay, the Conjectures read not as a 
proto-romantic text, but as a post-platonic text—a modulated continuation of ideas that 
Cudworth and other Cambridge Platonists had developed and defended a century 
before. In short, Young was an innatist. 
The linchpin of Young's innatist argument in the Conjectures is an analogy 
between the concept of genius and the concept of conscience, a term that literally 
denotes inward knowledge, and that in the early-to-mid eighteenth century was at the 
center of a dispute over the innateness of the faculty of moral judgment.60 As late as 
1744, Jonathan Swift had insisted that conscience "properly signifies the Knowledge 
which a Man hath within himself of his own Thoughts and Actions" and that such 
knowledge is useless for the purposes of moral judgment unless supplemented by the 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 1983-84, 430. See also M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1953). 
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study of scripture.61 Swift's quasi-empirical stance here allies him with Locke and puts 
him at odds with followers of the Cambridge Platonists such as Joseph Butler and 
Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, both of whom viewed conscience 
as an innate faculty of moral judgment. By the time Young wrote his Conjectures, the 
term had become more firmly associated with Shaftesbury and Butlers' anti-empirical 
view of conscience, and Young uses the term accordingly: "With regard to the Moral 
world, Conscience, with regard to the Intellectual, Genius, is that God within. Genius 
can set us right in Composition, without the Rules of the Learned; as Conscience sets us 
right in Life, without the Laws of the Land" (30-31). Conscience is "that God within," 
fully present in individuals before they learn institutional rules, and at times perhaps 
even opposed to those institutional rules. By characterizing conscience as a faculty that 
guides us "without the Laws of the Land," Young echoes Shaftesbury's critique of the 
claim, made famous by Thomas Hobbes, that the state is the only guarantor of 
individuals' moral behavior. Conscience, for both Young and Shaftesbury, precedes and 
underwrites institutions of law; and likewise, Young insists, genius precedes institutions 
of learning. 
Young's conception of genius also resembles Shaftesbury's conception of 
conscience in that both are threatened by other kinds of acquired knowledge. For some 
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forms of "infantile genius," Young says, learning must be 
Nurse, and Tutor; but this Nurse may overlay with an indigested Load, 
which smothers common sense; and this Tutor may mislead, with 
pedantic Prejudice, which vitiates the best understanding: As too great 
admirers of the Fathers of the Church have sometimes set up their 
Authority against the true Sense of Scripture; so too great admirers of the 
Classical Fathers have sometimes set up their Authority, or Example, 
against Reason. (32) 
Through the organic metaphor of a nursing child, Young argues that the impositions of 
learning and authority may turn the development of genius awry, just as the authority of 
institutions can derail moral, religious and rational judgment. These institutions, born of 
imitation, go against nature: 
by a spirit of Imitation we counteract Nature, and thwart her design. She 
brings us into the world all Originals: No two faces, no two minds, are 
just alike; but all bear Nature's evident mark of Separation on them. Born 
Originals, how comes it to be that we die Copies? That meddling Ape 
Imitation, as soon as we come to years of Indiscretion (so let me speak), 
snatches the Pen, and blots out nature's mark of Separation, cancels her 
kind intention, destroys all mental Individuality. (42) 
Maintaining his extended analogy between conscience and genius, Young puns on the 
term discretion, which may refer either to judgment about right behavior or to the act of 
distinguishing or discerning, as between writers. And here again, Young's argument 
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calls to mind arguments by Shaftesbury, such as his assertion that "false Imagination of 
Right and Wrong... can proceed only from the force of custom and Education in 
opposition to Nature," as when by "Custom or politick Institution, certain Actions 
naturally foul & odious are repeatedly view'd with Applause." Following the lead of 
Shaftesbury and his Platonist precursors, Young associates the innate knowledge 
granted by conscience and genius with the bounty of nature, which is threatened by 
artificial institutions such as church and state. 
In addition to being innatist, Young's conception of genius is dispositionalist. A 
writer "may possess dormant, unsuspected abilities," a fact which "is evident from the 
sudden eruption of some men, out of perfect obscurity, into public admiration, on the 
strong impulse of some animating occasion; not more to the world's great surprize, than 
their own." (50). Genius hides its gifts, in the manner of More's sleeping musician, "till 
awakened by loud calls, or stung up by striking emergencies" (50). Until then, a writer 
may remain "scarce less ignorant of his own powers, than an Oyster of its pearl, or a 
Rock of its diamond" (49-50). Like his philosophical precursors, Young preempts any 
argument that genius must not be innate because it is not apparent from birth. Genius 
need not be visible to be present. 
Just a few pages later, however, the difference between Young's innatism and 
the innatism of Shaftesbury and the Cambridge Platonists becomes more apparent. The 
Cambridge Platonists had held that innate ideas were not only innate, but also universal; 
similarly, Shaftesbury insisted that "Sense of Right and Wrong" is a "first Principle in 
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our Constitution & Make" (44), and argued that the universality of conscience 
facilitates a natural process of community formation. But crucially for Young, genius 
does not unite individuals into a community; genius creates distinctions between 
individuals. Moreover, genius is not universal: "Let thy Genius rise," he commands— 
"(if a Genius thou hast)" (53). Not all writers have genius, and for that reason a 
significant portion of Young's essay is dedicated to the problem of discovering whether 
one has genius or not. Combined with Young's dispositionalism, the belief that not all 
writers have genius generates a kind of belletristic Calvinism; genius may emerge 
without prior indication, leaving the would-be writer of genius to constantly seek signs 
of his or her place among the literary elect. "Know Thyself... Dive deep into thy bosom" 
exhorts Young, and "learn the depth, extent, bias, and full fort of thy Mind" (53); and if 
genius is to be found there, "Thyself so reverence as to prefer the native growth of thy 
own mind to the richest import from abroad" (54). But this holds only if one does 
indeed have genius: "as nothing is more easy than to write originally wrong; Originals 
are not here recommended, but under the strong guard of my first rule—Know thyself 
(61). Without the support of genius, originality is a handicap, a literary vice. 
It is in the context of this stark divide between literary haves and have nots that 
Young links genius most visibly to property. The writer of genius who reverences 
himself. Young asserts, 
will soon find the world's reverence to follow his own. His works will 
stand distinguished; his the sole Property of them; which Property alone 
can confer the noble title of an Author: that is, of one who (to speak 
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accurately) thinks, and composes; while other invaders of the Press, how 
voluminous, and learned soever, (with due respect be it spoken) only 
read, and write. (54) 
This passage marks a critical shift from the universalist innatism of the Cambridge 
Platonists to an exclusionary innatism—a novel version of Platonism that is uniquely 
suited to form the basis of a property claim. One of the hallmarks of property, as Joseph 
Yates would insist a decade later in the milestone copyright case Millar v. Taylor 
(1769), is that it grants "sole and exclusive Enjoyment" (73) of an object. But if ideas 
are both innate and universally held—even if only potentially—then such exclusive 
enjoyment is contrary to their very nature. Young's theory of genius bypasses this 
problem, articulating a proprietary Platonism in which certain ideas are indeed 
exclusively possessed. Certainly anyone can imitate a work of genius, but such imitation 
amounts to nothing more than a loan; "Learning is borrowed knowledge," while by 
contrast, "Genius is knowledge innate, and quite our own" (36). This incommensurable 
gap between imitation and creation means that the "noble title of an Author" is non-
transferable, a fact that Young reiterates through another organic metaphor: "An 
Original author is born of himself, is his own progenitor, and will probably propagate a 
numerous offspring of Imitators, to eternize his glory; while mule-like Imitators, die 
without Issue" (68). Imitators are the sterile products of an illegitimate union, and when 
they pass away, any ideas of their own die with them. 
Young's proprietary Platonism stands in stark opposition to many of Locke's 
ideas. For example, Locke's critique of innatism as a product and propagator of 
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intellectual laziness applies to Young's arguments about genius just as well as it does to 
any of the Cambridge Platonists' arguments about "actuall Knowledge" or "innate 
cognoscitive power." But despite their differences, Young and Locke agree that at least 
some kinds of ideas are exclusively held by the mind that creates them, and are strictly 
non-transferable—or, one might say, incommunicable. To be sure, ideas are 
incommunicable in their accounts for very different reasons; but both of their accounts 
hold out the possibility that authors retain something when they communicate a work. 
That possibility of retention formed the basis of the property claim that William 
Blackstone and his allies made in mid-century copyright cases. 
Property and Incommunicability 
In April and May of 1759, banker and bookseller Benjamin Collins printed, 
published and sold copies of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele's The Spectator. 
Collins was not the copyright holder; the elder Jacob Tonson had purchased copyright 
in the work forty-seven years previously, in 1712. But since the only applicable 
copyright statute, the Statute of Anne (1710), protected works for a maximum of 
twenty-eight years, Collins could not be prosecuted under it; as far as the Statute was 
concerned, the work had effectively entered the public domain. Nonetheless, the 
younger Jacob and his brother Richard, inheritors of the elder Tonson's estate, brought a 
suit against Benjamin Collins, claiming that Collins had invaded his literary property. 
The Tonsons" counsel argued that they retained copyright in The Spectator despite the 
limited term of the Statute: copyright, far from being the temporary consequence of a 
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statutory monopoly, was literary property in the fullest sense.64 Like any other property, 
they argued, it was protected in perpetuity by the common law, independent of any 
statute, and was recognized not only by ancient usage, but also by reason and natural 
right.65 
The plaintiffs' counsel in Tonson v. Collins were not the first to make such an 
argument, nor did the case set any lasting precedent; the Court of King's Bench refused 
to consider the case further after finding that the plaintiffs and defendant were colluding 
in an effort to set a precedent favorable to themselves and their fellow booksellers in the 
London trade.66 Nonetheless, it was a case of historical significance because it featured 
two figures who would later participate in the precedent-setting cases Millar v. Taylor 
(1769) and Donaldson v. Beckett (1774). The first, William Blackstone, who would 
soon publish his influential Commentaries on the Laws of England (\165), was again 
counsel for a London bookseller in Millar v. Taylor, and would defend literary property 
before the House of Lords as one of twelve advisory judges in Donaldson v. Beckett. 
The second, Joseph Yates, would take a place on the Court of King's Bench and write 
the dissenting opinion in Millar v. Taylor, setting forth a critique of literary property 
that remains salient after more than two hundred years. 
The case was heard twice, in 1761 and 1762, before the Court of King's Bench, 
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with Lord Mansfield presiding as Chief Justice. Alexander Wedderburn argued on 
behalf of the plaintiffs for the first hearing, and attempted to restrict the property claim 
of authors to the profits of publication. This was, he claimed, an incorporeal property 
right, but only in the sense that, for example, the right of way across a tract of land is 
incorporeal; such incorporeal rights in corporeal entities were by this time fairly well-
established in the common law. 7 "When I speak of the Right of Property," declared 
Wedderburn, "I mean in the Profits of his Book; not in the Sentiments, Stile, &C."68 
Wedderburn was clearly hoping to sidestep the argument that "sentiment" and "style" 
are incorporeal, impossible to possess exclusively, and therefore incapable of supporting 
any property right whatsoever. However, when the case was heard a second time in 
1762, William Blackstone took Wedderburn's place and made a much bolder claim. Not 
content to sidestep the argument that sentiment and style are incorporeal and impossible 
to possess, Blackstone directly attacked it. Quoting Edward Thurlow, the barrister who 
had argued for the defendants in 1761, Blackstone insisted that "'A literary 
Composition, as it lies in the Author's Mind, before it is substantiated by reducing it 
into Writing,' has the essential Requisites to make it the Subject of Property." To 
support this claim, Blackstone famously referred to Locke's Second Treatise of 
Government and the theory of property articulated therein: property commences with 
invention and labor, and both are required to produce "an original Composition'' since 
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'''Original (ex vi termini) implies Invention; as Composition does, Industry, and 
Labour." Furthermore this property "may with equal Reason be acquired by mental, as 
by bodily Labour" (321) because there is the "Same Right of Occupancy in Ideas as in a 
Field, a Tree, or a Stone" (322). In short, Blackstone finds a perfect analogy between the 
labor of the body and of the mind, and based on that analogy, argues that the products of 
both kinds of labor are, by reason and natural right, the private property of their 
producers. 
After making two additional arguments of dubious soundness, Blackstone 
returns to the question of how a purely ideal entity could become property. While a 
literary composition 
lies dormant in the Mind, it is absolutely in the Power of the Proprietor. 
He alone is intitled to the Profits of communicating, or making it public. 
The first Step to which, is cloathing our conceptions in Words, the only 
Means to communicate abstracted Ideas. Ideas drawn from external 
Objects, may be communicated by external signs; but Words only, 
demonstrate the genuine Operations of the Intellect. (323) 
In this passage, the philosophical assumptions that underlie Blackstone's argument 
immediately become clear. Specifically. Blackstone"s distinction between "Ideas drawn 
from external Objects" and "abstracted Ideas" parallels the dichotomy developed by 
Locke and widely deployed in his Essay on Human Understanding to explain how 
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abstractions such as numbers or geometrical forms can arise from sense impressions. 
That parallel alone indicates that Blackstone was drawing not only from Locke's 
political theory, but also from his epistemological theory. But more generally, this 
passage shows that Blackstone cannot be thinking of ideas in a platonic way. The very 
notion that ideas in the mind are "absolutely in the Power of the Proprietor" directly 
contradicts any theory holding ideas to be universal and innate. Even if an idea is 
immediately present in just one mind, the mind of the so-called "proprietor," a 
dispositional form of platonism would hold that it is, potentially present in the minds of 
all others; the "proprietor" could do nothing to prevent any of them from acquiring it on 
their own. Blackstone therefore must have been working with an anti-platonic view of 
ideas, and based on his implicit use of Locke here, we can conclude that he was 
probably thinking of ideas from an empirical standpoint. 
For Blackstone, then, ideas are the product of individual experience and mental 
labor—in the Lockean sense identified above—and the right of property in ideas arises 
naturally from that fact.71 This interpretation of Blackstone's argument is further 
supported by a subtle shift in his diction through the course of his first argument. 
Through the beginning of the argument, the word he uses most often to refer to mental 
objects is "idea," but as he continues, he begins to favor to another term: "sentiment." 
Two paragraphs after asserting that we communicate by "cloathing our conceptions in 
Words, the only Means to communicate abstracted Ideas" (323, italics mine) he 
performs a nearly parallel substitution: "Words are the Vehicle of Sentiments" (323, 
' ' Locke himself would not have approved of this line of reasoning. Locke explicitly denounced perpetual 
copyright protection of any kind; see Deazley, 3-4. 
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italics mine). He then insists that sentiment is the essence of literary property, stating 
that "The Sentiment therefore is the Thing of Value, from which the Profit must arise" 
(323-4) though just a few paragraphs earlier he had argued that literary property is 
founded on "Occupancy in Ideas" (321). Blackstone appears to be using the words 
"idea" and "sentiment" interchangeably; but to treat the two terms as mere synonyms 
misses an important distinction.72 When one examines the etymology of the two words, 
Blackstone's shift appears strategic: the term "sentiment" is based on the same Latin 
root as the term "sense," and in the eighteenth century was still occasionally used to 
refer to sense impressions. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding David 
Hume used "inward sentiment" and "outward sentiment" to refer to roughly the same 
concepts that Locke had called "reflection" and "sensation," thus associating the term 
"sentiment" with private experience. At the same time, the term "sentiment" was 
increasingly being associated with a particular register of private experience, feeling— 
that is to say, with affect, sensibility, and a particular kind of refined subjectivity. Both 
associations link the term to the personal and private. By contrast, the etymological root 
of "idea" is the Ancient Greek iSea, a term Plato had used to denote eternal forms. 
Insofar as it was linked to a philosophical tradition claiming that all mental objects are 
held in common, "idea" was a troublesome word for Blackstone, and he learned quickly 
to eschew it. 
The correspondence between Blackstone's account of ideas and Locke's is 
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close; but it is not perfect. Most notably, Blackstone speaks of ideas being 
communicated, whereas for Locke, communication may occur, but ideas are never 
themselves communicated. We might assume that when he speaks about 
communication, Blackstone means just what Locke does—that is, communication not 
of, but about ideas—but this interpretation poses certain problems for Blackstone's 
argument. After all, if communication does occur in the Lockean sense, then by Locke's 
explicit assertion, both parties must already have the very same ideas. Even more 
troublesome for Blackstone's argument is the fact that if Lockean communication 
occurs between readers and an author, then the readers must have come by their ideas 
the very same way the author did—through their own mental labor. Why, then, should 
the author have any more right to those ideas than the reader? On the other hand, if no 
communication between readers and author occurs, then it is difficult to surmise how a 
literary work could have value at all. Clearly Blackstone requires a different model of 
communication, or at least of reading, than we have encountered so far. In fact, 
Blackstone hints at such a model in his rebuttal to Yates, whose counterargument 
exposes some of the potential difficulties of Blackstone's position. 
A platonic understanding of communication forms the foundation of Joseph 
Yates' argument against literary property. He begins his counterargument by conceding 
that mental labor does grant a property right. However, "this, and every other Kind of 
Property may be rendered common, by the act of the Proprietor," and publication is 
precisely the act of rendering common one's mental property: "the Author has a 
Property in his Sentiments, till he publishes them... But from the Moment of 
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Publication, they are thrown into a State of universal Communion." Two English 
cognates of communis, "common" and "communion," foreshadow the direction of 
Yates' argument. He then considers the prerequisites for a property claim, insisting that 
an item of property must be capable of "separate and exclusive Enjoyment," and that 
"actual Possession is not always necessary, yet potential Possession is" (333). Though 
he does not say so explicitly, Yates implies that incorporeal rights such as the right of 
way across land arise from the possibility of exclusion. Right of way exists, in short, 
because it may be enforced or denied by corporeal means. But this is not so of ideas: 
The original MS. is not, nor ever was, in the Hands of the Defendants. 
The Books sold are not, nor ever were, the Property of the Plaintiffs. The 
Paper and Ink belonged to the Defendants. All the Plaintiffs can claim is, 
the Ideas which the Books communicate. These, when published, the 
World is as fully in Possession of, as the Author was before. From the 
moment of Publication, the Author could never confine them to his own 
Enjoyment (334). 
After the physical book is sold, nothing corporeal remains for the author or publisher to 
lay claim to; and because Yates takes a platonic view of communication, he insists that 
the act of communicating an idea destroys any possibility of exclusively possessing it. 
Filling out Yates' argument from the perspective of a dispositional innatist and 
universalist, we might say that the author's ideas were already potentially in the 
possession of all readers, and that by publishing them, the author actualizes that 
possession, so that no further legal distinction can be made between the author's 
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possession of the ideas and readers' possession of them. Since the author can no longer 
exercise any form of exclusive possession over the ideas, they can no longer be the 
subject of property, which, Yates reiterates, "acts only upon Subjects, where there is a 
Possibility of separate and exclusive Enjoyment" (334). 
Yates' repeated emphasis on "separate and exclusive Enjoyment" is worth 
noting, and indicates that his concern with corporeality and incorporeality has more to 
do with the specific problem of exclusion than with a vague metaphysical qualm about 
incorporeal property. Nonetheless, when Blackstone begins his rebuttal, he draws 
attention to Yates' emphasis on corporeality, criticizing Yates' view of property as 
"having nothing for it's [sic] subject, but what is substantial, palpable and visible," and 
asserting that Yates has "omitted the Distinction, between corporeal and incorporeal 
Rights" (340). Blackstone then lists a number of incorporeal rights—"Options... 
Advowsons, Commons, Ways"—that appear to contradict Yates' staid conception of 
property. However, Blackstone still fails to address Yates' fundamental argument, 
which is that ideas (as Yates defines them) cannot ever be exclusively possessed the 
way options, advowsons, commons and ways can. All of these rights are based on the 
fundamental property rights granted by physical occupancy or possession, and even if 
they were not protected by the law as separable and individually transferable rights, 
they would still exist, being vested in owners as part of their—in Blackstone" s words— 
"sole and despotic dominion" over their property.7 On the other hand, ideas, at least in 
the platonic sense, cannot ever be exclusively possessed. Even when the author has an 
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idea that no one else has ever thought of before, it remains possible that another may hit 
upon the very same idea; as Yates would later argue in Millar v. Taylor, "many People 
may have the same Ideas upon the same Subject. In that Case, every one of those 
Persons to whom they independently occur, is equally possessed and equally Master of 
all these Ideas" (68). One might object that such a scenario is unlikely, but, objects 
Yates, 
the Improbability of their hitting upon those Ideas is not to the Point. If 
they should occur to the Author; He has a Right to publish them. Of this, 
I think, there can hardly be a Doubt. Yet Property, says Pufendorf is a 
Right by which the very Substance of a Thing belongs to one Person, so 
that it can not, in the Whole, nor after the same Manner, become 
Another's15 
The possibility that an idea might occur to two people independently destroys the 
possibility that any one person could exclusively possess it. Furthermore, if we adopt a 
platonic view of ideas, as Yates seems to, then it is possible for any idea to occur to two 
people at once. Exclusive possession of an idea is only possible if we conceive of 
possession of a corporeal representation of that idea as a way of possessing the idea 
James Burrow, ed., The Question Concerning Literary Property, (London, 1773), rpt. in The Literary 
Property Debate: Six Tracts 1764-1774, (New York: Garland, 1975). In Millar v. Taylor, Yates would 
further clarify his position regarding the relationship between property rights and the objects to which 
these rights apply, arguing that his opponents' argument relies on a "Fallacy" that results from 
the equivocal Use of the Word "Property"7; which sometimes denotes the Right of the 
Person; (as when We say, "such a One has this Estate, or that piece of Goods;") 
sometimes, the Object itself... Here, The Question is upon the Object itself, not the 
Person. I readily admit that the Rights of Persons may be incorporeal... But the Question 
is now, "Whether any Thing can be the Object of proprietary Right, which is not the 
Object of Corporeal Substance." (72) 
By this line of reasoning, even "incorporeal rights" are corporeal insofar as they are rights of a 
corporeal person to engage in some behavior or another. 
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itself. It is only through the corporeal representation of the idea that the common law 
•-if-
property in the right of first publication attaches. 
Throughout most of the rebuttal, when Blackstone attacks Yates' view of 
property, he attacks a straw man; and indeed, neither Blackstone nor Yates seemed to 
fully realize that their disagreement arose from two dramatically different definitions of 
the word "idea." However, Blackstone does offer one analogy that strikes near the heart 
of their disagreement. Disputing Yates' claim that a published work is, "like Land 
thrown into the Highway... a Gift to the Public," Blackstone counters that publishing a 
book "is more like making a Way through a Man's own private Grounds, which he may 
stop at Pleasure; He may give out a Number of Keys, by publishing a Number of 
Copies; but no Man, who receives a Key, has thereby a Right to forge others, and sell 
them to other people" (341). In this analogy, the relationship of author, idea, work and 
reader in Blackstone's view becomes momentarily crystallized. Per Locke, ideas are not 
held in common but are the inalienable property of their creators, having been generated 
by individual experience and mental labor. A work is not a collection of its author's 
ideas, but is rather a key that opens a passage through its author's mind, giving readers a 
particular kind of access to those ideas. No ideas ever change hands, but, just as one 
might stroll along a fenced path to view the terrain beyond, readers are able to 
experience the author's ideas, and to develop ideas of their own from that experience. A 
key is alienable, but the lands to which it grants access remain the property of their 
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owner, and it is a breach of that property to copy the key without permission. Likewise, 
a work is alienable, but the ideas it grants access to remain the property of their creator; 
therefore one may possess a work without possessing the right to copy it. 
Not only does Blackstone's analogy clarify these relationships, it also hints at a 
model of reading (thought not of communication—this is a model of reading as non-
communication) that might help Blackstone defend literary property from a Lockean 
standpoint. In this model, the value of the work comes not from the ideas that it 
communicates, but from the experience that it enables readers to have. Young takes 
such a view of literary value: "The mind of a man of Genius is a fertile and pleasant 
field" (9), and the work of genius "opens a back-door... into a delicious Garden of 
Moral and Intellectual fruits and flowers; the Key of which is denied to the rest of 
mankind." These fruits and flowers never change hands; the pleasure of observing them 
is enough. The work is an "Amusement" and a "Refuge"; through it the reader is 
"quieted" and "refreshed" (5), and takes a "pleasing Pause" (6); but does the work 
communicate anything? Insofar as it does, it is devalued by Young, for whom anything 
communicable is, at best, mere learning—"borrowed knowledge" (36) available for 
loan by anyone, and therefore worth little. In an economy of scarcity, the value of a 
literary work arises from its incommunicability. 
Blackstone and Young must agree on this point if Blackstone's argument is to 
be sound. If communication does occur, then whatever is communicated cannot be 
literary property, even if we adopt a Lockean view of ideas. For if readers' ideas are 
indeed the same as the author's ideas, as Locke insists is necessary for communication; 
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and if readers produce them by their own labor, as the author had before them, then 
there remains nothing to be withheld as property. Indeed, at this point, the Lockean 
model of communication begins to look suspiciously similar to the model of 
communication implicitly proposed by the Cambridge Platonists. Ideas may come from 
experience rather than from an "innate cognoscitive power," but they are effectively 
common property either way, at least potentially, because otherwise, no communication 
could occur. The equivalence between innatism and empiricism that Locke had 
identified in his Essay begins to reassert itself here. As long as Blackstone holds on to 
the notion of communication, he is caught in a double-bind—an inescapable 
consequence of the paradox of communicable property. 
Eight years after Tonson v. Collins, Yates and Blackstone again spoke on 
opposite sides of the literary property debate. This time, Yates stood on the other side of 
the bar, as one of the four justices in Millar v. Taylor, however, he stood alone. As the 
sole dissenter in the case, Yates' arguments failed to sway the court against literary 
property. The center of the literary property debates shifted from the English to the 
Scottish courts, where a platonic view of ideas continued to play a role. In Hinton v. 
Donaldson (1773), the case in Scotland that contradicted Millar v. Taylor and set the 
stage for Donaldson v. Beckett (1774), Donaldson's counsel made a familiar argument: 
Suppose two different men compose tables of interest; if both their 
calculations are exact, they must, according to the rules of arithmetic, 
turn out to be the same. This observation will apply to most kinds of 
tables or calculations, as on life-annuities, logarithms, almanacks, &c. If 
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the first publishers of any such works were to have a perpetual 
monopoly, how absurd would such a position be, and how unjust to the 
77 
rest of mankind! 
In a line of reasoning reminiscent of the arguments that Smith, Culverwel and Cudworth 
had made a century before, Donaldson's counsel argued that the universal nature of 
mathematical truth—whether founded on empirical observations or on innate truths— 
directly contradicts the logic of literary property. The very possibility of communication 
is founded on these truths, and thus if communication is possible, then literary property 
cannot exist except as a statutory monopoly. There is only one situation, Donaldson's 
counsel argued, 
in which it can be figured that an author retains the exclusive enjoyment 
of his ideas, after having published them, viz. if he writes in an unknown 
language, or character invented by himself, and which he alone can 
decypher. 
The regime of literary property is a regime of encryption, in which the reader's 
understanding of the text is endlessly deferred, but the possibility of understanding 
remains; and the proprietary work is held forever just out of its reader's grasp. 
Lord Coalston, Reporter, Information for Mess. John Hinton of London, Bookseller, and Alexander 
MacKonochie, Writer in Edinburgh, his Attorney, Pursuers; against Mess. Alexander Donaldson and 
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Chapter Two: 
The Vacuous Sovereign in Fielding and Hobbes 
In the previous chapter I discussed two claims about knowledge. The first was a 
neo-platonic claim that we all possess the same innate knowledge, but that this 
knowledge must be activated in some way—"awoken," as one metaphor had it—before 
it can be used. The second was a Lockean claim that we are born without any 
knowledge at all, that all our knowledge is acquired through experience, that we may 
have different knowledge depending on our experience, and that we cannot transfer this 
knowledge directly between one another. Although they are primarily claims about 
knowledge, each entails its own model of communication, with a corresponding 
structure of power that places communicator and audience in a hierarchical relationship. 
In the first model, to use a metaphor from Plato's Theaetetus, we are "pregnant" with 
knowledge, which lies in the womb of our mind, and we give birth to it with the aid of a 
midwife—a title that Socrates claims for himself in the Theaetetus. Understood as an 
account of communication, this metaphor casts the communicator in the role of the 
midwife, and the audience in the role of the mother, gravid with knowledge that exists 
but is not yet born. As with a literal birth, the midwife is present only to serve the 
mother, and as with a literal birth, the midwife is not strictly necessary for a successful 
birth. At one point in the Theaetetus, Socrates even goes so far as to say that he knows 
nothing of the matter of which he speaks, and that only his interlocutor has any 
knowledge of it at all: "I myself know nothing about such things, and claim none of 
65 
them as mine, but am incapable of bearing them and am merely acting as a midwife to 
you." 79 In this model of communication, then, there appears to be a hierarchy of 
knowledge: Socrates' knowledge helps ease the pains of birth, perhaps, but it has no 
effect on the fundamental relationship between audience members and their own 
nascent knowledge. Although the matter becomes more complicated, at least at first 
glance, it appears that the knowledge of the audience is central, while the knowledge of 
the communicator, which exists only to bring forth the audience's knowledge, is 
peripheral. 
The second model of communication inverts that apparent hierarchy. The 
knowledge of the communicator, acquired through experience and firmly in the 
communicator's possession, is central. The knowledge of the audience at best only 
enhances the audience's appreciation of the communicator's knowledge. As Blackstone 
put it in Tonson v. Collins, the communicator is like a landowner, and the 
communicator's knowledge is like a fenced-in estate: the communicator speaks or writes 
the estate into being, and audience members may enter the estate and observe, listen, 
read—but must leave empty-handed. In the first model of communication, the audience 
contains knowledge; in the second, the audience is contained and constrained by it. 
Despite their differences, both models of communication have certain effects in 
common, from a historical materialist point of view. They both take a social relation—a 
linguistic exchange between communicator and audience—and reify it. In the first 
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model, the exchange of questions yields a child in the hands of the audience. In the 
second, language becomes real property in the firm possession of the communicator. 
Although the possessors differ, both models of communication concretize knowledge 
through a distinctly possessive metaphor. A fundamental premise of this dissertation is 
that these two models of communication—these two ways of reifying the 
communicative act—are only two among a diverse array of models that populated 
eighteenth-century discourse. 
In this chapter, I argue that in Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones, Henry Fielding 
articulates another model of communication that can be usefully understood as a 
synthesis of these two models—a model of communication that casts the communicator, 
or in this case, the author, in the role of sovereign. Considering the metaphor of textual 
sovereignty as deployed in these two novels, I show how these novels cast authority as 
fundamentally interpretive: the role of the sovereign, whether in a textual or a literal 
domain, is to resolve interpretive conflicts, and to rectify failures of communication that 
result from the erroneous use and abuse of language. Within his or her jurisdiction, the 
sovereign has the absolute and uncontested power to dictate meanings—but the 
question of who is the true sovereign lingers. 
As Thomas Hobbes would have it, sovereign power in the abstract "is as great, 
on 
as possibly men can be imagined to make it." Yet the body or bodies in which it is 
vested are subject to contingency and temporal decay, and the true locus of this absolute 
sovereign power remains uncertain. The possibility always remains that the seeming 
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sovereign of today may be usurped by the true sovereign of tomorrow. I begin this 
chapter by arguing that a similar potential for inversion of authority appears in Plato's 
Theaetatus: through the metaphor of midwifery, Socrates claims a position of 
ambiguous authority, placing himself both above and below knowledge. This reading of 
Plato lays the groundwork for understanding how Fielding synthesized Platonic and 
Lockean frameworks through the figure of authorial sovereignty. Unlike Blackstone's 
figure of author as landowner, the figure of author as sovereign, I argue, is structured 
around a kernel of epistemic doubt. Subsequently, 1 examine the ways that Fielding 
portrays himself as sovereign of the works Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones and links his 
sovereignty to a particular kind of interpretive power that is akin to Socrates' 
ambiguous power over knowledge—ambiguous, yet finally indispensible in the face of 
a Hobbesian proliferation of self-interested miscommunication. I then directly examine 
the relationship between Fielding and Thomas Hobbes, showing that for both, 
interpretation poses a fundamental challenge to the concept of sovereignty. Finally, I 
argue that Fielding's understanding of textual sovereignty infects his conceptions of 
originality and imitation with its ambiguity, producing a model of literary property that 
acknowledges overlapping spheres of influence within the textual domain. 
Sovereignty and Knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus 
The figure of Socrates-as-midwife appears early in Plato's Theaetetus. Written 
around 369 BCE, this dialogue begins when Socrates is introduced to Theteaetus, the 
young pupil of a mathematician; in the course of their conversation, Socrates begins to 
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wonder "what knowledge really is" (145e). They go on to discuss three definitions of 
knowledge, none of which turns out to be fully satisfactory. But before their discussions 
of knowledge as "perception," as "true judgment," and as "true judgement with an 
account," and before the apparent refutation of each of these definitions of knowledge 
Q 1 
in turn, leading to an aporetic conclusion —Socrates describes his own vexed 
relationship to whatever it is that we call knowledge: he has none. "I am sterile in point 
of wisdom" (150c), he tells Theteaetus. Yet at the same time, he says, "those who 
associate with me... have found in themselves many fair things and have brought them 
forth" (150d). Though he lacks knowledge, he nonetheless appears to be a proxy for 
knowledge. Even more puzzlingly, he declares that his highest duty is to distinguish 
between true and false knowledge, as a midwife might distinguish between true and 
false progeny, if such things were possible: "women do not, like my patients, bring 
forth at one time real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to 
distinguish from the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the 
midwives would be in distinguishing between the real and the false" (150a-b). Both in 
its content and in its somewhat grandiose tone, this assertion belies Socrates' apparently 
humble claim to know nothing, which begins to look like an exaggeration. Mustn't 
Socrates know something if he is to make such judgments? Socrates is a pauper of 
knowledge, but somehow he stands in judgment over knowledge like a prince. 
How do we resolve this contradiction? One might be tempted to dismiss 
Socrates' claim to know nothing as purely rhetorical—as a mere example of so-called 
For an in-depth analysis of the Iheaeletus, see Timothy Chappell, Reading Plato's Theaetetus 
(Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004). 
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'socratic irony.' However, I would like to suggest that if there is irony here, we should 
understand it as part of the Theteaetus' discussion of knowledge—as an irony 
embedded in the concept of knowledge itself. If Socrates is a to be a judge of 
knowledge, then perhaps if Socrates did have knowledge of the matters under 
discussion, his knowledge would interfere with his duties as a midwife. Perhaps he 
would deliver a changeling, substituting his own knowledge for the knowledge of his 
audience. Or, even worse, what if Socrates' knowledge were itself false? How could he 
distinguish false knowledge from true knowledge without being swayed by his own 
(false) biases? These possibilities suggest that in order to distinguish between true and 
false knowledge, Socrates must stand apart from the particular knowledge under 
discussion—in much the same way that a sovereign, in Hobbes' influential account of 
sovereignty, stands apart from the law. As Hobbes explains at length in the Leviathan, 
in addition to making law, it is the sovereign's power and duty to interpret law, and to 
dictate which statements are valid law, and which statements are not. The sovereign has 
this power not because he has any great understanding of the law, or any particular 
insight into the law; the sovereign has this power because he is above the law. But for 
that same reason, no law can validate the sovereign power, which is always threatened 
by the possibility of a collapse into the state of nature. 
It is this figure of the sovereign, standing in judgment over the law—just as 
Socrates stands in judgment over knowledge—that I argue Fielding had in mind when 
he famously declared himself, in Tom Jones, to be the sovereign founder "of a new 
Province of Writing," and the maker of laws that "my Readers, whom I consider as my 
Subjects, are bound to believe in and to obey." Simon Stern has persuasively linked 
this moment of self-crowning to the contemporaneous discourse surrounding literary 
property, associating it with William Blackstone's definition of property as "that sole 
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of 
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." As 
Stern points out, Blackstone's description of the right of property as the right of "sole 
and despotic dominion" is an exaggeration; one need only consider the phenomenon of 
eminent domain (as one of many examples) to realize that such "total dominion" is at 
best hyperbole, and at worst an outright fabrication. They may have similarities, but 
property and sovereignty are not at all the same—to state the obvious. But since this 
obvious difference is easily elided, it is worthwhile to consider the precise ways these 
two metaphors resemble each other and the precise ways they differ, and to examine the 
implications of Fielding's choice of metaphor for our understanding of his relationship 
to his text—bracketing, for the moment, the complexities introduced by his ironic tone. 
The metaphor of communicator as sovereign shares much with Blackstone's 
metaphor of communicator as landowner. Both metaphors conceive of communication 
in terms of spaces, territories, arenas of influence and control. Both embed 
communication within a dense network of social, political, and legal discourses. And 
both posit a structure of power with the author at its pinnacle, and the audience at its 
base: one might even say that they are both proprietary metaphors. But despite these 
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obvious affinities, the metaphor of communicator as sovereign partakes of the Platonic 
model of communication in a way the landowner model does not. It resembles the 
Platonic model because it sets the communicator apart from the matter being 
communicated, in a position of absolute but ambiguous authority. Whereas in the 
landowner metaphor, the author owns a text tout court, in the sovereign metaphor, the 
author determines the rules of property within a textual domain. In that sense, then, 
textual sovereignty is a higher order of property analogous to Socrates' higher order of 
knowledge. 
Partaking of these higher orders of property and knowledge entails some 
sacrifice. Socrates' claim to know nothing frees him to stand in judgment over 
knowledge, but also brings his judgment into question. The landowner's possession is 
secured by the laws of property, but if a sovereign has absolute power to make law, law 
cannot make a sovereign without begging the question. The question of where 
legitimate sovereignty lies remains unanswered. According to this metaphor, then, the 
sovereign author's power over the text is simultaneously absolute and contested. 
Most fundamentally, these two metaphors, the metaphor of author as landowner 
and the metaphor of author as sovereign, suggest two different kinds of power over text. 
What the landowner possesses in the form of property is power over a localized and 
constrained domain, power that is alienable and strictly limited in scope. However, the 
laws of property secure that limited power in a relatively unambiguous way. Under 
most circumstances, the laws of property ensure that it is clear who owns what, and 
when an ambiguity does arise, it is the lawmaker's duty to resolve that ambiguity 
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according to the rules of equity. What the sovereign possesses, however, cannot be 
guaranteed by law, because sovereignty is the foundation of law. One cannot depend on 
the circular argument that sovereignty guarantees the law, and the law guarantees 
sovereignty, because it provides no basis on which to choose between two rival 
claimants to sovereignty. Though greater in scope, sovereignty is subject to ambiguity 
and contingency in a way that property—when provided with a solid foundation of 
law—rarely is. 
Miscommunication and the Sovereign as Interpreter 
Ambiguity is a central problem for Fielding as well as Hobbes. Many of Joseph 
Andrews' comic scenes rely on choreographed miscommunications; a single phrase 
uttered in one of these scenes may admit three or four viable yet contradictory 
interpretations, and each of these interpretations may be applied to the phrase by one or 
more characters present. To understand these scenes—to perceive the unexpected turns 
of fate that unfold—to follow the motivations of characters—in short, to get the jokes, 
one must hold each of these interpretations in suspense with the others. One might 
analyze these choreographed miscommunications formally, as part of a finely-honed 
comic technique. However, in my reading of Joseph Andrews, these 
miscommunications serve a thematic, as well as a formal, purpose: they show how 
sovereign power, when confronted with ambiguous language and a range of conflicting 
and contested interpretations, works to select and enforce one particular interpretation. 
At the same time, they show how sovereign power cannot extinguish this ambiguity, 
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which lingers in spite of the judgments of the sovereign, and may even be said to be the 
source of the sovereign's power. For if a piece of language truly has only one admissible 
interpretation, then the sovereign is bound to accept it, but if a piece of language has 
many equally valid interpretations, then the sovereign is free to select from among 
them. 
The relationship between power and miscommunication becomes a central 
concern early in Joseph Andrews. Joseph's adventures begin when he is dismissed from 
Lady Booby's service as a result of two elaborately staged, sexually charged 
conversations, in which Joseph speaks at cross purposes with first Lady Booby and then 
Mrs. Slipslop. Both scenes are broad parodies of seduction scenes from Samuel 
Richardson's Pamela that derive most of their comic effect from a reversal of gender 
roles, and for my purposes are worth mentioning only briefly as examples of Joseph 
Andrews' preoccupation with miscommunication and its abuse by individuals in 
positions of power. In one representative exchange, Lady Booby asks '"who is the 
happy girl whose eyes have made a conquest of you?,'" and when Joseph responds that 
all women '"were equally indifferent to him,'" Lady Booby accepts the denotation but 
inverts the connotation: " ' 0 then... you are a general lover.'" Such comic exchanges 
reappear throughout the novel, most notably between Joseph and Mrs. Slipslop a few 
pages later (75). 
Elsewhere in the novel, however, Fielding takes up the problem of 
miscommunication in a less flippant, if no less satiric, fashion. Joseph Andrews is rife 
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not only with miscommunication, but also with narratives of jurisprudence, and in 
several places in the text the two become tightly linked. Rather than passing rulings on 
the validity of evidence or assigning punishments, judicial officers in Joseph Andrews 
spend much of their time both producing and clearing up linguistic confusion. 
In one particularly striking scene, Fielding substitutes a series of ribald puns, 
misquoted lines of poetry, and failed attempts to decipher a text written in Greek for a 
somber narrative of due process. The scene begins with an improbable coincidence: 
while talking with a hunter he has randomly encountered on the road, Parson Adams 
hears a cry for help, and when he seeks out its source, he finds a rapist attacking a 
young woman, who turns out to be Fanny Goodwill. Adams knocks Fanny's attacker 
unconscious, but just as he is preparing to take Fanny to safety, a crowd of nighttime 
bird hunters—"bird-batters"—arrives on the scene. Unhappily, Fanny's attacker awakes 
just in time to persuade the crowd that he was the victim of Adams and Fanny, whom he 
accuses of assault and robbery. The bird-batters, examining Adams' face and declaring 
it "the most villainous countenance they ever beheld" (191), decide to bring Adams and 
Fanny before the justice of the peace, encouraged by an attorney's clerk who informs 
them that between them they will split an eighty-pound bounty. A debate ensues 
between them over who deserves the greatest portion of the reward, a debate that 
distracts the crowd such that it "required not the art of a Sheppard to escape" (192); but 
nonetheless, Adams and Fanny do not make the attempt, Adams trusting "rather to his 
innocence than his heels." Adams' faith, however, appears to be misplaced, at least 
initially. He and Fanny are brought before the justice, who instructs the clerk to take a 
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deposition from Fanny's attacker. But in the place of a juridicial narrative describing the 
testimony of witnesses and the judgment of the justice after due process of law, Fielding 
substitutes a broadly comic scene featuring a series of communicative failures between 
Adams, the justice, and the crowd of bird-batters. 
These communicative failures begin when one of the crowd sights a "cassock 
peeping forth from under the greatcoat of Adams." Having been prejudiced by the lies 
of Fanny's attacker, the justice misinterprets the cassock, saying '"How, sirrah... do you 
go robbing in the dress of a clergyman? Let me tell you that your habit will not entitle 
you to the benefit of the clergy" (195). Immediately, what might seem to be a 
substantial piece of evidence in favor of Adams' innocence is transformed into evidence 
of his conniving criminality. One of the crowd, sarcastically dubbed "a great wit," then 
challenges Adams to trade quotations of Latin poetry with him, assuming that Adams' 
outward appearance will not be matched by his inward knowledge. Adams initially 
refuses to participate, telling the 'wit' that '"he deserved scourging for his 
pronunciation'" (195). The wit interprets this refusal as a further sign of ignorance and 
guilt, asking '"Why didst not steal some of the parson's Latin as well as his gown"' 
(195). The 'wit' continues to bait Adams with quotations of various Latin verses, which 
he believes Adams will not be able to match, but which are in fact misquotations that 
Adams, exercising polite self-restraint, refrains from correcting. When Adams finally 
emerges from his damning silence to point out one of the errors, the 'wit' proposes a bet 
that Adams must decline, not having any currency on hand. The crowd sees this as 
further evidence that Adams is an impostor, confirming "the triumph of his adversary" 
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(196). 
Once the clerk has finished the depositions of Fanny's attacker and of the other 
bird-batters, he delivers them to the justice. But the contents of those depositions are 
never described, nor are they even seen by the justice himself, "who, having sworn the 
several witnesses without reading a syllable, ordered his clerk to make the mittimus" 
(196). At this point, the evidentiary process has been entirely superseded by the a string 
of linguistic confusions. Adams objects to having his arrest warrant drawn up without 
his being given a chance to defend himself, but by this time, it is clear that the challenge 
Adams faces is not to demonstrate his innocence by presenting evidence and 
establishing the true facts of the matter, but is rather to overcome the misinterpretations 
that have accumulated about his speech and person—a challenge that can be met by no 
quantity of physical evidence. 
That conclusion is reinforced by the justice's reaction to a book that the clerk 
finds in Adams' pocket. Redoubling the prevailing linguistic confusion, the book is 
"written, as he apprehended, in cyphers; for no one could read a word in it" (197). The 
justice concludes that Adams "may be more than a common robber; he may be in a plot 
against the Government" (197). When Adams insists it is a manuscript copy of the 
works of Aeschylus, further confusion erupts; the clerk declares "Aeschylus" to be an 
outlandish name, while the justice insists that it is entirely fictitious. The parish parson, 
who turns out to be present, determines that it is indeed written in Greek, and that 
Adams probably stole it along with the cassock. The parish parson declares it to be a 
catechism in Greek, translating its beginning as "what is your name?"; the justice 
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repeats the question in earnest to Adams, who does not hear and insists again that '"It is 
Aeschylus, and I will maintain it,'" and the justice, thinking Adams is answering his 
question, says '"make Mr. Aeschylus his mittimus. I will teach you to banter me with a 
false name"'(198). 
Finally, someone in the company of the justice recognizes Adams and tells the 
justice that Adams is indeed a clergyman and a gentleman. Immediately the justice has 
a change of heart, declaring "I know how to behave myself to gentlemen as well as 
another. Nobody can say I have committed a gentleman since I have been in the 
commission" (198). After hearing out Adams' tale, he quickly concludes that Fanny's 
attacker had perjured himself, and becomes enraged when he learns that the man has 
escaped. 
Throughout the course of the justice's deliberation, judgments regarding matters 
of fact receive far less attention than judgments regarding meaning. If one accepts the 
principle that the sovereign has absolute power, then this is not entirely surprising, 
because while no earthly being could have total authority over matters of fact, it is at 
least more plausible to claim that an earthly being might have total authority over the 
arbitrary significations of language. The justice, like all eighteenth-century officers of 
the judiciary, acts in the name of the sovereign, and the proof of that power lies not so 
much in his ability to sift through evidence to determine the facts of the matter as in his 
ability to impose a definitive interpretation on the clothes, acts, and, most importantly, 
on the speech of Adams, and on the meaning of the words recorded within the book in 
his pocket. 
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A final coda, however, shows the corresponding instability of such absolute 
power over meaning. The episode comes to its conclusion when a "horrible uproar from 
without" ensues: 
the persons who had apprehended Adams and Fanny had been regaling, 
according to the custom of the house, with the justice's strong beer. 
These were all fallen together by the ears, and were cuffing each other 
without any mercy. The justice himself sallied out, and with the dignity 
of his presence soon put an end to the fray. On his return into the parlour, 
he reported, 'That the occasion of the quarrel was no other than a dispute 
to whom, if Adams had been convicted, the greater share of the reward 
for apprehending him had belonged. (199) 
Despite the fact that the justice has ruled that Adams is innocent, a fight has broken out 
on the premise that he is not, giving that premise an afterlife, a continued presence that 
cannot be dispelled by the justice's ruling. This afterlife is the negative counterpart of 
the justice's absolute power to make meaning. If the justice's sovereignty relies on the 
arbitrariness of signification, that arbitrariness also taints his judgment, which becomes 
arbitrary in turn. The justice could have ruled the other way just as easily, a possibility 
made all the more palpable by the fact that his judgment was swayed not by any 
physical evidence or testimony that he sought out, but by a random utterance from the 
crowd. Although the justice ruled in favor of Adams, his ruling was a highly contingent 
one, and the possibility that he might have ruled otherwise lingers. 
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Hobbes and Judicial Sovereignty 
Fielding's treatment of justice, ambiguity, and miscommunication in this scene 
and others like it supports a revised understanding of Fielding's relationship to the work 
of Thomas Hobbes. Scholars have generally focused on Fielding's relationship to 
Hobbes in one of two ways. Some have considered it in fairly narrow biographical 
terms. Fielding may have flirted with Hobbes' philosophy in the early 1730s, during a 
period of interest in deism spurred by friends James Ralph and Thomas Cooke, ^ and 
throughout his life Fielding would continue to refer to Hobbes' statement that we laugh 
at things for which we feel contempt.86 However, by the 1740s, Fielding had made 
Hobbes a minor target of his satire, mentioning "The Great Mr. Hobbes" in "An Essay 
On Nothing,"87 and implicitly including Hobbes among "these philosophers... who 
some years since very much alarmed the world, by showing that there were no such 
things as virtue or goodness really existing in human nature." These philosophers 
achieved their alarming results, Fielding explains, using a faulty method: "the 
searching, rummaging, and examining... into the nastiest of all Places, A BAD MIND" 
(240)88—the bad mind in question being, of course, the philosopher's own. Some 
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scholars have interpreted such jabs as evidence that at least in his later work, Fielding 
draws his view of human nature from the generally optimistic perspective of 
o n 
latitudinarian (and starkly anti-Hobbesian) theologians such as Samuel Clarke. 
On the other hand, as C. J. Rawson has it, "ideas of the natural depravity of man 
were certainly in wide circulation and could readily enter into certain moods or states of 
mind in writers who (like Fielding) mainly disliked Hobbes."90 On that basis, scholars 
such as Stuart Sim and David Walker have developed a broader thematic argument that 
reads Tom Jones within the frame of Hobbesian pessimism about human nature. In that 
novel, they argue, "in the main, human relations fall into a recognizable Hobbesian 
pattern, where individuals are constantly vying... to improve their own position in the 
general scramble for power."91 According to this view, figures such as Tom Jones and 
Squire Allworthy are notable counterexamples struggling against a selfish mainstream, 
and therefore Fielding does not wholeheartedly embrace Hobbes" pessimism. But the 
virtue of Tom and Allworthy, even as it confounds the universality of the rule of self-
interest, reinforces the Hobbesian argument in favor of absolute sovereignty, as long as 
it is sovereignty of the good.92 
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attention to a narrower register in which Fielding reiterates some of Hobbes' ideas. 
When Fielding declares his sovereignty over the "New Province of Writing" that is Tom 
Jones, he adds a subtle but remarkable rider, expanding the scope of his sovereign 
power: "I am at liberty to make what Laws I please therein. And these Laws, my 
Readers, whom I consider as my Subjects, are bound to believe in and to obey" (74, 
emphasis added). It is insufficient to command the obedience of his readers; Fielding 
must command their belief as well. What it would mean to 'belive in' a law is 
somewhat obscure—perhaps we may surmise that 'believe in' here is simply short-hand 
for 'believe in the authority of; but even so, by casting his authority as a function of 
belief as well as of obedience, Fielding introduces an interpretive dimension into the 
sovereignty to which he lays claim. 
This rider therefore has implications in both literary and legal contexts. Thinking 
in terms of genre, we might read this rider as part of Fielding's broader insistence upon 
the historicity of his fiction, as when in Joseph Andrews he explains that "those 
romance-writers, who intitle their books, the History of England, the History of France, 
of Spain, &c... should indeed be termed topographers," since although those works 
eternally contradict each other, "some representing the same man as a rogue, to whom 
others give a great and honest character, yet all agree in the scene where the fact is 
supposed to have happened; and where the person, who is both a rogue, and an honest 
man, lived." By contrast, "with us biographers the case is different, the facts we deliver 
may be relied on, tho' we often mistake the age and country wherein they happened" 
(239). In short, Fielding (only half-jokingly) defines biography as that which is 
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probably true somewhere, and history as that which is certainly false in one precise 
locale.93 This approach to fiction might be termed "realism," but it is a realism of a 
peculiar sort, because it does not purport to hold a mirror up to the world itself, but 
rather to hold a mirror up to the forms that compose the world. This becomes clearer 
when Fielding turns to his own work and informs us that "I describe not men, but 
manners; not an individual, but a species" (240)—'species' being a term used by 
numerous seventeenth- and eighteenth-century commentators on Plato as a synonym for 
'"idea."94 Thus, like all the characters in Joseph Andrews, the "lawyer m the stage-
coach. .. is not only alive, but hath been so these 4000 years"—and during this long life 
he hath not indeed confined himself to one profession, one religion, or 
one country; but when the first mean selfish creature appeared on the 
human stage, who made the self the center of the whole creation; would 
give himself no pain, incur no danger, advance no money to assist, or 
preserve his fellow-creatures' then was our lawyer born; and whilst such 
a person as I have described, exists on earth, so long shall he remain 
upon it. (242) 
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The lawyer, in other words, is a personification of an abstraction, and the realism that 
Fielding espouses here is a Platonic realism, a realism that seeks to uncover the 
structures of repetition and replication within which our everyday experience unfolds. 
However, insofar as it aims for such generality and divorces itself from the everyday 
world, Fielding's fiction also admits the possibility of what might be called the 
erroneous ascription of forms. In other words, although we might incredulously ask, 
along with Fielding, "is there in the world such a sceptic as to disbelieve the madness of 
Cardenio?" (240) we are still left to ask who, precisely, has the madness of Cardenio. 
This is a problem that Fielding neatly avoids by renouncing the historian's ambition to 
ascribe a particular character to a particular person at a particular place and time. 
For both Hobbes and Fielding, the problem of sovereignty arises from this 
strategy, which Hobbes employs at one key moment in the Leviathan. Speaking of the 
sovereign as a species, he draws our attention to a puzzling double-bind. First, he insists 
that "the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy, or in one 
Assembly of men, as in Popular and Aristocratical Common-wealths, is as great, as 
possibly men can be imagined to make it" (106-107). Then he acknowledges that such 
power may appear to be too great, and that "men may fancy many evil consequences" 
(107) of it—but they can do nothing to mitigate these consequences, because 
"whosoever thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesser?; must 
subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater" (107). In a 
startling paradox, we find that Hobbes must be correct: any attempt to limit sovereignty 
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only magnifies sovereignty. If there is a power that can limit the apparent sovereign, 
then that power must be greater, and is therefore the true sovereign. However, this 
argument follows only because Hobbes has cleverly avoided locating sovereignty in any 
particular person or body. Sovereignty, in the context of this argument, is not the 
sovereignty of the Rump Parliament, or of Charles II in exile, but is simply sovereignty, 
which lies wherever it must. 
Properly understood, Hobbes' argument here is tautological, and he uses the 
term "must" to indicate not compulsion, but logical necessity. People are not compelled 
to submit to one particular sovereign; rather, it is logically necessary that there exists a 
sovereign to whom the people submit. The absolute sovereignty that Hobbes is 
defending does not rest anywhere in particular, and the question of who is sovereign is 
left open to (potentially violent) debate. 6 In a sense, then, Hobbes' argument is a 
vacuous argument that leaves us with a vacuous sovereign. This vacuity is precisely the 
vacuity that Fielding embraces when he defines biography as that which is true 
somewhere. Furthermore, as Fielding suggests by redefining history as romance, any 
attempt to fill that vacuum must be imaginative. Here the overlap between Hobbes and 
Fielding becomes clearest: if the power of sovereignty "is as great, as possibly men can 
be imagined to make it," perhaps that is because imagination produces sovereignty in its 
concrete form. We do not simply obey the sovereign; we apply a conventionally literary 
mode of interpretation to a political state of affairs by believing in the lawmaker or 
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lawmakers' sovereignty, even though we know their sovereignty may be at best a useful 
fiction. 
This overlap between Hobbes and Fielding operates not only at the level of 
literary interpretation, but at the level of legal interpretation as well.97 When Fielding 
declares his sovereignty over Tom Jones, he also announces "I shall not look on myself 
as accountable to any Court of Critical Jurisdiction whatever" (74). Though it primarily 
satirizes the self-importance of Grub Street critics, this witticism draws its structuring 
metaphor from political philosophy. The relationship between the judicial system and 
sovereignty is one that Hobbes considers at some length, recognizing that the power to 
interpret law may become a threat to sovereignty: 
The Legislator known; and the Lawes. either by writing, or by the light 
of Nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very material 
circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the Letter, but the 
Intendment, the Meaning; that is to say, the authentique Interpretation of 
the Law (which is the sense of the Legislator,) in which the nature of the 
Law consisteth... (142) 
Hobbes' insistence that power be located in the sovereign forces him to consider the 
issue of "authorial intent" in matters of law. This is no mere intentional fallacy, but a 
logical consequence of Hobbes" line of political reasoning: if the law were to be 
identified with the "Letter" of the law alone, then law would cease to be a matter of the 
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sovereign will, and power would devolve to the text, or worse, to the interpreters of the 
text. This would be an unacceptable blow to sovereign power: 
the Interpretation of all Lawes dependeth on the Authority Soveraign; 
and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the Soveraign... shall 
appoint. For else, by the craft of an Interpreter, the Law may be made to 
bear a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign; by which means the 
Interpreter becomes the Legislator" (142-143). 
Without the support of sovereign authority, an interpretation cannot be considered valid; 
therefore interpreters of the law must be appointed by the sovereign, and when they 
interpret, they interpret in the sovereign's name alone. 
Furthermore. Hobbes insists, there is no loophole; there are no steps that the 
sovereign may take to avoid the problem of interpretation, because language is 
unavoidably obscure. Even the unwritten law of nature, "though it be easie as such" 
(143), requires interpretation, which becomes difficult when all available interpreters 
are "blinded by self-love, or some other passion." How much more difficult, then, are 
written laws, which "if they be short, are easily mis-interpreted, from the divers 
significations of a word, or two: if long, they be more obscure by the divers 
significations of many words." In short, without the constraint imposed by the sovereign 
will, the meanings of any law are subject to ever-increasing proliferation. Therefore, to 
understand the law, one must have "a perfect understanding of the final causes, for 
which the Law was made: the knowledge of which final causes is in the Legislator" 
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(143). This last comment reiterates Hobbes insistence, throughout this passage, that the 
interpretation of a given law must reflect its author's intent. However, as it finally 
becomes clear, it is not necessary that the interpretation of the law reflect the 
sovereign's intent at the time of the law's creation. Even that is unnecessary, because 
for the sovereign, "there cannot be any knot in the Law, insoluble, either by finding out 
the ends, to undo it by; or else by making what ends he will, (as Alexander did with his 
sword in the Gordian-knot,) by the Legislative power; which no other Interpreter can 
do" (143). Faced with the knotty prose of written law, the sovereign may attempt to 
gently unravel the tangled threads of meaning woven therein; but unlike other 
interpreters, the sovereign has another option. In the final analysis, the sovereign is not 
the authority on the meaning of a law because there is some fact of the matter about 
what the law means, which only the sovereign knows, or even because there is some 
fact of the matter about what the sovereign meant the law to achieve, which only the 
sovereign knows, and which others can only guess at. The latter may even be true—but 
it is, finally, irrelevant. The sovereign is the authority on the meaning of a law because, 
fundamentally, to interpret a law is to make it anew, which only the sovereign may do. 
To put it into modern literary critical terms, one might say that in Hobbes' view, the 
sovereign is the one reader for whom the reader-response approach to interpretation is 
not only semantically but also legally valid. 
Because the fundamental source of the sovereign's power to interpret law is the 
sovereign's power to make law, that interpretive power extends beyond written laws to 
the unwritten laws of nature, which the sovereign had no part in composing. Natural law 
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may exist, and philosophers may describe and explain it, but those descriptions and 
explanations are not legal interpretations. Hobbes writes, "The Interpretation of the 
Laws of Nature, in a Common-wealth dependeth not on the Books of Moral Philosophy. 
The Authority of Writers, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, maketh not 
their opinions Law, be they never so true" (143). Even Hobbes' account of natural law, 
"though it be evident Truth, is not therefore presently Law... though it be naturally 
reasonable; yet it is by the Soveraign Power that it is Law" (143). The only 
interpretation that matters is that of the sovereign. 
Nonetheless, Hobbes' account of sovereignty does not hold the sovereign 
directly responsible for every valid act of legal interpretation. Law is interpreted not by 
the sovereign alone, but also by 
the Judge constituted by the Soveraign Authority, to hear and determine 
such controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application 
of the Law to the present case... which Interpretation is Authentique; not 
because it is his private Sentence; but because he giveth it by Authority 
of the Sovereign, whereby it becomes the Sovereign's Sentence; which is 
Law for that time, to the parties pleading" (143). 
The sovereign delegates the work of interpretation to a judge, but the resulting structure 
of power is somewhat new. Hobbes has repeatedly insisted that the sovereign may be 
one person or a body of people who collectively posses sovereignty. In either case, there 
appears to be a fairly simple relationship between sovereignty and those who possess it. 
Here, however, the judge speaks in the name of the sovereign, and the judgment 
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becomes the sovereign's, but the judge is neither the sovereign nor a component of the 
sovereign body. The judge seems almost to wield temporary sovereignty, and during 
that time, the judge is not himself—or, if he is, then his judgment is mere opinion. In 
the passage that follows, however, it begins to seem that this temporary sovereignty is 
not only a unique property of judicial sovereignty, but of all sovereignty. At first, 
Hobbes seems simply to be acknowledging the possibility of judicial error: "there is no 
Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but may erre in a Judgement of Equity; if afterward 
in another like case he find it more consonant to Equity to give a contrary Sentence, he 
is obliged to do it" (144). For this same reason, the decision of one judge cannot bind 
another, at least in matters of natural law: 
For though a wrong Sentence given by authority of the Soveraign, if he 
know and allow it, in such Lawes as are mutable, be a constitution of a 
new Law, in cases, in which every little circumstance is the same; yet in 
Laws immutable, such as are the Lawes of Nature, they are no Lawes to 
the same, or other Judges, in the like cases for ever after. Princes succeed 
one another; and one Judge passeth, another commeth; nay, Heaven and 
Earth shall pass; but not one title of the Law of Nature shall pass; for it is 
the Eternal Law of God. 
Not only is the power of a judge ruling in the name of the sovereign temporary, the 
power of the sovereign is temporary when it comes to interpreting natural law. When 
confronted with eternal natural law, the sovereign ceases to be a transcendent font of 
power, and becomes a mouthpiece for another, higher power. The sovereign does for 
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natural law what the appointed justice does for the sovereign: he takes a higher order of 
law and interprets it, applying it to a particular set of local circumstances. This is an act 
that is fundamentally akin to the work done by those historians who Fielding derides as 
romance-writers: they conclude that this specific person at this specific moment is a 
rogue or an honest man, and deserves to be treated as such. When Fielding's justice of 
the peace considers Adams' fate, he must make an interpretive decision: what species of 
person is Adams? Is he a criminal, or is he a parson? Is he a vagabond, or is he a 
gentleman? The justice has, in that moment, absolute interpretive power. His ruling may 
be found erroneous and overturned later, but in that moment, it is incontestable; he may 
make what meanings he will. 
This is the power that Fielding claims for himself when he declares himself 
unaccountable "to any Court of Critical Jurisdiction whatever" (74). But the right of 
interpretation that he claims for himself in this case is the right not to interpret 
characters as fictional analogues of living individuals, but the right to decide the species 
of writing to which Tom Jones belongs. Likewise, in Joseph Andrews, by claiming to 
describe "not an individual, but a species," Fielding is explicitly disavowing any 
interpretation that maps characters in the novel to living individuals, but he is also 
simultaneously declaring, as from the sovereign's throne, the species to which Joseph 
Andrews belongs: it is not a roman a clef or a caricature of one person, but a social 
satire that aims for broad applicability, and should be read with a reflective mindset. It 
is through this particular mode of textual sovereignty, I argue, that Fielding expresses 
his relationship, as author, to the text. 
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Genre, Copyright, and the "New Province of Writing" 
By disavowing interpretations of Joseph Andrews that focus on narrow 
correspondences between characters and living individuals, Fielding makes the case that 
the distinguishing characteristics of his novel do not appear at the narrow level of 
individual character; and likewise, when in Tom Jones Fielding declares his 
sovereignty, he does so in order to assert his right to neglect narrative details that he 
deems unimportant. The unique qualities of the novel do not arise from such details, and 
to focus on them is to misread. Fielding explains, "My Reader then is not to be 
surprised, if, in the Course of this Work, he shall find some Chapters very short, and 
others altogether as long; some that contain only the Time of a single Day, and others 
that comprise Years; in a Word, if my History sometimes seems to stand still, and 
sometimes to fly" (74). The nature of the "New Province" that Fielding has created, 
then, does not consist merely in Fielding's autocratic status as author, whose word is 
law within the narrative. Fielding's power goes well beyond mere power over the 
behaviors of a character or the unfolding of a particular plot point. Fielding's "New 
province" is a new genre of writing; Fielding's laws are not narrow laws that operate 
only at the level of plot detail—accounts of what Tom did on page 117 —but broad 
and novel generic laws that determine anew what kinds of writing are appropriate at 
particular moments. Fielding's claim to originality is not merely at the level of plot and 
character, but at the level of genre. 
He punched Blifil in the nose. 
Insofar as Joseph Andrews is a new genre, then, it is likely to be unfamiliar to 
readers, and Fielding's methods are likely to be clouded in obscurity. This is a good 
thing, Fielding informs us: 
It is an observation sometimes made, that to indicate our idea of a simple 
fellow, we say, He is easily to be seen through: nor do I believe it a more 
improper denotation of a simple book. Instead of applying this to any 
particular performance, we chuse rather to remark the contrary in this 
history, where the scene opens itself by small degrees, and he is a 
sagacious reader who can see two chapters before him. (90) 
For a book to be easily seen through is to be simultaneously predictable and unoriginal. 
One sees through a book because it hews slavishly to certain formal conventions; one 
has, in some sense, read it already, having read so many others like it before. It is easy 
to master a simple genre as a reader, and once one has mastered the genre, one has 
mastered the books that belong to it as well. Still more, to master the book is to usurp 
the author, for one could just as easily have written it oneself. In this sense, an easy-to-
see-through book is not only an unentertaining one, but also one that has somehow 
slipped through its author's grasp. 
This is the fate that Fielding avoids by claiming a higher level of sovereignty 
over his text. Joseph Andrews, says Fielding, is difficult—perhaps impossible—to 
master. Its author is its master, upon whom readers depend to explain, clarify, unfold 
the narrative piece by piece. But this only holds if the novel is inscrutable: in a sense, 
then, it is Fielding's job not to communicate with his readers, but to withhold 
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communication, to pose riddles and conundrums not to be seen through. Without the 
textual sovereign to guide us, we readers are lost in a wilderness of the sovereign's own 
creation. We must, as readers, submit to our sovereign. This need for submission is 
further reinforced by Fielding's repeated insistence that readers not dwell on the details 
of the plot, trying to map characters to living individuals in Joseph Andrews and to 
work out what happened during the capacious breaks and gaps in the narrative of Tom 
Jones. Once one has mastered all those details, one has still not yet mastered the text. 
With this line of reasoning, Fielding anticipates the arguments that Edward 
Young would later make about originality in his Conjectures on Original Composition 
(1759). The details of plot and character that readers can easily glean from any text 
amount to mere learning, which Young calls "borrowed knowledge," and contrasts with 
genius, which is "knowledge innate, and quite our own."1 There is also an echo of 
Fielding's claim to have founded a new genre in Young's claim that "An Original 
author is born of himself, is his own progenitor, and will probably propagate a 
numerous offspring of Imitators, to eternize his glory; while mule-like Imitators, die 
without Issue."101 Young here creates an insurmountable distinction between imitation 
and true originality that is strikingly compatible with Fielding's claim to be a sovereign 
of the genre to which his novels belong, set apart from all others, and laying down laws 
that others—though they may submit to them, and thereby attain some part of Fielding's 
success, rather as a well-heeled landowner may depend upon the law of king and 
Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition (London, 1759), rpt. in Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online. Gale (CW104998891), 36. 
parliament to preserve power over an estate—cannot alter. The property granted by 
imitating Fielding, in this metaphorical schema, is analogous to an estate; but no form 
of estate ownership will allow an imitator to claim the sovereignty that Fielding holds. 
For both Fielding and Young, there is some aspect of the author's text that cannot be 
communicated to readers under any circumstances, and this asymmetry becomes the 
basis of an asymmetry of power. Fielding's insistence upon the obscurity ofJoseph 
Andrews thus foreshadows the claim of sovereignty that Tom Jones makes explicit. 
However, Fielding's understanding of originality differs from Young's in ways 
that complicate any straightforward proprietary metaphor. For Fielding, originality and 
the sovereignty it grants an author coexists with other, more universal modes of 
communication. Fielding makes this quite explicit when, in the first chapter of the 
twelfth book of Tom Jones—subtitled, quite baldly, "Shewing what is to be deemed 
Plagiarism in a modern Author, and what is to be considered as lawful Prize" (545)— 
Fielding declares that "The Antients may be considered as a rich Common, where every 
Person who hath the smallest Tenement in Parnassus, hath a free Right to fatten his 
Muse" (546). Here Fielding diverges markedly from Young's position that we ought 
only imitate the ancients insofar as they were originals; Fielding seems to be perfectly 
comfortable here with the notion that at some level, the produce of human literary 
creativity ought to circulate freely and universally. At the same time, "all I require of 
my Brethren, is to maintain the same strict Honesty among ourselves, which the Mob 
shew to one another. To steal from one another, is indeed highly criminal and indecent; 
for this may be strictly stiled defrauding the Poor" (546). If poor moderns must steal 
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from the abundant estates of the ancients, so be it; but they must not steal from one 
another. Here, much more than in Young, we see overlapping spheres of right, power, 
and influence within the textual domain. Some potential conflict between these 
overlapping spheres emerges; though Fielding finds theft from the ancients tolerable, 
such theft nonetheless inaugurates a new absolutely private property vested in Fielding. 
Having stolen sentiments from the ancients, he nonetheless declares "I expect all 
Readers henceforwards to regard them as purely and entirely my own" (547), a position 
that in Simon Stern's words "simply parodies Locke's theory of acquisition, substituting 
theft for labour" (438), and threatens to promptly consume and lay waste to this newly 
acknowledged public domain. However, this competition between public and private, 
between the commons and the encroaching fence, is unavoidable in a scheme of literary 
possession that turns on sovereignty rather than on property. Fielding presents his 
dictate as an "expectation" to be enforced, finally, not by some universally recognized 
law of the land, but by the self-policing behaviors of Fielding's loyal reader-subjects. 
That is the fulcrum on which this passage and others like it turn, swinging from stately 
rhetoric to winking self-parody and back again: only as long as we readers recognize 
Fielding's sovereignty does his expectation stand as literary law. 
By acknowledging the imitative strain in his work, both here and elsewhere (as 
when he speaks of imitating nature or representing universal types or species in his 
novels), Fielding ultimately recognizes two different and competing modes of 
communication. In the first, the author lets his readers in on only half of the secret, 
opening the scene "by small degrees" (Joseph Andrews 90) and always withholding 
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some fundamental item of knowledge. In the second, the author aids his readers, 
granting elevated access to the commons of universal knowledge, acting as a teacher or 
perhaps even midwife, aiding readers as they bring forth knowledge that they possessed 
already without knowing it. However in both of these models of communication, there 
remains a lingering sense of doubt. The sovereign author, like Hobbes' sovereign, 
wields power on an uncertain foundation that is liable to attack by usurpers—imitators 
who see through the author's obfuscation, perhaps, creating imitations of such 
excellence that they surpass the original—or by critics who declare that the author never 
was the rightful sovereign, but only an imitator himself. The knowledge the author 
withheld, in that case, may prove a phantom that served only to inflame the 
imaginations of readers. And though the literary midwife helps readers bring their own 
knowledge forth, the questions of what knowledge is and how to successfully 
distinguish between true and false knowledge remains unanswered. 
This uncertainty finally confirms, at least partially, that at the heart of Fielding's 
understanding of communication lies a Hobbesian vision of a linguistic state of nature. 
To escape this state of nature, some variety of submission—one hopes to a benevolent 
sovereign—is necessary. But even so, this escape is always provisional, and perhaps 
more so than in any corporeal commonwealth. In the context of a linguistic bellum 
omnium contra omnes,]02 the author is king, but no form of textual property is 
guaranteed. 
Hobbes' phrase, meaning '"war of all against all.'" 
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Chapter Three: 
The Matter of Property in Clarissa 
Samuel Richardson's Clarissa begins with an asymmetry: Clarissa's grandfather 
wills an estate to her, but her gender and age prevent her from coming into her 
inheritance, except through marriage. In a certain sense, she possesses the estate, since 
it has been willed to her, and cannot be taken from her outright; but neither can she 
dispose of it as she sees fit, and hence, she does not own it. 
Clarissa's situation is a particular example of a more general legal asymmetry 
between possession and ownership. In Clarissa's case, gender is the wedge that 
sunders the two. Yet Clarissa and its author were beneficiaries of another wedge driven 
between possession and ownership: copyright law. The Statute of Anne (1710) granted 
authors a limited-term monopoly on printed reproductions of their writing. The statute 
and court cases that followed established a sharp legal distinction between possessing a 
text and owning it. To own copyright in a text was to own literary property; to possess a 
text, materialized as a book or manuscript, was to own nothing more than paper and ink. 
I<b
 I will be using these two terms, possession and ownership, as a way of registering relative differences 
without reference to one absolute scale. This dissertation discusses many different models for the 
distinction between possession and ownership, and therefore the words "possession" and "ownership" 
will have many different meanings in absolute terms; but in all cases, I take the asymmetry itself to be 
more significant than any one of the many (frequently contingent and constructed) justifications for, or 
models of, that asymmetry. So, for example, primary texts will sometimes express the possession-
ownership divide in terms of material control as opposed to immaterial right; and in that case, 
"possession" will suggest a corporeal relationship between person and object. At other times, sources will 
reject the material or immaterial side of this distinction; one might argue, for example, that relationships 
between persons and objects should be expressed exclusively in terms of rights, in which case 
"possession" loses its specifically corporeal connotation, simply becoming a second set of rights distinct 
from the set specified by "ownership." Because my aim is to explore precisely the differences between 
such models of difference, I cannot rely on the semantic stability of these terms. 
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In the career of Samuel Richardson, author and printer of Clarissa, these two 
wedges played equally important roles. The first provided a backdrop against which 
Clarissa's character could emerge; and the second provided a legal and economic 
framework in which Clarissa could flourish. While many eighteenth-century authors 
were insulated from copyright issues by booksellers—who, unlike modern publishers, 
rarely offered authors a royalty per-sale104—Richardson felt the direct economic effect 
of copyright violations against his novels. He expressed his distress to Lady Bradshaigh 
in 1754, when his last novel, Sir Charles Grandison, was printed and sold without his 
consent in Ireland: "The Irish Pirates have undersold me in the Six Volumes and made a 
not unsuccessful Hand of the Basenes, as I am informed... I have been far from meeting 
with the Success in that Kingdom, that a Man so much injured might have expected." 
Because his career brought him into contact with both of these legal 
asymmetries, Richardson is an excellent figure through which to examine the relation 
between them. This chapter begins by arguing that many models of copyright law in the 
eighteenth century were implicitly gender-based: they imagine a masculine author 
capable of the incorporeal labor required to create and own immaterial texts, and a 
feminine reader capable only of possessing and reading material texts. Such models 
extended, into the realm of copyright, the very legal asymmetry that Richardson 
critiques in Clarissa. Yet Richardson's defense of his economic interests required him 
to favor copyright. To negotiate this potential conflict, Richardson rejected models of 
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copyright that privileged the immaterial over the material in a gendered way, instead 
basing his argument for copyright on a predominantly corporeal understanding of 
virtue. Richardson justifies copyright with an ethical argument that recognizes the 
investment of corporeal resources into an act of reproduction as the primary determinant 
of property rights in a text. This model denies the existence of an immaterial "ur-text" 
that could be owned separately from any particular materialization; the text arises 
precisely at the moment of printing, and exists only by virtue of the act of reproduction. 
This reading of The Case of Samuel Richardson, of London, Printer sheds light not only 
on Richardson's position on copyright, but also on the complex and often seemingly 
contradictory politics of corporeal virtue in Clarissa. 
The primary legal determinant of copyright in the mid-eighteenth century was 
the Statute of Anne, passed in 1710, which granted to an author a limited-term 
monopoly on reproductions of his or her writing—the author typically then sold this 
monopoly right to a printer or bookseller. However, the Statute of Anne did not extend 
to Ireland, and the resulting trade in reprints (or piracies, depending on which side of 
the Irish sea one stands) meant that printers and booksellers on either side of the Irish 
sea had no legal guarantee of profit in Ireland after the first printing. Richardson 
therefore hoped to have Sir Charles Grandison released first in Dublin, and was making 
arrangements to do so in the Summer of 1753. In a letter dated July 5th, he remarks that 
Irish bookseller George Faulkner was negotiating with Richardson for the exclusive 
right to print the first edition in Ireland. A month later, Richardson wrote to Sophia 
Westcomb that the deal had gone sour: 
"I received a letter from Ireland, the contents of which perhaps will 
expedite my Design of publishing sooner than I had thought to do... Four 
Dublin Booksellers have found means to corrupt some of my workers, to 
give them Copies of my work; which they are printing at several Presses 
in that City, and so will have me at their Mercy" {Selected Letters 240). 
By bribing Richardson's press workers, the Dublin booksellers had acquired more than 
three-fourths of the novel, and were putting it to the press as quickly as they could. 
Richardson's initial attempts at damage control led to his publication, in 
September, of a four-page pamphlet, "The Case of Samuel Richardson, of London, 
Printer." In it, Richardson details the series of events that led to Faulkner's withdrawal 
from their contract. After receiving only twelve sheets of Grandison from Richardson, 
Faulkner had discovered that three other Dublin printers had acquired substantial 
portions of the novel by bribing Richardson's employees. He then told Richardson as 
much in a letter, explaining that he intended to join ranks with the other printers to 
recover some fraction of the profit he had anticipated earning from his own printing of 
Grandison. 
Richardson's pamphlet denounces Faulkner's actions in the strongest terms; In 
response, Faulkner issued a number of public letters defending his actions: as 
Richardson put it, "Faulkner has attempted to whiten himself..." {Selected Letters 295). 
Faulkner's actions were not chivalric, but Richardson's pamphlet failed to acknowledge 
the difficulty of his position. Not only did Richardson fail to secure the text of his 
novel—essentially, if unintentionally, violating their contract—he provided Faulkner 
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with only twelve sheets, (roughly two-thirds of the first volume) while the other three 
printers had acquired the first five volumes in full, as well as portions of the other two. 
With such a small portion of the novel, Faulkner could not have mounted a successful 
defense; indeed, as Faulkner explains in one of his letters, the only reason he could have 
recovered any profit at all was that, according to a long-standing tradition among Irish 
Printers, when multiple parties received portions of a text by the same post, they would 
share them and split the profits of publication. Faulkner's acquisition of the twelve 
sheets thus entitled him to join the others. 
The debate between them became heated enough that Richardson published a 
second pamphlet, longer than the first. "An Address to the Public" reproduced portions 
of the epistolary exchange, with extensive commentary by Richardson. When he 
released his authorized edition of Grandison in February 1754, he included the 
pamphlet at the end of the final volume. In this chapter, I argue that such projection is 
useful not only in the case of Sir Charles Grandison, but in the larger examination of 
Richardson's career. In the following sections, I first examine Richardson's position on 
copyright law through an analysis of his pamphlet, "The Case of Samuel Richardson," 
situating it in its legal and social context and showing that Richardson's position on 
copyright placed unusual emphasis on the specifically material process of textual 
reproduction. I then examine Richardson's Clarissa, in order to show that Richardson's 
emphasis on the material in his discussions of copyright finds a striking parallel in his 
discussions of Clarissa's body, especially in the latter portions of the novel. 
Richardson's emphasis on the corporeality of the text, and the physical nature of the 
violation, should encourage us to reconsider the notion that Clarissa's virtue is wholly 
immaterial. Although it is certain that her virtue dues not depend upon the state of her 
own body, her virtue must still have physical effects. The act of publishing her letters, 
of "causing two copies to be made," allows her to leave a material trace of her virtue 
after her virtuous mind/soul passes beyond the material. 
The full title of Richardson's first pamphlet in the matter of Grandisoris piracy 
is "The Case of Samuel Richardson, of London, Printer; with Regard to the Invasion of 
his Property in The History of Sir Charles Grandison, before Publication, by Certain 
Booksellers in Dublin." It is a title that leaves little to interpretation: specifically, it 
unequivocally identifies Grandison as Richardson's property. As one begins to read the 
pamphlet, however, the matter becomes increasingly unclear. For a text intended to 
document a theft, it is remarkably silent about what, precisely, has been stolen. 
In part, it remained silent on this matter because copyright law was still in its 
relative infancy. Although the Statute of Anne (1710) had been tested in court numerous 
times, its full significance would not be worked out until 1774, and many questions 
were still unanswered when Richardson wrote his pamphlet. One set of unanswered 
questions is especially important in this case: first, does an author's monopoly on 
reproductions of his or her works constitute a common law property? Second, if so, did 
that property depend on an author's possession of the physical manuscript, or did 
emerge from an author's role as the creator of the text, when understood as an abstract, 
immaterial entity? This last question proved remarkably difficult to answer during the 
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eighteenth century. It was even difficult to ask: as Ronan Deazley has shown, the 
second question was never explicitly posed at any point during Donaldson v. Beckett 
(1774), the case that gave a definitive answer to the first.106 Yet this second question has 
enormous philosophical and legal ramifications. In its most extreme form, it is a 
question about whether Platonic forms exist, and whether they can be owned. 
It is therefore unsurprising that Richardson's pamphlet, published two decades 
prior to Donaldson, falls prey to the same ambiguity. What kind of "Property in The 
History of Sir Charles Grandison" does Richardson possess? °8 He never specifies. 
However, as one reads the pamphlet, a surprising pattern emerges—one that suggests a 
strictly materialistic account of literary property, which repeatedly rejects any notion of 
property in immaterial texts. 
The first hint of Richardson's approach to literary property appears at the 
beginning of the pamphlet, as he describes the precautions he took to thwart piracy: 
Pope v. Curl! had settled the second question with respect to the Statute of Anne (Mark Rose, Authors 
and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 64), but did nothing to clarify the matter with 
respect to the common law, since statutory protection of Pope's letters had not expired. In the court 
records of Donaldson v. Beckett, the closest thing to such a question was the following, posed to the panel 
of judges who spoke before the House of Lords: "If the Author had such Right [to the first printing] 
originally, did the Law take it away upon his printing and publishing such book or Literary Composition, 
and might any Person afterward reprint and sell, for his own Benefit, such Book or Literary Composition, 
against the Will of the Author?" (Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy (Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2004), 195). This question almost clarifies the matter; but it leaves open the possibility that an 
author could sell a manuscript without publishing it and hence still own the right to the first printing. 
Copyright would, in that case, be divorced from the physical object, although it would not survive 
publication. Thus the specific question, "Does immaterial or intangible property in a text exist by the 
common law" remained unanswered. 
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 This question is also raised by the modern practice of patenting software algorithms, many of which 
are based on or encode insights from pure mathematics—a field that could be said to define the essence 
of the Platonic form. 
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 Because the Statute of Anne did not extend to Ireland, he could not have claimed Sir Charles 
Grandison as property under that act in Ireland. Initially, therefore, Richardson seems to be arguing that 
he possesses a common-law property in the novel; but this position is inconsistent with Richardson's later 
descriptions of that property, for the reasons I give below. 
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He had heard an Irish Bookseller boast, some Years ago, That he could 
procure from any Printing-Office in London, Sheets of any Book printing 
in it, while it was going on, and before Publication; and Mr. Faulkner 
cautioning him on this Subject, with regard to this Work, he took 
particular Care to prevent, as he hoped, the Effects of such an infamous 
Corruption, as it must be called; since it could not be done but by bribing 
the Journeymen or Servants of the London Printer. He gave a strict 
Charge, before he put the Piece to Press, to all his Workmen and 
Servants, as well in PRINT (that it might the stronger impress them), as by 
Word of Mouth, to be on their Guard against any out-door Attacks. 
("Case" 1) 
Richardson's emphasis on the word "print" is notable. Why does Richardson feel that a 
printed notice would impress his workers more strongly than, say, a handwritten notice, 
or a direct verbal instruction? He appears to perceive an asymmetry between print and 
other linguistic media—an asymmetry that is incompatible with the logic of immaterial 
copyright, which would collapse all distinctions between representations of a text, 
regardless of their medium of transmission. And while Richardson's focuses, here, on 
the notice's influence on its audience, rather than the question of who owns the text of 
the notice, these two issues are closely linked. Richardson's strategy implies that printed 
text conveys a greater sense of authority than other language: paradoxically, 
Richardson's printed notice, divorced as it is from his body, and providing no clear 
evidence that it comes from him, is a more authoritative expression of his will than 
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speech uttered in his own voice! From this perspective, it is more fully his text precisely 
because it has been duplicated and distributed; it is a more authentic expression of his 
will because it is, so to speak, louder than his voice, and resonates longer—it does not 
fade into silence the moment it is uttered, and is heard wherever it is distributed. 
We may or may not agree with such an attitude, but a strictly materialistic 
account of literary property could easily emerge from it. One such account, for example, 
could hold that the existence of literary property does not imply the existence of an 
immaterial text; rather, a printed text is simply an amplification of the author's voice. As 
such, authors have the same rights over the printed text as they do over their own voice. 
In other words, the property in a book arises not from the labor of its production but 
from its status as an extension of the author's own body.' 
Richardson never tells us enough to extrapolate such a fully formed account of 
literary property. However, Richardson did not simply warn his employees and leave at 
that; nor does his pamphlet. As he describes further precautions, Richardson's emphasis 
on the material side of literary production becomes more apparent: 
To be still more secure, as he thought, he ordered the sheets, as they 
were printed off, to be deposted in a separate Warehouse; the Care of 
which was entrusted to One, on whom he had laid such Obligations, as, 
if he is guilty, has made his Perfidy a Crime of the Blackest Nature... 
Having Three Printing-houses, he had them composed, and wrought, by 
109
 Such a model would resemble, in certain respects, the notion of moral rights as understood in civil law 
jurisdictions. While moral rights in modern practice do not include copyright, they reflect the notion that 
an author's work is, in some way, an extension of him or herself, and hence subject to certain kinds of 
protection. 
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different Workmen, and at his different Houses. (2) 
Here we learn details about the disposition of the sheets destined to be cut and bound; 
they were composed by one set of workmen and printed ("wrought") by another; this 
process was carried out at three different locations in London; and the resulting sheets 
were deposited at a separate Warehouse guarded by a trusted employee. These rich 
descriptions of Richardson's printing method make this pamphlet a magnificent resource 
for historians of material texts: it contains details about the book's manufacture that 
might have been lost entirely. Yet nowhere does Richardson spend a moment describing 
the creative or mental, i.e. immaterial labor that produced the text. The space he does 
not devote to descriptions of the book's production, he devotes to accounts of his 
employees' corruption, which bookend the above quote, leaving no doubt that their 
crime constituted a physical violation. 
The pamphlet continues to follow this pattern, alternating between descriptions 
of the book's manufacture and denunciations of the Irish printers along with the 
workmen they bribed. This pattern reaches its climactic moment at the end of the 
second page, where we find the most convincing evidence of Richardson's 
preoccupation with the physical labor of book production: "The Editor, who had also 
great Reason to complain of the Treatment he met with in his Pamela, on both Sides of 
the Water, cannot but observe, that never was Work more the Property of any Man, than 
this is his. The Copy never was in any other Hand; He borrows not from any Author: 
The Paper, the Printing, entirely at his own Expense" (3). Were Richardson to take up 
the notion of mental labor, this would be the perfect moment; yet the closest he comes 
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is to say that "he borrows not from any Author." Richardson's previous descriptions of 
the production of the book were detailed, and here again, he refers to the handwriting on 
the manuscript and the cost of the paper and presswork. Yet he reveals no details about 
his mental labor as an author. In another context, we might interpret this recalcitrance as 
an attempt to preserve the illusion of historicity. In this case, however, this 
interpretation is difficult to sustain: "The Copy," Richardson insists, "never was in any 
other Hand." Not only does he implicitly claim authorship in this passage, he does so by 
referring to the physical labor of inscription. 
So what is literary property for Richardson? By the end of the pamphlet, when 
he finally makes an explicit reference to authorial labor ("in order to secure to Authors 
the Benefit of their own Labours..." (3)), he has made it abundantly clear that he does 
not think of such labor as purely or even predominantly mental. What, then, is the 
alternative? To answer this question, I now turn to a pair of court cases that address 
such questions. The first, Millar v. Kincaid, was concluded in 1751, just three years 
before Richardson's brush with Faulkner; and the second, Millar v. Taylor, was 
concluded in 1769. Because this second case is better-documented than the first, I will 
examine them in reverse order; however, the documents that have survived show that 
the first case, of which Richardson would almost certainly have been aware, addresses 
precisely the same questions as the second. 
When he published Pamela. Richardson carefully avoided being identified as the author, and even 
expressed gratitude that the plagiarists who released Pamela in High Life did not reveal the secret 
{Selected Letters 45). 
The dissenting opinion of Millar v. Taylor articulates a lucid objection to the 
idea of immaterial copyright. Justice Yates was the single dissenter in the case, which 
was resolved in favor of Andrew Millar, a London printer who had brought suit against 
Robert Taylor for printing Thompson's The Seasons without his consent. The Plaintiffs 
had argued, following Locke, "That Invention [i.e. discovery] and Labor are the Means 
of acquiring Property; and that literary Compositions are the Objects of the Author's 
sole Pains and Labour: Therefore They have the sole Right in them" ("The Question 
Concerning Literary Property" 66). Yates objected, replying that 
If this Argument is confined to the Manuscript, it is true: It is the Object 
only of his own Labor, and is capable of a sole Right of Possession. But 
it is not true, if extended to his IDEAS. 
All Property has its proper Limit, Extent, and Bounds. Invention 
or Labour (be they ever so great) can not change the Nature of Things; 
or establish a Right, where no private Right can possibly exist. 
The Inventor of the Air-Pump had certainly a Property in the 
Machine which He formed: But did He thereby gain a Property in the 
Air, which is common to All? Or did He gain the sole Property in the 
abstract Principles upon which he constructed his Machine? And yet 
these may be called the Inventor's Ideas, and as much his sole Property 
as the Ideas of an Author. 
To extend this Argument, beyond the Manuscript, to the very 
IDEAS themselves, seems to Me very difficult, or rather quite wild. (66) 
Yates accepts Locke's argument, but only so far as it applies to material objects. Any 
extension of property beyond the physical or corporeal is nonsensical for Yates. He uses 
several distinct arguments to support this conclusion, but the most interesting concerns 
the bounds of common-law property: 
That every Man is intitled to the Fruits of his own Labour, I readily 
admit. But He can only be intitled to this, according to the fixed 
Constitution of Things; and Subject to the general Rights of Mankind, 
and the general Rules of Property. He must not expect that these Fruits 
shall be eternal; that he is to monopolize them to Infinity; that every 
Vegetation and Increase shall be confined to Himself alone, and never 
revert to the common Mass... The Labours of an Author have certainly a 
Right to a Reward: But it does not from thence follow, that his Reward is 
to be infinite, and never to have an End. Here, it is ascertained. The 
Legislature have fixed the Extent of his Property: They have allowed 
Him Twenty-eight Years; and have expressly declared, He shall have it 
no longer. (69) 
Physical objects exist only for limited periods of time: houses decay, wood rots and iron 
rusts, and we do not expect property to extend beyond the "fixed Constitution of 
Things." Common-law property lasts only as long as its object survives; why then 
should literary properly have an infinite term? Yet the patterns of letters that make up a 
text cannot rot or decay, in so far as we conceive of them as independent of their 
medium, ink and paper - a conception that necessarily underwrites copyright law, 
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specifically copyright law's ability to protect an author's claim over his work. Such 
immaterial patterns are infinite in duration, and therefore common-law property in them 
must also be infinite - a temporality contrary to the nature of the common law. Yates' 
argument resembles a proof by negation; he shows that the idea of a common-law 
property right in an immaterial text is self-contradictory. Yates is not talking about a 
statutary, but a common-law right that is in every sense legally indistinguishable from 
any other form of common-law property. However, he does not then conclude that 
copyright cannot exist—he only concludes that the common law cannot provide the 
protections necessary to reward an author's labor. Copyright must therefore be instituted 
by statute alone. By limiting its duration, the Statute of Anne does for literary property 
what the common law cannot. But while the Statute may protect an abstraction, rather 
than a physical object, it is justified by physical labor, not mental—the labor of 
transforming ideas into physical objects, manuscripts and books. 
This expression of skepticism regarding immaterial property illuminates 
Richardson's pamphlet. Richardson, like Yates, recognizes the right of authors to benefit 
from their labor—but not their exclusively mental labor. For both Yates and 
Richardson, the temporary monopoly granted by the Statute of Anne serves to reward 
only the labor of framing an idea in written language, which can then be duplicated with 
relative ease. Note that that this viewpoint places the labor of printers on the same level 
as the labor of authors—writing and printing, from this perspective, are essentially 
similar acts, acts of translation from one format to another. The so-called "creative" 
labor of authors does not elevate them above printers. This emphasis on physical labor 
I l l 
helps explain why Richardson in his pamphlet made reference to his own writing of the 
text: because he wrote it in his own hand first, his manual labor makes him the origin of 
the text, its maker and its owner. 
Although the case was not argued until 1769, the questions it raises would 
almost certainly have been familiar to Richardson, through an earlier case, as he 
composed his pamphlet. In 1751, just three years before the publication of "The Case of 
Samuel Richardson," The House of Lords ruled against a group of London booksellers 
in the case of Millar v. Kincaid. Although the arguments from that case are less 
rhetorically splendid than Yates' dissenting opinion, they address essentially the same 
questions. The case had been initiated in 1743, by a group of sixteen London 
booksellers who charged over twenty Scottish printers from Edinburgh and Glasgow 
with the piracy of several profitable texts, including Fielding's Joseph Andrews 
(published by Andrew Millar several years before). Rather than coming to any general 
conclusion about the nature of literary property, The House of Lords rejected the suit 
based on procedural issues—"the action 'was improperly and inconsistently brought."' 
1
' 'As a result, no binding precedent was set. Nonetheless, the arguments voiced in the 
case revealed deep inconsistencies between the letter of the law and the everyday 
practices of London printers and booksellers. 
The letter of the law—embodied by the Statute of Anne—specified penalties to 
be levied against printers and booksellers who trafficked in unauthorized editions. 
However, for those penalties to apply, the copyright holder of the pirated book must 
1,1
 The Case of the Appellants, 1751 (British Library, BM 18th Century Reel, 4065/03). 
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have registered the book's title with the Stationer's Company, along with a record of the 
Author's consent to transfer copyright, if the Author was not the copyright holder. The 
London booksellers1 n found this requirement onerous: in their Petition of 9 December, 
1747, they report that 
'This Method of proceeding, is so inadequate a Remedy, and is attended 
with so many Difficulties, that it has scarse ever been practiced since the 
making of the Act; but Authors and Proprietors, waving the Penalties, 
have Recourse to a Court of Equity, which proceeds upon the Foundation 
of the Property declared by the Act, and gives a specifick Relief, by 
granting Injunctions, to restrain the printing, publishing or selling of 
pyrated Editions, and decrees them to account to the Proprietors for all of 
the Profits made by the Sale of any Copies of a pyrated Edition. 
And in a Court of Equity, it is noway material whether the Book 
ever was entered, this being considered as a Circumstance only to intitle 
i n 
the Proprietor to sue for Penalties.' (4) 
In other words, the London booksellers had developed a legal sleight-of-hand that 
converted a limited statutory property into a property "by the common Rules of Law" 
(9)—a common-law property of exactly the same nature as property in an estate. They 
1 u
 As William Sale explains in Samuel Richardson Master Printer (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1950), [XXX], the term "bookseller" had a specific meaning, distinct from the term "publisher," in the 
eighteenth-century book trade. "Booksellers" were merchants who purchased copyrights and then sought 
out a printer to produce an edition, which the bookseller would then sell. "Publishers," on the other hand, 
were merchants whom printers or authors commissioned to sell their own copyrighted works. Naturally a 
bookseller was almost always also a publisher, but was only the "publisher" of a particular book if he did 
not own the copyright. 
1
 In the eighteenth century more so than now, there was a distinction between law and equity. A Court 
of Equity would rule on what we would now describe as civil suits. 
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were able to do so because of the ambiguity of the word "property" in the Statute of 
Anne; they chose an interpretation that worked in their favor. 
What evidence was there that the Statute of Anne declared a common-law 
property in an abstract, immaterial text? As the Scottish printers pointed out in their 
Memorial, the statute makes little use of the term. While the term "proprietor" appears 
many times, the word "property" appears only once, in the clause requiring that titles be 
registered with the Stationer's Company to receive protection—the very requirement the 
London Booksellers were disputing. Moreover, argued the Scottish printers, 
As Property, by all Lawyers antient and modern, is defined to be jus in 
re
 l4
, there can be no Property without a Subject. The Books that remain 
upon hand are no doubt the Property of the Author and his Assigns. But 
after the whole Edition is disposed of, the Author's Property is at an End 
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 "Right in a thing " In later cases, supporters of immaterial property would correctly argue that many 
forms of property are more concerned with usage rights than with physical possession—for example, a 
theater subscription grants you the right to sit in a given seat for given periods of time, but you do not 
therefore own the seat Nonetheless, a theater subscription is a form of property—arguably, an 
incorporeal or intangible property On the other hand, a theater subscription can be reduced, in the final 
analysis, to a right in a unique physical object This right does not extend to all the seats in the theater, 
nor to all seats of a particular design Literary property and its cousins are unique in that they do not 
protect rights in any particular object, but rather protect rights in any object in a given abstract class 
This is a subtle distinction, and deserves further clarification Supporters of immaterial copyright 
could object that one can own an immaterial, common-law right in a class of objects For example, one 
could imagine someone buying tickets to all the seats in a theater in that case, the purchaser would own 
an immaterial right in all the objects in a given class—the class of all seats in the theater However this is 
a strictly finite class, since only so man) seats can fit in the theater This situation would be analogous to 
a system of copyright that piotects the author's right to copy all physical books that are pi ovably of a 
particular physical origin However, this again is a strictly finite class The moment one protects rights in 
any book that "looks like" the book in question one gets a potentially infinite set of books A useful 
concept to clarify this issue comes from the distinction, made in the philosophy of language, between 
"intension" and "extension " The intension of a set is, essentially, the test that determines which objects 
aie membeis of the set and which are not The extension of a set is precisely those objects which exist and 
are members of the set If we define copyright as applying to a set of texts defined extensionally, then that 
set is necessarily finite and has a corpus If we define copyright as applying to a set of texts defined 
mtensionally—that is, by some rule of resemblance—then the set could in principle be infinite Using 
these terms, w e can be more precise and say that Yates and co are objecting to the idea that copyright 
might protect rights in a set of objects defined mtensionally 
114 
There is no Subject nor corpus of which he can be said to be Proprietor. 
(7) 
This argument reappears, in various forms, several times throughout the Memorial, 
showing that the foundation of Yates' argument had been laid many years before his 
articulation of it. 
It is almost certain that Richardson would have been aware of Millar v. Kincaid. 
We know, at the very least, that Millar and Richardson were business partners and 
friends. Through the course of his career, Richardson printed more than seventy works 
for Millar (Sale 331), and wrote to Aaron Hill, in 1749, that he thought Millar "a fair 
honest, open Man, and one who loves to deal generously by Authors'" (quoted in Sale 
331). In another letter, written to Thomas Edwards in April 1753, he reports being in the 
company of Millar and encountering William Warburton {Selected Letters 226). 5 In 
addition to being a friend of one of the plaintiffs in the case, Richardson was a senior 
member of the Stationers' Company, having been elected to the office of upper warden 
in June, 1753; the next year, just a few months after the publication of Sir Charles 
Grandison, Richardson was elected Master of the company, its highest office (Sale 
331). Millar v. Taylor was of such importance to London printers that it could hardly 
have escaped the notice of any of the Company's senior officers. 
Richardson's position of prominence among London printers makes it especially 
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 In the letter, Richardson reports that Warburton slighted him, apparently offended by a passage in 
Clarissa that may have referred to Alexander Pope, who had been a close friend of Warburton's. 
Warburton himself had been a participant in the copyright debates; his Letter from an Author to a 
Member of Parliament, Concerning Literary Property was published in 1747 (William Warburton, Letter 
from an Author to a Member of Parliament, Concerning Literary Property, (London: John and Paul 
Knapton, 1747), rpt. in Horace Walpole's Political Tracts, 1747-1748, ed. Stephen Parks, (New York: 
Garland, 1974).) 
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surprising that Richardson sympathized with the perspective of those who argued that 
common law property could only apply to corporeal bodies. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, printers from London consistently took the position that a common law 
property in textual copyright existed, and defined that property in a way that was 
inconsistent with that position on copyright. Yet as I have tried to show, "The Case of 
Samuel Richardson" resists the suggestion that property might exist in an immaterial 
text. In the next section, I argue that Richardson's position on literary property is 
inextricable from the aesthetic and ethical positions he maps out in his Clarissa. The 
copyright materialists consistently argued that property must eventually relate to a body, 
a corpus; no property could exist in the incorporeal and immaterial realm of ideas. This 
argument is especially revealing when considered alongside long-standing debates over 
the virtue of Richardson's heroines. Was Pamela a paragon of virtue or simply a canny 
saleswoman? In the latter case, what could she have sold to Mr. B, over and above her 
body? The matter is further complicated in the case of Clarissa: once she loses control 
of her body, what property does Clarissa retain in herself? We could ask a nearly 
identical question about Richardson and his book, Sir Charles Grandison: after he sold 
his copies of the first edition, what property does Richardson still hold that could 
exclude the Irish booksellers from reprinting it? These questions, which copyright poses 
in such stark terms, also go to the very heart of Richardson's novels. 
The choice between Pamela and Clarissa is a classic one between two 
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strikingly and reciprocally imperfect alternatives: manifest material and 
social empowerment, which can be only fitfully acknowledged on the 
plane of discourse; and manifest discursive and imaginative 
empowerment, whose material register consists in nothing more 
substantial than the posthumous requital of one's persecutors.116 
When Michael McKeon framed his "classic choice" between Pamela and 
Clarissa, in The Origins of the English Novel, he cannot have been thinking of 
immaterial copyright. Few concepts seem so perfectly designed to allow one to have 
one's imaginative and discursive cake and eat it too; in the context of immaterial 
copyright, imaginative empowerment and material empowerment are perfectly 
coterminous. Imagine, for a moment, that Richardson's heroines had been able to 
benefit monetarily from the success of their epistolary output. There is little doubt they 
would have prospered; and while, in Pamela's case, the profits from manuscript sales 
would have been icing, for Clarissa, they would have been the entire cake. 
Therein lies both the promise and the paradox of immaterial copyright. As we 
carry this absurdity a bit further, we run into a problem: for while it would seem 
appropriate for Clarissa to receive some recompense for her suffering, to profit from the 
publication of such suffering seems sordid. Imagine Clarissa at a book signing, "in her 
virgin white.""7 Look, she even brought her coffin—see, there, behind the podium! 
116
 Michael Michael, The Origins of the English Novel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002), 381. 
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 Samuel Richardson, Clarissa (New York: Penguin, 1985), 1351. 
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It would probably have spoiled the ending. 
Debates over literary property yield similar puzzles. At one point in his 
dissenting opinion in Millar v. Taylor, Yates remarks on the perplexing fact that, 
according to his opponents, publication marks the beginning of a. private property 
(Burrow 67). This follows from an argument common among supporters of perpetual 
literary property in the eighteenth century: where there is value to protect, they argued, 
there is property (65). But the immaterial text itself has no clear value until it has been 
reproduced and published; however high the demand for a text might be, without a 
supply of copies, the text has little value. It acquires value only once it has been 
reproduced and made available to the public, and the market value of the copyright is 
therefore based on the projected profits to be made from the sale of those physical 
copies (65). The manuscript itself could be sold prior to publication, but in that case, it 
is difficult to distinguish between the value of the text and the value of the manuscript; 
they are, after all, one and the same. Even in the case of manuscript copies, the price 
would have reflected the labor of the scribe as much as—if not more than—the labor of 
the author. We can determine the value of the text itself only after publication. Hence 
the unpredictable nature of royalty advances in today's commercial book trade. Yet after 
publication, no single book or manuscript fully embodies the text; the text has no 
particular corpus, no body, any longer. A text can only become a profitable commodity 
once it has been "dislodged" from its body by reproduction—when it has lost an 
individual body or source, and inhabits multiple bodies, i.e. when it is reproduced. 
In both of these cases, the elevation of an object to the status of commodity 
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coincides with its own erasure as a unique material object. The manuscript, which was 
once the text itself, becomes just another copy. Likewise, Clarissa can only become a 
cultural icon if she is not, and has never been, a living person. Commodities—eternal 
forms—discursive constructs—are in a certain sense incommensurable with physical 
things. Yet the notion of immaterial property attempts to bridge this gap, by 
guaranteeing an exclusive dominion over forms that resembles our exclusive dominion 
over corporeal property. For Richardson, such attempts fail; but McKeon is incorrect to 
suggest that this failure yields a simple choice between material and discursive 
empowerment. In fact, such attempts to bridge the gap between the material and the 
immaterial worlds are as important to Richardson's ethical vision as are their eventual 
failures. To choose only one or the other is as blamable as to believe that you have a 
firm grasp on both. 
Nonetheless, McKeon's choice is an old and familiar one. According to this 
view, Pamela's virtue consists of nothing more or less than control over her body, and as 
such, is indistinguishable from the control a careful businessperson would exert over 
her merchandise.119 Clarissa, on the other hand, steadfastly refuses to involve herself in 
this marketplace of marriage, whether bargaining from a position of strength or of 
weakness. Read against the backdrop of Pamela, this refusal becomes corroborating 
evidence of the evaporation of Clarissa's body into pure discourse. 
A number of recent critical works have questioned this easy dichotomy on both 
118
 One might object that manuscripts are still accorded special status; but 1 doubt the value of an 
unpublished manuscript could ever approach the net earnings of its text after a few years of publication. If 
it could, then authors would have little motive to print their texts. 
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 For an updated version of this argument, see Ann Louise Kibbie, "Sentimental Properties: Pamela and 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," ELH 58.3 (1991), 561 -577. 
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sides. Yet I would argue that none have fully countenanced one of the deepest 
paradoxes of Clarissa: as the novel draws to a close, its heroine enmeshes herself in 
material commerce even as she renounces the material world. Irene Fizer's excellent 
"Rags of Immortality" makes a laudable attempt to synthesize these opposing 
tendencies: she reads Clarissa's commercial activity as a means "by which she 
accommodates to a status of radical disinheritance" and "asserts ownership... over 
herself (34). But Fizer's is an uneasy accommodation; the second-hand sale of clothing 
at artificially low prices is a poor comfort. Moreover, as Fizer herself observes, Clarissa 
continues to sell her clothing after she is beyond any comfort, instructing in her will that 
her linen and remaining laces be sold off.121 Although Fizer correctly asserts that these 
commercial acts do not debase Clarissa, her reading masks the way the novel, in its 
preoccupation with such acts, echoes Clarissa's tortured relationship with her body— 
"how this body clings—How it encumbers!" (1265). Clarissa cannot escape her body, 
and Clarissa cannot escape describing, in sometimes cumbersome detail, the minutia of 
its adornment.122 
In my reading, Clarissa's attention to her body and its adornment is no mere 
accommodation to disinheritance—nor is it simply a means of reasserting self-
In the case of Clarissa, see Irene Fizer, "Rags of Immortality: Clarissa's Clothing and the Exchange of 
Second-Hand Goods," Eighteenth-Centwy Fiction 20.1 (2007), 1-34. See also John Richetti, The English 
Novel in History, 1700-1780 (New York: Routledge, 1999). Charlotte Sussman's review of McKeon's 
opus in diacritics outlines a comparable critique in the case of Pamela (Charlotte Sussman, '"I Wonder 
Whether Poor Miss Sally Godfrey Be Living or Dead": The Married Woman and the Rise of the Novel" 
Diacritics 20.1 (1990), 88-102). 
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 To be precise, she instructs that Mrs. Lovick and Mrs. Smith divide the effects between themselves, 
but that, "in the case of disagreement," (1417) they should sell them and split the profits evenly. This 
potentially avoids placing the textiles on the open market, but it also validates the open market as the true 
and final arbiter of their value. 
" Despite these problems, Fizer's essay throws into brilliant relief the error of any interpretation of 
Clarissa that treats the novel exclusively as a story of "discursive and imaginative empowerment." 
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proprietorship. Rather, it is evidence of an irresolvable paradox at the heart of the 
concept of virtue. Some of the clearest evidence of this paradox appears in her will— 
which, when it comes into effect, marks both her death and her strongest assertion of 
proprietorship in the novel. This paradox brings into sharp focus the contradiction 
between accommodation to "radical disinheritance" and the assertion of self-ownership. 
What more radical disinheritance is there than death? No self-ownership can be asserted 
in the face of death, nor can anything accommodate one to it. And yet the self-
possession with which Clarissa has penned her will gives it an extraordinary force. 
Though her requests in life were not granted, her instructions in death are assertive and 
commanding; only then does she possess that crowning right of property, jus 
disponendi, the right to dispose of a thing. Only in death is Clarissa the unquestioned 
proprietor of her estate.123 As I read it, Clarissa does not attempt to synthesize these 
opposing trends; rather, Clarissa is the end result of the productive tension between the 
two. As it transforms perfect disinheritance and perfect ownership into their exact 
opposites, Clarissa's will forms the singularity around which the rest of the novel 
revolves. 
The will foregrounds this paradox in its first three instructions. She first requests 
that that her body remain unburied for three days; second, she requests that it "remain 
unopened" (i.e. that no autopsy or embalming be performed); and third, she requests 
'~' Ann Louise Kibbie takes this fact as the basis of her concept of "posthumous possession" (Ann Louise 
Kibbie, "The Estate, the Corpse, and the Letter: Posthumous Possession in Clarissa," ELH 74.1 (2007), 
117-143). It is important to remember, however, that any such "possession" dissolves as soon as the will 
is executed, divesting the estate. 
121 
that "it shall not be touched but by those of my own sex" (1413).124 These instructions 
directly contradict the notion that Clarissa had divested herself of all concerns about the 
material world. If Clarissa were indeed perfectly content to leave behind the corporeal 
world, it is unlikely that she would have included such detailed instructions about her 
body's treatment. This is especially true of the third instruction. Combined with her later 
instructions, the first two leave no ambiguity as to the manner of her burial. They 
certainly would have prevented Lovelace from taking possession of her body by having 
her embalmed, as he proposed to Belford after learning of her death. As such, they 
fulfill whatever duties were left to her, and sew up whatever plot threads remain. 
Clarissa's additional desire that her corpse remain untouched by men exceeds the 
requirements of duty and plot. It belies her earlier claim, as reported by Belford, that 
"the thought of death, and its hoped-for happy consequences... annihilates all other 
considerations and concerns... and shuts out the remembrance of past evils from my 
soul" (1306). The comfort of an approaching death did not erase her concern for her 
body after all. We can see that this concern for her body yielded tangible fruit; her 
instructions regarding her body were followed. Lovelace, who had once taken 
possession of Clarissa's living body, never possesses it after her death, nor does his 
desire to see her embalmed come to pass. Clarissa's other instructions regarding her 
body were also followed; even her more tentative requests, such as her request to be 
interred at her grandfather's feet, were granted. In the matter of her body's disposition, 
124
 Although such instructions were not without precedent (Kibbie 131-132), they appear to have been the 
exception, rather than the rule, as the century wore on. See Paul S. Fritz, "The Undertaking Trade in 
England: Its Origins and Early Development, 1660-1830," Eighteenth-Century Studies 28.2 (1994), 249. 
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her testament is the most successful expression of her will in the novel. However, 
Richardson only allows us to learn this after Clarissa has been buried; we first learn of 
her body's treatment through Bedford's correspondence with Morden, and only later do 
we see the text of the will. This delay further emphasizes the incommensurability of 
Clarissa's corporeal presence with the physical execution of her wishes. 
As the will transitions from burial instructions to property divestment, Clarissa's 
tone becomes even more commanding. She introduces her first bequest with a 
particularly forceful sentence: "And now, with regard to the worldly matters which I 
shall die possessed of, as well as to those which of right appertain to me, either by the 
will of my said grandfather, or otherwise; thus do I dispose of them" (1413). The 
semicolon towards the end of this sentence severs it in two, creating a sharp distinction 
between necessary but equivocal legal cant and the will's most important illocutionary 
act. The latter is a self-contained sentence, despite its punctuation; given Clarissa's 
normally verbose style, is a remarkably short, forceful declaration, which sets a tone 
that infuses the rest of the will. She begins to use declarative sentences of the kind 
rarely seen in any of her early letters concerning property. Early in the novel, for 
example, when Clarissa informs her mother that she has received a letter from 
Lovelace, she packages her desire in an admirable labyrinth of equivocal modifiers: "I 
humbly presume to hope that I shall not be required to produce the letter itself (123). 
Even the most tentative of sentences in the latter portion of the will is more 
straightforward; consider Clarissa's assertion of her right to bequeath money inherited 
from her grandfather: "These sums, however considerable when put together, I hope I 
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may be allowed to dispose of absolutely" (1414). Clarissa no longer characterizes her 
hope as a "humble presumption"—and yet she is speaking of the disbursement of more 
than a thousand pounds, whereas before, she was defending a simple right to withhold 
private correspondence. After this deferent gesture, almost all of the remaining 
instructions use unqualified verbs: "I give and bequeath all the real estates in or to 
which I have any claim... to my ever-honoured father..."; "I bequeath to my ever-valued 
friend..." (1414-1415). In this, her final composition, Clarissa's language adopts the 
force of law; her words become flesh. 
While this central paradox becomes most visible late in Clarissa, its foundation 
is laid much earlier in the novel. In one key letter, written after Belford's first face-to-
face meeting with Clarissa, Belford intercedes with Lovelace on her behalf, requesting 
that he abandon his attempts to seduce her, and "be honest, and marry" (556). 
Lovelace's other compatriots also sign the letter, and Belford speaks for all of them 
when he confesses that he does not see Clarissa as a corporeal being: 
She is, in my eye, all mind: and were she to meet with a man all mind 
likewise, why should the charming qualities she is mistress of, be 
endangered? Why should such an angel be plunged so low as into the 
vulgar offices of domestic life? Were she mine, I should hardly wish to 
see her a mother unless there were a kind of moral certainty that minds 
like hers could be propagated. For why, in short, should not the work of 
bodies be left to mere bodies? (555) 
Taken at face value. Belford's description of Clarissa seems to validate the notion that 
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her virtue is of an entirely otherworldly nature, utterly divorced from the bustle of the 
material world, the "vulgar offices of domestic life." Clarissa's very nature as a pure, 
virtuous mind renders her unfit for the "work of bodies." Yet we must ask why 
Richardson puts these words in the mouth of a close associate of the novel's greatest 
villain. Belford pens this letter well in advance of his full reformation, and while it 
foreshadows that reformation, it does not express sentiments appropriate to a reformed 
rake, since it advocates not a general end to Lovelace's predatory sexuality, but only 
forbearance in the case of a particularly virtuous woman. Belford's letter is not an 
example of virtue; instead, it is a foil against which Richardson encourages us to read 
Lovelace's response: "is it to be expected that a woman of education, and a lover of 
forms, will yield before she is attacked?" (557). Belford's letter emphasizes the depth of 
Lovelace's depravity, showing that he will go further than any of his rakish associates. 
Should we, then, entirely trust Belford's vision of Clarissa as pure mind, 
unadulterated nous? I think not: although he perceives Clarissa's virtue, he does not 
fully comprehend it. Nonetheless, his description of Clarissa's virtue contains very 
specific clues as to its true nature. Belford states that he would not want to see Clarissa 
a mother, "unless there were a kind of moral certainty that minds like hers could be 
propagated" (555, italics mine). Belford does not believe that Clarissa should engage in 
physical reproduction unless that physical reproduction would yield minds as virtuous 
as her own. If such an expectation could be met, then it would be appropriate for 
Clarissa to descend from the realm of mind into the realm of matter, undertaking the 
"work of bodies." Indeed, it would be more than appropriate; although Belford does not 
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say so directly, his language logically implies that if such a "moral certainty" did exist, 
it would be more virtuous for Clarissa to bear children than for her to remain childless. 
As the novel proceeds, we learn that no such "moral certainty" exists, and 
Clarissa fails to reproduce—at least in the conventional sense. However, the closing 
episodes of the novel reveal that Belford's first impression of Clarissa concealed a 
prophetic kernel. Adam Budd has persuasively argued that Richardson intended Belford 
as a model of Clarissa's ideal reader: a former rake reformed by his exposure to 
Clarissa's story, Belford exemplifies the transformation that Richardson hoped his novel 
would encourage in readers. Or—to put it in Belford's own words—he becomes the first 
proof that "minds like hers could be propagated." Even more suggestively, Belford 
becomes Clarissa's literary executor, having been directed by her will to collect the 
letters pertaining to her story and to "cause two copies to be made of this collection" 
(1418). Belton's first encounter with Clarissa led him to fantasize about mental 
reproduction; and by the end of the novel, Belford has become Clarissa's partner in the 
propagation of virtuous minds. While this partnership retains an incorporeal, mental 
character, Belton's prophetic description of Clarissa after their first meeting shows that 
even such an apparently mental partnership can never be fully distinguished from a 
physical one. It is precisely the "work of bodies" that enables propagation of virtuous 
minds—an assertion born out by the simple observation that it is precisely Belford's 
corporeal act of duplicating the text of Clarissa's story—of causing "two copies to be 
made"—that enabled its spread. Without such corporeal reproduction, no mental 
reproduction could occur. 
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Belford's description of Clarissa thus encourages us to associate mental 
reproduction with physical reproduction, and by extension, to associate sexual and 
textual reproduction. Read through such a lens, Belford and Clarissa's partnership late in 
the novel takes on a sexual character, and to the degree that Clarissa is fertile in the 
novel, it is through their pairing. Yet here again, there is a twist: if we take this analogy 
to its logical end, then we must acknowledge that Clarissa inseminates Belford, while 
Belford carries the pregnancy to term. Considered in this light, Richarson's novel 
articulates a coherent ethic of reproduction, one that can be applied both to biological 
and intellectual partnerships—to partnerships between husbands and wives, 
partnerships between authors and executors, and, in the final analysis, partnerships 
between authors and publishers. This ethic does not confine itself to the behaviors of 
the mind—to intentions, beliefs and intellectual pursuits—but overflows into the 
material realm, as it must if it is to have any influence over the course of human lives. 
Richardson was by no means the first to yoke child-bearing and literary 
production; as Margreta de Grazia and others'25 have shown, metaphors of reproduction 
were freely exchanged between discourses of printing and of parenting in the early 
years of the press. Moreover, these exchanges often turned upon the uncertainty, which 
haunted both, over legitimate parentage. The impression of inked type on blank page 
modeled (and was modeled by) the impression left by a father on a mother's womb; 
family resemblance between father and child—that uncertain evidence of fidelity in 
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 Printing and Parenting in Early Modern England collects a number of essays addressing this topic, 
see especially Margreta de Grazia, "Imprints Shakespeare, Gutenberg, and Descartes," Printing and 
Parenting in Early Modem England, ed Douglas Brooks (Burlington Ashgate. 2005) 
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reproduction—gave proof that the printer was true to her copy: "Your mother was most 
true to wedlock, prince, / For she did print your royal father off, / Conceiving you" (The 
Winter's Tale 5.1.123-5, quoted in de Grazia 42). De Grazia identifies Aristotle's theory 
of the four causes126 as an ancient forebear of this metaphorical exchange; father and 
mother are, she argues, to be identified respectively with the efficient and the material 
causes: the type and the paper; the fashioner and the material to be fashioned. However, 
for my purposes, the most interesting cause is Aristotle's second, the formal cause. De 
Grazia does not discuss this cause directly, but it is quite as relevant to the gendering of 
reproductive activity as are efficient and material causes: it is present in the efficient 
cause prior to the act of reproduction, and in the act, is transmitted to the material. The 
flow of forms from object to object is thus a gendered flow, from masculine to 
feminine. One could go so far as to argue that the gendered nature of this flow underlies 
the more superficial gendering of efficient and material causes in these metaphors of 
generation. 
Although these early modern conceits had partially faded into the background of 
eighteenth-century discourse, they had not disappeared: in "A Letter from an Author to 
a Member of Parliament," the author observed that "A Father cannot more justly call his 
Child, than an Author can his Work, his own" (2), specifically associating the fathering 
of children with the intellectual work of framing texts, despite—or because of—a 
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causes could be thought of as the answers to the following four questions: Of what is it made? What is its 
form? Who or what makes it? Why was it made? 
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mother's stronger claim to parenthood in physical and biological terms . The flow of 
forms from object to object was still gendered; form still originated with the masculine 
and flowed into the feminine. This gendering can be seen at work in Young's 
Conjectures on Original Composition, which originated as a letter to Richardson from 
the author, and was first printed by Richardson in 1759. Young observes that many 
classical authors "are accidental Originals; the works they imitated, few excepted, are 
lost: They, on their Father's Decease, enter, as lawful Heirs, on their Estates in Fame"; 
by contrast, "The Fathers of our Copyists are still in possession; and secured in it, in 
spite of Goths, and Flames, by the perpetuating power of the Press. Very late must a 
modern Imitator'?, fame arrive, if it waits for their decease" (15). Here a formal 
inheritance is passed on from father to son by the rules of primogeniture. However, 
Young takes the metaphor in an unexpected direction: the embodied text becomes not 
simply a child but a vehicle for a surrogate self, which may die at the hands of "Goths 
and Flames," but only in the absence of adequate reproductive technology. Given a 
sufficiently fecund and faithful press-womb, authors can, in a matter of speaking, clone 
themselves indefinitely and prolifically, without relying on the uncertain and limited 
output of the scribe's pen. This new development further magnifies the link between 
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 This is by no means an assertion that authorial production was exclusively associated with fatherhood, 
but simply that the association between fatherhood and mental, intellectual and incorporeal labor and 
reproduction remained strong Maternal metaphors perforce earned other associations, casting authorship 
as another form of bodily labor, which would have done little good in defense of an incorporeal property, 
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Brooks (Burlington Ashgate, 2005)) Richardson's description of the caches of printed sheets from 
Giandison, and his sense ot violation at the invasion of those caches, suggest that a similar metaphor is at 
work in The Case of Samuel Richardson However, Richardson is too polite to explicitly make the 
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masculinity and formal creation: now authorial genius must transcend mere literary 
inheritance by creating textual forms from thin air; "nor looks it for any inspiration less 
than divine" (68, italics mine). In this masculine fantasy of formal parthenogenesis, the 
material role of the press is briefly acknowledged, but only as a spur to discard 
"accidental Originals" in favor of the real thing. Through all this, the intellectual 
laborer remains male; the "Fathers of our Copyists" remain fathers. 
In the courtroom, these parental metaphors are further submerged, but Justice 
Aston reveals their influence nonetheless when he remarks, in Miller v. Taylor, that he 
cannot "comprehend any property more emphatically a man's own, nay, more incapable 
of being mistaken, than his literary works" (English Reports 98:224, italics mine). 
Aston's mid-sentence interpolation turns a discussion of mere property into a discussion 
of a more fundamental connection between author and work. The key term in this shift 
is "mistaken"; for while one person's property can be quite easily mistaken for another's, 
Aston contends that anyone could perceive the link between a literary work and its 
author. Furthermore, Aston's use of "mistaken" implies that we perceive this link 
through a sense of immediate recognition. We don't analyze a written work, carefully 
combing it for signs of its author's voice, collecting evidence, building a case; we 
simply recognize it, as we would a face, a voice or a characteristic mannerism. In short, 
a literary work looks like its author in some sense; they share a family resemblance, a 
resemblance that is much more important the secondary question of which press issued 
the work. 
This notion remains indispensable in modern Anglo-American legal discourse, 
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insofar as that discourse makes a distinction between idea and expression. Partially in 
response to arguments (like Yates') that ideas cannot be private property, copyright law 
came to distinguish between pure thought and the language in which, to use Pope's 
metaphor, it is clothed. As the US Supreme Court would put it in Baker v. Selden 
(1879): "Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the common property 
of the whole world, an author has the right to express the one, or explain and use the 
other, in his own way."12 A single idea could occur to many people, and therefore 
cannot be privately held under copyright law; but no two people would express the 
idea in identical ways. Hence expressions can be treated as property, even when ideas 
cannot. Implicit in this argument is the notion that, by expressing ideas held in common 
in their "own way," authors must also be somehow expressing themselves. This 
interpretation is both held up and modified by later decisions establishing the "merger 
doctrine," which the opinion from Kohus v. Mariol (2003) clearly defines, citing 
Concrete Mack Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. (1988): "the merger doctrine 
establishes that 'when there is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and 
its expression are inseparable [i.e., they merge,] and copyright is no bar to copying that 
expression.'"'131 Some ideas—in the case of Kohus, the idea of a child's safety latch— 
1-8
 In the US, this distinction has a statutory basis; in the UK, it plays a role in case law, but has no 
statutory support. See Simon Stokes, Art and Copyright (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2001), 48-53. 
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 Baker v. Selden, U.S. Supreme Court, October 1879 (101 U.S. 99.). 
1
' ° For simplicity's sake, my discussion sets aside patent law, which does enable some kinds of ideas to be 
privately held, in a sense, for brief terms. However, modern patents are much more limited than 
copyrights, both in their term and in the range of activities they protect: although a patented design may 
not be implemented or otherwise embodied by anyone other than the patent holder, the design, in so far as 
it is an idea, may be represented in full detail by anyone. In this way, the term "patent" retains a kernel of 
its ancient meaning: "open." Patents can be usefully contrasted with trade secrets, which are more fully 
closed: possession of trade secrets resembles an author's possession of a manuscript prior to publication. 
m
 Kolms v. Mariol, No. 01-4089, US Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 20 May 2003 (328 F.3d 848), 
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admit only a few very similar expressions, meaning that the possibility for creative or 
original expression is severely limited.1 2 In effect, these expressions have been judged 
to look too much like their ideas, and too little like their authors, to be protected by 
copyright. Hence the sentiment Justice Aston expressed in Millar v. Taylor, that we 
recognize in a work something of its author, retains legal currency even now. 
The merger doctrine further illustrates that for a work to be protected by 
copyright, it cannot be too abstract, too ideal, lest it loose its connection with its author. 
And what is the nature of that connection? How does a work resemble its author? 
Justice Aston might respond that it resembles the author's mind—but how can such a 
resemblance exist, unmediated by the sensory recognition of a face, a voice, or of the 
distinctive stroke of an author's pen on paper? The similarity of a child to its father, 
even according to Aristotelian notions of procreation, remains evidence of a bodily act. 
The discourse of copyright, despite its exaltation of the creative powers of the intellect, 
and of the infinite reproducibility of the immaterial text, cannot ever quite leave the 
body behind. This is the insight that I argue is reflected in "The Case of Samuel 
Richardson," and in another, very different way, in Clarissa. 
This insight, however, does not exhaust Richardson's novel. If, in Clarissa, 
bodily labor enables the reproduction and propagation of virtue, it also conspicuously 
citing Concrete Machinery Co v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., No. 87-1491, US Court of Appeals, 
First Circuit, 1988 (843 F.2d 600). 
, j2
 Arguably, many literary texts also push to its breaking point this distinction between idea and 
expression, by focusing so intently on the mode of expression—the form of the language—that it 
becomes the idea to be expressed. Whether this could or should disqualify such texts from copyright 
protection is unclear. 
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interferes. The guarantee of wider distribution of virtue justifies taking up the work of 
bodies, but the intrusion of an unwieldy body threatens virtue. 
In Clarissa, these intrusions often read as interruptions in the smooth flow of 
language. A number of such interruptions appear at regular intervals as Clarissa forms 
and then abandons a plan to escape from her family under Lovelace's protection. After 
having written Lovelace requesting his assistance, she is plagued by sudden doubt: "Oh 
my dear Miss Howe!—what a sad, sad thing is the necessity, forced upon me, for all 
this preparation and contrivance!—But now it is too late!—But how!—Too late, did I 
say?—What a word is that\—what a dreadful thing, were I to repent, to find it to be too 
late, to remedy the apprehended evil!" (351). Later, after Clarissa has resolved not to go 
with Lovelace, she has further doubts, this time about her fate at the hands of her 
family: "if it be resolved that the ceremony shall be read over my constrained hand— 
why then—alas! What then!—I can but—but what?" (365). Given Clarissa's penchant 
for clean, structured prose, these brief passages are notable for their fragmentation. 
Scattered with dashes, interjections and interrupted thoughts, they reveal chinks in 
Clarissa's otherwise evenly-mortared linguistic facade. Elsewhere, Clarissa expresses 
her doubts in the trappings of reason; here, her doubts make themselves^//, as if they 
had delivered physical blows. Clarissa's emotions register themselves on her body, as 
her family perceives— her sister with scorn, and her aunt, with sympathy: "Why these 
sighs, why these heavings here, said she, patting my neck?" (366). Interjections and 
gaps are the epistolary analogue of those bodily sighs and heavings. 
These interruptions reach their fever pitch as Clarissa waits to meet Lovelace 
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and inform him that she intends to remain with her family. As she waits, she writes: 
It would be hard if I, who have held it out so sturdily to my father and 
uncles, should not—But he is at the garden door — 
* 
I was mistaken!—How many noises un-\ike, be made like what one 
fears!—why flutters the fool so! — 
I will hasten to deposit this. (370) 
As Clarissa becomes increasingly fearful, her writing begins to disintegrate; her 
sentences decay; verbs vanish; first slips into third person. Most tellingly, unusual 
punctuation appears: an asterisk marks the break between Clarissa's exit and return. 
This asterisk serves no grammatical or semantic function. It marks a point at which 
Clarissa's text has been entirely evacuated of meaning—of traces of Clarissa's mind. 
Nothing is left but a mark on a piece of paper; and at that very moment in the story, 
Clarissa's own body deceives her, causing her to hear Lovelace's approach in every 
sound, corroding the hegemony of her reasoning mind. 
At the letter's close, Lovelace still has not arrived, and we do not learn what 
happened until after several letters have been exchanged. The resulting narrative is one 
of the most difficult moments in Clarissa: as Toni Bowers has observed, "when it 
comes to the all-important matter of agency, the episode at the garden gate has proven 
much more problematic than the rape."133 Initially it seems that Lovelace is wholly to 
' " Toni Bowers, The Politics of Motherhood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221. 
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blame. Lovelace had anticipated Clarissa's decision to remain with her family, as well as 
her fear of being discovered, and had instructed Joseph Leman, his spy among the 
Harlowes' servants, to pretend to discover them and shout for help if Lovelace gave the 
signal. The ruse succeeds, and fear overwhelms Clarissa's capacity for reason: 
Oh Lord!—help, help, cried the fool, all amaze and confusion, 
frightened beyond the power of controlling. 
Now behind me, now before me, now on this side, now on that, 
turned I my affrighted face in the same moment; expecting a furious 
brother here, armed servants there, an enraged sister screaming and a 
father armed with terror in his countenance, more dreadful than even the 
drawn sword which I saw or those I apprehended. I ran as fast as he, yet 
knew not that I ran; my fears at the same time that they took all power of 
thinking from me adding wings to my feet" (380). 
This brief narrative directly contradicts Belford's assertion, later in the novel, that 
Clarissa is "all mind." Here, she is all body; her emotions, which at other times attest to 
her acute sensibility and showcase her mindfulness, now occlude all thought, 
transferring executive function to her body. 
Most importantly, Clarissa again shifts momentarily into the third person— 
"help, help, cried the fool"—echoing the self-mocking question she asked herself 
previously: "why flutters the fool so?" This echo underscores the resemblances 
between these two episodes; but it also reveals a fundamental difference. In the first 
case, the slip into third person was indeed a slip, written hastily in a moment of panic, 
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without premeditation. By contrast, this second slip appears during an extended 
narrative that Clarissa wrote well after the events she describes. The prose in which it 
appears is less jagged; fewer gaps break its flow; and the gaps that do appear, appear 
only in dialogue. The narration itself consists of perfectly formed and punctuated 
sentences, broken only by the occasional new paragraph. Such even prose indicates that 
Clarissa's choice to speak of herself as a fool in the third person is a carefully 
considered rejection of her panic, and its effects on her mind and body. In the first case, 
Clarissa's slip conveys distraction and confusion; in the second, Clarissa's considered 
shift empties her narrated self of subjectivity. 
Why does Clarissa choose to make this shift a second time? From a certain 
perspective, this rejection buys Clarissa absolution. As Lovelace cynically puts it, while 
defending his actions to Clarissa, "the reluctance you showed to the last to leave your 
persecutors has cleared your conscience from the least reproach of this sort" (392). 
Clarissa's repeated refusals to join Lovelace appear to prove that Clarissa bears no 
responsibility for joining him in the end; she did so against her wishes. However, 
Lovelace's language conceals an ambiguity: he does not simply say that Clarissa's 
conscience is clear, but that it is clear "from the least reproach." In this subtle caveat, 
Lovelace reveals his inability to distinguish matters of conscience from matters of 
public reputation and reproach. Because Clarissa expressed such unwillingness to go, 
and therefore appears to have gone against her will, her conscience is clear from public 
reproach—but not necessarily from private reproach. Clarissa perceives something 
evasive in Lovelace's language, responding "Are you so light in your anger, as to dwell 
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upon words!" (392). This brief exchange between Lovelace and Clarissa turns on the 
fundamental incompatibility of their views about virtue. As Lovelace would have it, 
'"He who seems virtuous does but act a part/And shows not his own nature, but his art'" 
(143)—a notion perfectly repugnant to Clarissa, who detests the artifice she perceives in 
Lovelace's anger, as she writes and reflects on their conversation: "I have since thought 
that his anger was not owing to that sudden impetus, which cannot be easily bridled; but 
rather was a sort of manageable anger, let loose to intimidate me" (392). Clarissa 
perceives that Lovelace's righteous anger was a calculated act; in Clarissa's fearful 
escape, Lovelace perceives nothing more than another successful performance. 
However, Clarissa's actions have already shown that in this particular case, she 
agrees with Lovelace. Her fear at the garden door was genuine, but her sprint to Lord 
M's chariot was just an act. It was a purely physical act, uncontaminated by her rational 
mind, her thinking self; her fear "took all power of thinking." By persisting in this 
claim, Clarissa fails to fully acknowledge her actions at the garden door as her own, 
instead suggesting that they were the actions of a body for which her self—her mind— 
was not fully accountable, either publicly or privately. Both Clarissa's sense of self-
worth and her public reputation thus rest on a partial acceptance of Lovelace's 
reasoning. The absolution that Clarissa obtains thereby comes at a price: by disavowing 
those emotions and passions that lead her to rash acts, Clarissa forecloses the possibility 
of maintaining a subjectivity connected to her body. Such foreclosure is not, as some 
might surmise, the apotheosis of virtue for Richardson—for precisely the reasons that 
Belford will unwittingly express later. In order to live up to her full potential, she must 
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make peace with her body, a process the novel will represent both literally and 
figuratively in its closing episodes. 
Having come thus far, we may say that virtue for Richardson does not subsist in 
the absolute subordination of body to mind, but in the harmonious relation of mind and 
body—a harmony that, in its most perfected form, yields the potential for virtuous 
reproduction. However, such harmony is not easily achieved or maintained. The 
fragmentation that appears in Clarissa's letters just prior to her abduction foreshadows 
the bodily response to her fear that will enable that abduction. But we err if we interpret 
this as evidence that Richardsonian virtue amounts to absolute control of mind over 
body. I conclude with a reading of the fragments of prose that Clarissa generates after 
her rape. The first—annotated with a parenthetical remark, "(Torn in two pieces)" 
(890)—becomes a synchdoche for Clarissa's violated body, the torn body of the page 
literally interrupting lines of already-disjointed text. A litany of self-reproach follows in 
the nine numbered fragments that follow, of which one line stands out in particular: 
"How art though now humbled in the dust, thou proud Clarissa Harlowe!" (891). 
Although some critics have done so, it would be an error to read this as an insight; as 
Terry Eagleton observes, such writing must "be read in the light of the irrational guilt 
woman commonly experience after such violations."134 However, to cast it aside as a 
mere manifestation of a bodily intrusion, without value or substance, is to repeat 
Clarissa's previous mistake, made after her abduction. Clarissa's body has something of 
value to tell her, although she cannot articulate it in words, yet; we should not expect it 
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to first manifest itself in logically consistent, coherent prose. However, these fragments 
do contain at least one well-formed insight, one that was lacking before. Clarissa speaks 
of the fragments of paper, of herself, before her: "some time hence, when all is over, 
and I can better bear to read them, I may ask thee for a sight of them. Preserve them 
therefore; for we often look back with pleasure even upon the heaviest griefs, when the 
cause of them is removed" (890) 
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Chapter Four: 
Tristram Shandy and the Death of the Patron 
In March of 1761, Laurence Sterne traveled to London. Sterne's trip was 
subsidized by Stephen Croft, who had invited Sterne to be his traveling companion after 
they crossed paths on the street. Upon arriving, Sterne and Croft established quarters on 
Chapel street at Nathaniel Cholmley's; but the next morning, Croft did not see Sterne at 
breakfast. Later in the day, Croft and Cholmley encountered a buoyant Sterne, who 
burst from Robert Dodsley's bookshop declaring that he was "mortgaging his brains to 
Dodsley for £50"—an advance on the six-hundred pounds Dodsley had offered for the 
copyright of the first two volumes of Tristram Shandy. Hoping for an even greater 
windfall, Sterne intended to haggle further. Croft and Cholmley dissuaded him, and 
when Sterne returned to Cholmley's later that day, he came "skipping into the room, and 
said that he was the richest man in Europe."133 
Stephen Croft passed this anecdote on to his brother, John Croft, who in turn 
repeated it in a letter to Caleb Whitefoord. It is difficult to know what details may have 
been altered along the way, but whether we trust it as a document of Sterne's life, the 
story presents an eminently Shandean anecdote, with a plot almost too appropriate for a 
story about a master of digressive narration: a protagonist's impromptu excursion to 
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Sterne's eccentric sense of humor. He and Dodsley haggle over a "mortgage" that 
performs a comic dissection of the author, envisioning the sale of his copyright as an 
exchange not of abstract textual property, but of rights in a fragment of his own body. 
Sterne's witticism references the same crass materialism that Tristram Shandy satirizes 
in its first volume, as Shandy laments the circumstances of his conception, disrupted 
because his father had failed to wind a grandfather clock. Walter Shandy's neglect 
instigates a chain of events that "scattered and dispersed the animal spirits, whose 
business it was to have escorted and gone hand in hand with the Homunculus, and 
conducted him safe to the place destined for his reception." Shandy's embryo 
arrives in his mother's womb thoroughly traumatized, and his misfortunes have begun. 
Notwithstanding these narratives' comic overtones, we should see in them more 
than satire. Sterne's mortgaged brain and Shandy's unescorted embryo both partake in 
what I read as an explicit commentary on the condition of authorship in the new regime 
of copyright. Once sold, Sterne's text becomes a fragment of its author, floating 
unescorted through the marketplace; and Shandy's embryonic body drifts, without aid or 
shelter, towards its resting place in his mother's womb, arriving "miserably spent" (1:3, 
italics mine). Through the figure of Tristram Shandy, in other words, Sterne imagines 
not a proprietary author, but an author who is himself property, destined to be bought 
and sold, owned and borrowed against, fragmented, reassembled and scattered into the 
fiscal winds. This new kind of author is the product of reconfigurations in the ancient 
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system of patronage, reconfigurations that had been brought about by copyright law. 
Resisting current scholarly representations of the rise of copyright and the concomitant 
formation of professional authorship as a moment of proprietary control and semantic 
closure, I read the figure of Shandy not as the "principle of thrift in the proliferation of 
meaning,"138 but as a site of semantic unrest, profligate exchange and textual disorder. 
When it comes to matters of meaning, Shandy is a spendthrift, constantly introducing 
new contexts and paratexts, endlessly framing and reframing his circuitous prose. For 
that very reason, he is an author perfectly adapted for a literary marketplace dominated 
not by a few powerful patrons, but by the capricious and unpredictable demands of the 
mob. 
In Tristram Shandy, Sterne paints a very specific portrait of authorship. Sterne 
views the author neither as a compact engine of self-expression nor as a subjectivity 
specially gifted to act as an antenna for inspiration. Shandy is not, in short, a precursor 
to the romantic author. But neither is he an empty center, a cypher who becomes, 
through his very absence, the origin of an "inexhaustible world of significations" 
(Foucault 104). Although Sterne casts his author as a kind of property, he does not see 
him as a commodity floating freely through the marketplace, transcendent and 
untouched by exchange. Instead, I argue, Shandy and his text accumulate meaning as 
they move unpredictably through the marketplace. The meaning of Shandy's text is not 
anchored by the authority of Patron or Author, nor by the homogenizing force of a 
nascent commodity fetishism. Instead, Shandy participates in a fully symbiotic 
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relationship with the readers who both patronize and interpret him. The author and his 
textual fragments collectively embody Barthes' discursive 'textile,' but for Sterne this is 
not the condition of the author's death, but of the author's birth. 
I present this reading of Tristram Shandy as an account of a specific contribution 
to a discussion of authorship and patronage that was already under way, rather than as 
an authoritative description of the state of authorship in Sterne's time. Sterne was one of 
many authors in the eighteenth century making local interventions into the politics of 
literary production. Less than a decade earlier, Johnson had written his famous letter to 
Lord Chesterfield refusing Chesterfield's support for his Dictionary: and earlier in the 
century, Pope and Swift had satirized the sycophancy and greed that lay beneath the 
surface of so many polite dedications. These phenomena do more than provide evidence 
that power structures underlying literary production were shifting; they also anticipate 
the insights of Barthes, Derrida and Foucault, whose contributions to the discussion of 
authorship I also read as local, rather than transcendental. Rather than offer a reductive 
and anachronistic application of such theories to the eighteenth century, however, I read 
their conversation about authorship allegorically. Barthes, Derrida and Foucault do not 
offer, or necessarily even claim to offer, eternal truths about authorship that one could 
simply apply to the historical study of authorship in the eighteenth century. However, 
their discussion of authorship remains important to this historical discussion in so far as 
it exemplifies a moment in time that speaks to another moment in the eighteenth 
century. These moments are structurally similar even as they remain significantly 
different in their particulars. While Barthes, Foucault and Derrida have viewed the 
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figure of the author as an artificial force of constraint to be evaded or transformed by 
the free-floating signifiers of discourse, Sterne and other eighteenth-century writers 
portrayed the literary patron as a force of constraint to be evaded by a new kind of 
independent author. This is a fundamentally different narrative. The specific form this 
independent author should take varied between accounts, but the motivation for these 
different accounts was the same: a recognition that power vacuums had grown as 
literary patronage became less important relative to the "patronage" that readers could 
offer, via booksellers, under the auspices of copyright law. Certainly the patron was no 
more dead than the author is today; rather, I argue that like Foucault and Barthes, Sterne 
and Johnson saw opportunities to generate and organize meaning in new ways at 
particular moments in time, and took advantage of them. 
In developing this argument, I also want to avoid a teleological approach. 
Although I argue that figures such as Sterne and Johnson saw power vacuums in the 
literary marketplace, they did not seize them for some greater end, or as part of some 
grand authorial narrative. Instead, I maintain what might be called an evolutionary view 
of the process: small power vacuums appear and are filled as they appear, and as long as 
they keep appearing in a particular way, the evolutionary pressure is constant, and 
coherent change is effected. But this only happens if the pressure is consistent in a 
particular direction; if it is random, no aggregate change is likely to occur. In the case of 
Sterne, for example, one might argue that copyright was only a stepping stone on the 
way towards the full financial support of patronage. Sterne began his career seeking 
patronage, and once Sterne had acquired his fame via other means, he depended on 
many favors of the sort that counted as patronage in the eighteenth century. The patron 
was not yet dead; the "niche" of patronage still existed and could still support authors; 
and it would be a gross exaggeration to say that any one copyright success story could 
spell the end of classic patronage, which in some forms remains with us today. 
Likewise, "full" transformation of the concept of authorship could not take place except 
under steady pressure away from classic forms of patronage and towards more modern, 
copyright-oriented forms. A link does exist between the formation of the modern 
"author-function" and the rise of copyright, but it is not the rigid link that some have 
proposed it to be. 
Patronage Before and After the Statute of Anne 
This chapter takes a broader view of patronage than do most discussions of the 
history of copyright. Perhaps because copyright law deals at length with economic 
concepts such as property and monopoly rights, historians of copyright often understand 
the forms of patronage that preceded modern copyright as fundamentally economic 
institutions. In Authors and Owners, for example, Mark Rose describes patronage as an 
"economic relation" (4) that provided authors with monetary grants and printing 
privileges. However, the benefits of patronage went well beyond such direct and 
indirect financial support. Even in the eighteenth century, the term "patron" retained 
strong associations with its Latin etymon patronus, "protector." Dry den spoke for all 
writers of his day in his dedication of Marriage a-la-Mode to the Earl of Rochester: "to 
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your lordship's favour we generally owe our protection and patronage"139; more than 
half a century later, Johnson's Dictionary still defined "patronage" primarily as 
"support; protection."14 Accordingly, we should understand financial support as only 
one of several kinds of protection that patrons could offer to authors. Patrons could 
protect authors from want, but also from unwanted literary competition, from verbal or 
textual criticism, from political retribution, and indeed from threats of physical 
violence.141 A patron's protection could also allow an author to develop and maintain 
relationships with individuals of higher social rank than their own—relationships that 
otherwise might be thought improper, but that could yield substantial rewards, including 
further offers of patronage. 
These different forms of protection were all arguably founded on the patron's 
(usually aristocratic) status; and indeed, this very authority is perhaps the most valuable 
benefit that a patron could provide to a professional writer. In his dedication of Don 
Sebastian to Philip, Earl of Leicester, Dry den says of his patron, "the leading men still 
bring their bullion to your mint, to receive the stamp of their intrinsic value, that they 
may afterwards hope to pass with human kind" (Dramatic Works 3:16). Patronage, 
Dryden suggests, is like the coinage of money: as silver bullion is certified pure by the 
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authority of the crown and stamped with its true value, so a writer's intrinsic worth is 
evaluated by a patron and made socially legible by his stamp. Under the patron's 
authority, a writer may become—at least in a socially sanctioned sense—an author. 
However, the stamp of a patron's authority always comes at a price for authors. 
Writers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century were acutely aware of the 
debts they had incurred. Dryden modestly wrote to Lord Clifford of Chudleigh, "since 
all acknowledgements bear a face of payment, it may be thought, that I have flattered 
myself into an opinion of being able to return some part of my obligements to you" 
{Dramatic Works 3:348); while Pope, in his pride, took care only to accept invitations 
when he knew he could offer hospitality in return.143 Furthermore, writers who 
depended on patrons for both sustenance and literary authority owed both monetary and 
interpretive debts. The threat of patronage to the independence of writers was therefore 
twofold, as Samuel Johnson must have recognized when he disavowed Lord 
Chesterfield's support in his famous letter of 1755. His ire in that letter might surprise 
readers who assume that patronage was only a form of monetary support, because 
Chesterfield's gesture of support had no monetary component. He simply penned a pair 
of reviews for The World}44 Accordingly, modern commentators on the letter often 
assume that Johnson felt that Chesterfield's reviews implied financial support that had 
not been offered. However, this assumption is unwarranted since Johnson's letter 
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portrays the very act of writing reviews as unwanted patronage: 
The notice which you have been pleased to take of my labours, had it 
been early, had been kind; but it has been delayed till I am indifferent, 
and cannot enjoy it: till I am solitary, and cannot impart it; till I am 
known, and do not want it. I hope it is no very cynical asperity not to 
confess obligations where no benefit has been received, or to be 
unwilling that the public should consider me as owing that to a patron, 
which providence has enabled me to do for myself." 
Even Chesterfield's public notice of Johnson, his good word independent of any deed, 
would have been valuable if it had come early enough; but as Johnson claims, the notice 
has come after he is already "known" to the public, and he is unwilling to have it 
believed that he owes that public knowledge to Chesterfield's authority. Insofar as it is 
about public knowledge, Johnson's complaint has little to do with the money economy, 
and much to do with the semantic economy; the meaning of his work, Johnson asserts, 
should be understood in terms of his own fame and authority, rather than the fame and 
authority of Chesterfield.146 
Although it is perhaps the most famous disavowal of patronage, Johnson's letter 
was not by any means the first. In his biography of Pope, Maynard Mack famously 
suggested that the contract between Pope and Bernard Lintot for Pope's translation of 
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the Iliad foretold the fall of patronage long before Johnson's letter ; and as his 
dedications illustrate, even Dry den could buck genteelly under the yoke of patronage. 
His dedication of The Spanish Friar to John Holies, Lord Haughton, for example, 
contains a lengthy commentary on his writing strategies, at one point declaring almost 
haughtily, "I will settle myself no reputation by the applause of fools" {Dramatic Works 
5:120). The implication is charming enough: Dry den would not be seeking Haughton's 
approval if he were a fool, so he must not be. However, this line of reasoning subtly 
requires us to consider and acknowledge the worth of Dryden's judgment as well as 
Haughton's. Dryden closes the same dedication with a short paragraph in which he 
acknowledges that he has written something more resembling a preface than a 
dedication, admitting, "it was thus far my design, that I might entertain you with 
somewhat in my own art, which might be more worthy of a noble mind, than the stale 
exploded trick of fulsome panegyrics" (5:122). Here again, whatever flattery Dryden 
offers can only be received by a patron who accepts Dryden as an authoritative 
commentator on his own work: Haughton's mind is noble precisely because it can 
discern between Dryden's worthy "art" and "stale exploded trick[s]." Although these 
moments must be understood in the context of Dryden's many other "fulsome 
panegyrics," they nonetheless show that Dryden's instincts were not those of a 
mercenary flatterer, but of a writer who reflected constantly on the forms of patronage 
and the ways they could serve his career and broaden his influence. 
We should not see Dryden as an uncritical participant within the patronage 
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system; still, his subtle resistance hardly constitutes evidence of patronage's decline. As 
Dustin Griffin observes, Dryden's attitude towards patronage reflects his "anomalous 
position within it... As a university-educated gentleman, allied by marriage with the 
aristocratic Howard family, Dry den could mingle with the world of patrons in a way 
that a writer like Oldham could not" (76). However, Dryden's attitude towards 
patronage does appear to have served in some respects as a model for later poets with 
ambitions of independence. Pope's vaunted independence from patronage—"thanks," as 
he says, "to Homer"m that is, to the income from subscriptions to his translations of 
the Iliad and Odyssey—seems like the next logical step after Dryden's quiet pride. 
However, even Pope's independence was not a matter of simple "progress" away from 
patronage. Pope's profits from the venture were made possible specifically by the 
passage of the Statute of Anne, the first modern copyright law, in 1710. Without the 
protection of copyright, few publishers would have undertaken such a large and risky 
venture, even by subscription. Pope, in other words, ought to have saved some room 
in his couplet to thank Parliament alongside Homer. And while the Statute of Anne may 
have enabled Pope to achieve financial independence, it did not directly change any of 
the entrenched practices of patronage. Many writers still enjoyed the financial support 
of patrons, and even those who did not, such as Pope, still depended on the system of 
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patronage for other purposes. 
Pope's claims of specifically monetary independence seem fairly accurate. For 
example, the proceeds from his translation of the Illiad enabled him to purchase his 
villa in Twickenham, which in turn allowed him, later in his career, to repay any debts 
of hospitality he accrued from his highly-placed supporters (Griffin 129). This financial 
ascent may well have enabled him to criticize members of the patron class in 
unprecedented ways. However, Pope's financial independence did not preclude other 
kinds of dependence. As Johnson observed in Lives of the Poets, Pope "seems to have 
wanted neither diligence nor success in attracting the notice of the great."131 The simple 
fact that Pope had so many friends among the patrons of the day suggests that Pope 
relied on the other kinds of support that patrons could provide. We can find one of 
many examples in Pope's ploy of having the copyright of the Dunciad registered in the 
names of three peers—the Earls of Bathurst, Burlington and Oxford—who, as peers, 
were exempt from prosecution under libel law. Even our understanding of Pope's 
economic independence shifts when we consider that many subscribers to Pope's 
translation were peers and patrons, that some subscribers paid for many copies of the 
translation while accepting only one. and that Pope successfully enlisted supporters 
among the patron class to essentially act as salesmen, securing additional subscriptions 
to the venture (Griffin 125-126). Pope, like Dryden, wanted to influence the literary 
tastes of his day, and, like Dryden, he did so largely through the well-established 
channels of traditional patronage. 
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As the eighteenth century wore on, the steady influence of the Statute of Anne 
created more and more opportunities for writers to secure financial support from outside 
the usual structures of patronage; by mid-century, the textual economy of Great Britain 
was a mixed one. Some writers were able to support themselves largely through the sale 
of copyright in their texts; others still depended heavily, or at least substantially, on 
different forms of patronage. Edward Young, although he benefited from "copy-money" 
as it was called, continued to petition for the support of various patrons at least until 
1758, when he wrote the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Seeker, asking for 
support.1D2 His years of petitioning paid off remarkably well: by 1765, the year of his 
death, Young's estate was worth a substantial 14,000 pounds133 although he was never 
granted the bishopric he sought. In addition to illustrating the continued importance of 
patronage throughout the middle of the eighteenth century, Young's example 
encourages us to reconsider the association between the idea of "original genius" and 
the rise of copyright; Young's Conjectures on Original Composition played an 
important role in the articulation of ideas such as originality and genius, and yet Young 
himself sought recognition as a genius, and the support that could accompany that 
recognition, from the powerful as well as the public. Although new conceptions of 
originality and genius certainly proved useful in defending copyright law, it would be a 
mistake to say that they arose in tandem with copyright, since such ideas already 
formed part of the rhetorical toolbox of authors seeking patronage of various kinds, and 
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were only later adapted to the ends of copyright maximalism. 
Together, these examples suggest a specific narrative about patronage in the 
eighteenth century. Historians of copyright often argue that the licensing acts of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries combined copyright and censorship in a single 
social institution,155 and that the Statute of Anne was the first law to differentiate 
between politically motivated restrictions and economically motivated restrictions on 
printing, authorship and bookselling. A similar argument exists with respect to 
patronage. Prior to the Statute of Anne, the institution of patronage combined financial, 
legal and social protections in an undifferentiated way. The passage of the Statute of 
Anne effectively drove a wedge between these types of protection, rendering at least 
some of the financial protections afforded by patronage obsolete.15 However, the 
Statute of Anne did not supersede the legal and social benefits of patronage; and while 
political censorship, sundered from copyright, was maintained through other legislation, 
the statute of Anne left the non-monetary benefits of patronage largely unlegislated. It 
may have granted authors monopolies on the texts they wrote, but it did not attempt to 
legislate authority. The result was a bifurcation in patronage; the importance of 
economic patronage dwindled in the face of competition from copyright, but what I will 
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call semantic patronage—the protection of a text's meanings in the marketplace— 
lingered in many forms, exerting influence over the book trade into the late eighteenth 
century and beyond. 
Sterne and Patronage 
Laurence Sterne's career as a recipient of patronage must be understood in the 
context of this bifurcation. Sterne spent much of his youth as a dependent of his uncle, 
the elder Richard Sterne. His later education at Jesus College, Cambridge was partially 
funded by his cousin, the younger Richard Sterne. After his graduation in 1737 and his 
ordination the next year, Sterne depended on the influence of another uncle, Jaques 
Sterne, to secure him a living as vicar of Sutton-on-the-Forest. In the context of the 
highly-politicized Anglican church of his time, this favor demanded repayment; like 
many influential figures in the church, Jaques Sterne was a staunch Whig, and expected 
the support of his nephew's pen. Sterne wrote political journalism on behalf of local 
Whig interests for several years to repay his uncle's favor and secure further 
advancement.'57 
During these early years, then, Sterne was one of many writers who secured 
support for themselves by writing "for a Faction in the name of the Community." 
However, Sterne became dissatisfied as his political screeds earned increasingly bitter 
rebukes, and he would eventually decry the practices of "party-writing" as "not only 
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beyond the Rules of Decency but Morality."159 Sterne's uncle, however, did not consider 
Sterne's debt repaid, and the ensuing rift between them limited Sterne's prospects for 
further advancement in the church. Nonetheless, he continued to seek ecclesiastical 
preferment from moderately important figures in the church such as John Fountayne, 
who became the dean of York Minster in 1747 (Ross 183-184). Finally, in spring of 
1759, he began writing the first volumes of Tristram Shandy; just a year later, Sterne 
was in London, capitalizing on his newfound celebrity from the success of Tristram 
Shandy. Sterne had sought the aid of John Fountayne for many years, with little to show 
for it. His newfound fame enabled him to sue for and receive preferment directly from 
the Archbishop of York himself (Ross 257)—who "was so delighted with Tristram 
Shandy that he supposedly reread the first two volumes every six weeks" (Ross 205). 
Sterne's sudden success in securing influence in the church shows how 
structures of patronage were changing. The number of ordained ministers seeking 
preferment within the church vastly outnumbered church livings of the sort that Sterne 
sought160—livings that had constituted the "primary form of patronage" for several 
poets including Edward Young (Griffin 29). After seeking this kind of support 
unsuccessfully for many years, Sterne rapidly changed his fortune by circumventing the 
usual channels of patronage, instead turning directly to the copyright-driven literary 
market. The mechanisms of copyright had created new opportunities for writers to 
support themselves; but once Sterne had availed himself of those opportunities, he 
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quickly turned back to traditional forms of patronage to capitalize on his gains. 
Furthermore, even Sterne's turn to the marketplace for support depended, in a subtle 
way, on a kind of patronage. Although he was not a conventional patron, and did not 
provide Sterne with monetary support, David Garrick wielded substantial influence and 
literary authority in London, and Sterne's success may well have depended on his 
support—support that Sterne eagerly sought, and secured in part through the ploy of 
having Sterne's then-mistress, Catherine Fourmantel, an acquaintance of Garrick, send a 
letter to Garrick written by Sterne and copied into her own hand, praising his newly-
published novel (Ross 214, 247-248). Although atypical, Garrick's support could easily 
be conceived as a form of semantic patronage. The story of Sterne's success with 
Tristram Shandy thus illustrates the complex ways in which copyright and patronage 
could be profitably combined in the eighteenth century. 
Tristram Shandy's Dedications 
With Sterne's relationship to the changing system of patronage in mind, I now 
turn to his own dedications. Tristram Shandy contains several dedications; my 
discussion will focus on the first two. since both appear in the first volume and deploy 
conventional dedicatory rhetoric m unexpected ways. The first appears simple at first 
glance; after Dodsley agreed to sell a second run of the first two volumes of the novel. 
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 The other dedications were to later volumes of the novel Sterne dedicated the fifth volume to Lord 
Viscount John Spencer, with whom Sterne cultivated a friendship in his later years, this is his most 
traditional dedication, but like the dedication to Pitt, it does not contain any request for protection 
describing itselt rather as a gift The ninth volume begins with a dedication by Shandy, entitled "A 
Dedication to a Great Man," and containing a possible echo of the dedication of Dryden's Don Sebastian 
"Honours, like impressions on com, may give an ideal and local value to a bit of base metal, but Gold and 
Silver will pass all the world over w ithout any other recommendation than their own weight" (2 733) 
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Sterne decided to include a dedication to then-Secretary of State William Pitt (Sterne 
3:37-38). The dedication is succinct, filling only three small octavo pages and 
comprising just two paragraphs modeled on the first and last paragraphs of longer 
dedications, such as those written by Dry den. The first paragraph offers a typical 
gesture of modesty, insisting that "Never poor Wight of a Dedicator had less hopes from 
his Dedication," and describing the author's provincial surroundings. The second 
paragraph echoes the common dedicatory practice of closing with a request that the 
dedicatee take the work under protection; however, here Sterne's request takes an 
unexpected sylleptic detour at the last moment: "I humbly beg, Sir, that you will honour 
this book by taking it—(not under your Protection,—it must protect itself, but)~into 
the country with you." Sterne's sly insertion arrives just at the grammatical point of no 
return. He speaks of "protection," the foundational concept of patronage, only to discard 
it. Whereas in a conventional dedication, the patron would "take" the book in a purely 
metaphorical sense, Sterne's dedication literalizes the word; he asks Pitt to take physical 
possession of the book and carry it with him into the country. In the context of 
conventional patronage, it would do little good for a patron to take a single copy of a 
book under protection; the "book" to which conventional dedications refer is an 
abstraction—not a physical book, but a "work," a text. Through a single grammatical 
sleight of hand, Sterne turns Pitt, the honored patron into Pitt, a humble reader. 
By playing on this distinction between physical copies of books and abstract 
texts, between book tokens and book types,162 Sterne touched on ideas that were being 
1621 refer here to a schematic distinction between "token" and "type" introduced by C. S. Peirce and taken 
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discussed regularly in British courtrooms of the time.163 Although Sterne's dedication 
initially appears to have little to do with copyright, the distinction between book tokens 
and types with which Sterne toys was the subject of many legal debates over copyright 
law. Cases such as Millar v Kincaid (1751), Tonson v Collins (1762) and Millar v 
Taylor (1769) all turned on the question of whether the British common law granted 
property rights in abstract textual "works" or only in tangible, material objects, such as 
physical copies of books. Supporters of perpetual copyright argued that the common 
law164 granted authors property in the very works that patronage served to protect. And 
while the relationship of author to work under copyright differs in key respects from the 
prior relationship of patron to work, the latter relationship also had proprietary aspects. 
As Dryden says to the Earl of Orrery, speaking of his play The Rival Ladies, "It was 
yours, my Lord, before I could call it mine" (Collected Works 2:133). Certainly, at any 
rate, the patron had a special connection to the work that went well beyond possession 
of a single copy 
Sterne's dedication thus occupies a pivot between copyright and patronage; it 
up by many philosophers of language, which lines up neatly with the book-work distinction that 1 argue 
Sterne makes in his dedication In short, a type is an abstract category, while a token is an instance of that 
category—an object that in some sense belongs to that category Thus Ti istram Shandy the work is a 
type, a copy of Ti istiam Shandy is a token For a lively and brief introduction to the distinction, see W 
V O Quine, Quiddities 
"" For a discussion of Sterne's direct commentary on copyright and Tristram Shandy's play with the type-
token distinction, see Shaun Regan, "Print Culture in Transition Tristram Shandy, the Reviewers, and the 
Consumable Text,' Eighteenth Century Fiction 14 3-4 (2002), 303-309 
164
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and remains part of the common law The Statute of Anne granted authors a limited-term monopoly right 
to print their works, but the law itself never used the term "property" to describe that right Aftei failing to 
persuade parliament to extend the term of copyright protection in the 1730s, powerful booksellers 
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snatches the work out of the patron's hands, replacing it with a single copy, a mere sheaf 
of bound paper. However, it would be a mistake to say that Sterne views this as an 
author-take-all arrangement. Freed by copyright from financial dependence on 
traditional patronage, Sterne nonetheless understands that he remains dependent on his 
readers for financial support and for authority, just as earlier authors were on their 
patrons. Although the "work" has been placed back in Sterne's hands, Sterne himself is 
placed in his readers' hands, in the form of a book; no patronly authority stands between 
the author and his readers any longer. Alone and bereft of patronage, embodied in many 
copies and circulating from hand to hand among readers, Tristram Shandy "must protect 
itself" 
As I read Sterne's dedication, the transformation of the patron into a reader has a 
number of important consequences. With its newfound freedom to circulate among 
readers, its meaning unhampered by the modulating influence of a patron, the physical 
book itself becomes a token not simply of the work, but of the link between author and 
reader—in this case, a link of sentiment. Sterne asks William Pitt to carry this token 
with him into the country, "where," he says, "if I am ever told, it has made you smile, or 
can conceive it has beguiled you of one moment's pain—I shall think myself as happy 
as a minister of state;—perhaps much happier than any one (one only excepted) that I 
have ever read or heard of." Through the physical channel of the book, Sterne's 
sentiments and his reader's unite, and the reader's happiness becomes the author's. The 
book thus acts as a token of sentimental exchange, a kind of emotional coinage; and 
since it lacks the patron's authoritative stamp, the book's value is determined exclusively 
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by the circumstances of its exchange.165 
Sterne closes with a gesture towards the tradition of panegyric, while reiterating 
his new-found independence: "/ am, great Sir, / (and what is more to your Honour,) /I 
am, good Sir, /your Well-wisher, /and most humble Fellow-Subject, I THE AUTHOR." 
For a politician who had come to be known as the Great Commoner, this closing is 
certainly appropriate. It praises without seeming to flatter, is modest without groveling. 
It casts its author not as a "servant," as do so many dedications, but simply as a fellow-
subject, avoiding any implication that Sterne and Pitt are on different social planes. For 
that very reason, Sterne's dedication is able to remain consistent in its disavowal of 
protection, as it could not have if Sterne were seeking a traditional kind of patronage. 
Tristram Shandy's second dedication differs dramatically from its first. It 
appears within the novel's metafictional frame. Having been written by Shandy himself 
for his autobiographical work, it offers a much more pointed—not to mention bizarre— 
satire of the genre. While it is not addressed to anyone in particular, it is far from 
flattering, even verging at times on insult. Nor is it even recognizable as a dedication at 
first—it begins as a chapter on hobby horses, which I excerpt here at length simply to 
convey its disorienting trajectory: nDe gustibus non est disputandum;—that is, there is 
no disputing against HOBBY-HORSES; and, for my part, I seldom do..." (12). Shandy 
goes on to describe his own travels on hobby horses—"to my shame be it spoken, I take 
somewhat longer journeys than what a wise man would think altogether right.—But 
the truth is,—I am not a wise man..." (13)—as well as the travels of 
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 This moment thus bears comparison to the much-discussed snuffbox episode in Sterne's Sentimental 
Journev. 
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great Lords and tall Personages... such, for instance, as my Lord A, B, C, 
D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, and so on, all of a row, mounted 
upon their several horses;—some with large stirrups, getting on in a more 
grave and sober pace;—others on the contrary, tuck'd up to their very 
chins, with whips across their mouths, scouring and scampering it away 
like so many little party-colour'd devils astride a mortgage. (13) 
As the chapter closes, Shandy finally begins to slip into the language of a dedication by 
addressing an anonymous peer whom he calls "My Lord." When it comes to hobby 
horses, only one circumstance really upsets him: 
when I see one born for great actions, and, what is still more for his 
honour, whose nature ever inclines him to good ones;—when I behold 
such a one, my Lord, like yourself, whose principles and conduct are as 
generous and noble as his blood... when I see such a one, My Lord, 
mounted, though it is but for a minute beyond the time which my love to 
my country has prescribed to him, and my zeal for his glory wishes,— 
then, My Lord, I cease to be a philosopher, and in the first transport of an 
honest impatience, 1 wish the HOBBY-HORSE, with all his fraternity, at 
the Devil. (13-14) 
This impassioned tirade is followed by a brief and comically understated paragraph 
insisting that "notwithstanding its singularity in the three great essentials of matter, form 
and place," the above chapter is a dedication. 
The following chapter provides the punchline. Given that the above was written 
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"for no one Prince, Prelate, Pope, or Potentate,—Duke, Marquis, Earl, Viscount, or 
Baron," Shandy concludes that it would offend no one if he were to offer "it up fairly to 
publick sale; which I now do" (15). In the following sales pitch, he characterizes the 
usual method of securing patronage as "higgling for a few guineas in a dark entry" (15), 
while he, by contrast, is dealing "squarely and openly with your Great Folks" (15). 
Furthermore, the dedication is not "a gross piece of daubing" as are some; he speaks of 
its "colouring" and "drawing"; he measures it "in the painter's scale," assigning ratings 
out of twenty for outline, composition, coloring, expression and for design, of which he 
says: "if I may be allowed, my Lord, to understand my own design, and supposing 
absolute perfection in designing to be as 20,-1 think it cannot well fall short of 19" (16). 
Interested parties, he suggests, should pay 50 guineasl66 care of Mr. Dodsley, and in 
return, Shandy will place the appropriate "titles, distinctions, arms, and good actions" 
(16) at the beginning of the previous chapter, all of which will be dedicated to the 
patron, as well as "whatever else in this book relates to HOBBY-HORSES, but no more..." 
(16). Finally, Shandy strikes upon the most appropriate patron for his work, dedicating 
the remainder of the work to the moon—who "has most power to set my book a-going, 
and make the world run mad after it..." (16). He concludes: "Bright Goddess, I If thou 
art not too busy with CANDID and Miss CUNEGUND'S affairs,--take Tristram Shandy's, 
under thy protection also" (16-17). 
Like Sterne's dedication to William Pitt, this breathless parody deftly 
manipulates the formal conventions of dedications. Once one realizes that the chapter is 
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a dedication in disguise, a second reading reveals that Shandy has opened with the 
requisite gesture of modesty—"the truth is,—I am not a wise man"— and has ended 
with a bona-fide, if backhanded, attempt at flattery, which resembles Sterne's closing 
praise of Pitt in its description of "my Lord" as "one born for great actions," but "whose 
nature ever inclines him to good ones" (1:16).167 The sudden shift of direction in 
Sterne's dedication finds a counterpart in the bewildering and irreverent prose that 
begins Shandy's; however, the direction of the shift is reversed. Sterne's dedication sets 
out in the style of a typical dedication and then diverges in tone and content; Shandy's, 
in a chiasmic inversion of Sterne's, begins as a digression and ends with a dedication. 
Shandy's dedication also inverts Sterne's in other senses. If the first dedication 
amounts to a quiet assertion that Sterne's work is not for sale, Shandy constructs a bold 
storefront complete with prominent signage and hawkers on the corner. The chapter that 
follows Shandy's dedication pushes to its breaking point the commonplace that writing 
dedications amounted to nothing more than, as Young put it in 1719, "prostitution of the 
pen" (Collected Works 2:129). Young's phrase suggests the very sort of "higgling for a 
few guinies in a dark entry" that Shandy claims to abhor, and to which his innovations 
in patronage offer an alternative. Surely the transactions of patronage, conducted openly 
in a public forum, could no longer be compared to prostitution. 
However, Shandy's strategy has its side-effects. By offering his dedication 
openly for sale. Shandy deprives any would-be patron of special authority. After all, the 
authority conveyed by patronage goes hand-in-hand with the assumption that the 
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tasteful patron has singled, out of many, a particular work or author worthy of support. 
If we think of patrons as buyers, patronage is always a buyer's market. The public sale 
of goods, on the other hand, suggests a seller's market in which prices are driven up by 
demand, and in which buyers are essentially interchangeable, anonymous, and unable to 
convey much prestige to the product.1 Although the financial details of the transaction 
between Shandy and his patron-consumer would be identical to those between parties in 
traditional forms of patronage, the power structure underlying the exchange would 
entirely different. In a hybrid literary marketplace, in which copyright has begun to 
supplant financial patronage, Shandy's version of patronage—a form of financial 
patronage without semantic patronage—seems to be a chimera, an absurdity. 
Or is it? In fact, the relationship between author and patron in Shandy's sales 
pitch more closely resembles the relationship between author and book-buyer under the 
letter of the law of copyright. Books—that is, physical copies of books—had been put 
"up for publick sale" for centuries; and the passage of the Statute of Anne enabled 
authors to benefit more directly from the profits generated thereby—in effect, turning 
all book-buyers into potential financial patrons. 6 Like Sterne's dedication, Shandy's 
thus plays on the distinction between reader and patron—this time by emphasizing the 
Of course this argument glosses over a few details. Certainly high-profile buyers can bring prestige to 
a product sold publicly; however those high-profile buyers are likely to receive many such products for 
free, as do present-day celebrities in what amounts to a system of semantic patronage. See Waxman, 
Sharon, "Celebrity Freebies: A Force Irresistible?" The New York Times, February 15, 2006. 
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financial aspect of patronage. If we set aside the patron's traditional role as protector, 
retaining only the financial aspect of patronage, then the difference between patrons and 
readers (as book-buyers) under the regime of copyright disappears. 
Read this way, Shandy's dedication erodes the distinction between reader and 
patron from one direction, while Sterne's dedication erodes that distinction from 
another. Sterne's dedication demotes Pitt from patron to reader by flattening the 
hierarchical relationship between them, asserting that Sterne's book can protect itself 
and therefore does not need the aid of Pitt's authority. In short, his semantic patronage 
as a public figure is unnecessary. Instead, as the Great Commoner, Pitt stands in for all 
readers. Pitt's relationship to the text ceases to be authoritative, but it remains important 
as a paradigmatic example of a reader's relationship to an author. Shandy's dedication, 
on the other hand, cries out for a kind of financial patronage that Shandy could just as 
easily receive from ordinary readers, through the mechanisms of copyright. 
Furthermore, he offers in return a variety of praise so generic that it could be applied to 
anyone—bringing to mind common complaints that dedications praised 
indiscriminately.170 If he were to do otherwise, how could he sell his dedication 
publicly? Shandy's public sale thus leaves no way for patrons to distinguish themselves 
from other readers, other than by footing a larger bill. However, this does not thereby 
demolish the patron's importance entirely; the author simply depends on all readers 
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collectively for financial support. Together, these two dedications work to repudiate 
both financial and semantic patronage, while simultaneously reinscribing them within 
the author-reader relationship. 
The portrait of the author-reader relationship that emerges from these two 
dedications is clearly idealized. Even if we limit ourselves to Sterne's own example, his 
extensive history of seeking and securing patronage would belie any claim that these 
two dedications accurately reflect the condition of authorship during the 1760s. What is 
remarkable, then, about Sterne's vision of authorship in Tristram Shandy is its 
generosity. 171 The fantasy of authorship that Sterne develops, both through his 
dedication and through the figure of Shandy himself, is exceptionally inclusive. 
Consider Sterne's dedication of the novel to Pitt. Sterne has no debt to repay to him 
since Pitt has granted him no preferment, and Sterne speaks no words of thanks. 
Nonetheless, Sterne hearkens to the language of earlier dedications when he appeals to 
Pitt's judgment, desiring Pitt to take pleasure in the novel and insisting that Pitt's 
particular pleasure will reflect back on Sterne, increasing his own. Sterne seeks Pitt's 
approbation despite the fact that he and Sterne had no personal or professional 
connection; apart from Pitt's public successes in government, he was no different from 
any other anonymous reader for Sterne. Furthermore, the dedication draws almost no 
attention to Pitt's work in the government or to his political views, barely even hinting at 
his eminence by calling him "great Sir," and very obliquely referring to his status as a 
"minister of state." Not a single word in Sterne's dedication suggests that his interest in 
171
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illusion of intimacy and inclusion, which in turn helps to sell books. 
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Pitt's enjoyment arises from anything other than his belief, professed in the first 
paragraph of the dedication, that "every time a man smiles,—but much more so, when he 
laughs, that it adds something to this Fragment of Life." Sterne's dedication is, in the 
end, not simply a dedication to Pitt, but a dedication to all his readers, one which 
expresses the utmost concern for their response to Sterne's novel. 
At the same time, this concern is not expressed as an assertion of Sterne's own 
authority. In the context of Johnson's letter to Chesterfield, one might be inclined to see 
Sterne's rhetoric as a similar attempt to secure greater literary authority for himself. We 
can reasonably infer from the language of Johnson's letter, and from the many "bad 
words" that Johnson identifies in his dictionary, that Johnson sought authority to dictate 
the responses of readers to his text, as well as to others' texts. But while it is true that 
Sterne, like Johnson, resisted the imbalances of authority inherent in systems of 
patronage, Sterne, much more than Johnson, appears to be advocating on the part not 
only of authors, but of readers. While Johnson's work often seems invested in 
determining how the reading public ought to respond to texts, Sterne's dedication is 
invested in the reading public's actual response to texts, and—in the final analysis—on 
the freedom of an author to develop an intimate, interactive relationship with the 
reading public unhampered by the hierarchical structures on which patronage rested. 
In addition to distinguishing Sterne from Johnson, this focus on the 
independence of the author-reader relationship separates him from later authors invested 
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in the idea that great poets must remake public taste. The attitude taken by 
Wordsworth in his preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800) shares much with Johnson's, for as 
Wordsworth asserts, "an accurate taste in Poetry, and in all the other arts... is an 
acquired talent, which can only be produced by thought and a long continued 
intercourse with the best models of composition."174 Both Johnson and Wordsworth see 
it as part of their authorial duties to direct readers towards appropriate models173 and 
help them train their ear for language; and although Wordsworth does not describe this 
duty in terms of patronage, his ability to assert his literary authority as he did probably 
depended, at least to some degree, on the changes in patronage that had happened 
during the eighteenth century. To the degree that the author-reader relationship in (some 
examples of) romanticism is hierarchical,176 it replicates the power structures of 
patronage, differing only in that the author and patron appear to have merged. 
Recto Contra Verso 
In its first two dedications, Tristram Shandy envisions an intimate and 
interactive author-reader relationship, but how does that vision translate to the novel as 
a whole? Shandy's oft-quoted assertion that "writing, when properly managed... is but a 
l7>
 For a discussion viewing Sterne as a proto-romantic author, see Peter Conrad, Shandyism The 
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 Clearly not all romantic authors follow the example given by Wordsworth here, nonetheless, his 
attitude here does provide a convenient example of the way in which the diminution of patrons' authority 
continued to create new possibilities for authors to assert their own authority 
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different name for conversation" (1:125) suggests one answer to this question; the term 
"conversation" is quite compatible with the amiable, interactive, give-and-take 
relationships that Shandy's dedications imagine. However, the idea that "writing" and 
"conversation" could be synonymous contains a paradox. Especially in the context of 
print media, the relationship between writers and readers is in many ways less akin to 
the relationship between two friends sitting in a parlor, and more akin to the relationship 
between a speaker at a podium and the members of a listening audience. Some critics, 
favoring this latter model of reading, have interpreted the term "conversation" in the 
above quotation to mean something closer to "speech," arguing that Sterne meant his 
novel to "sound" as if it consisted of spontaneous oral discourse. Of course the problem 
with this approach is that, as a written text, the novel doesn't really have a sound at all. 
Hence one critic concludes that Tristram Shandy is less conversational than a 
'"conversationalistic"' (Hnatko 235); Sterne fosters a captivating illusion of 
conversation, but he cannot offer the real thing.177 
Other critics, attending to Shandy's own definition of "conversation," interpret it 
more metaphorically, focusing on the ways in which the novel leaves its readers 
"something to imagine" (1:125).17 By leaving substantial gaps in his narrative, they 
argue, Sterne allows readers to participate more fully in the imaginary world he has 
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brought into being.179 However, this remains a fairly loose interpretation of the term 
"conversation" because it leaves a sharp articulation between the contributions of the 
writer and the contributions of readers. Although readers may invent an exciting new 
plot thread, the novel cannot answer in reply, as a literal reading of the term 
"conversation" would require. Readers' contributions begin where the writer's end, and 
never the twain shall meet; the "conversation" remains one-sided and illusory. 
As an alternative to these two interpretations of "conversation," I offer a more 
literal reading of the term. Clearly no definition of the term could arrange for Shandy 
and his readers to literally spend an evening in face-to-face conversation, but consider 
for a moment the etymology of the term "conversation": it derives from the Latin 
conversare, meaning literally to turn to and fro. From the related verb vertere, we also 
have the word "verso," meaning the back page of a book's leaf, the side visible after the 
leaf has turned. I would argue that the conversation between author and reader in 
Tristram Shandy finds its apotheosis in the textual phenomenon of discontinuous 
reading—the active turning of pages to and fro. 
This definition of "conversation" is able to come much closer to the word's 
literal meaning because it emphasizes the embodiment of the book resting in a reader's 
hands. Although neither Shandy nor Sterne (since 1768) could be embodied as human 
conversation partners, they are in a certain sense embodied by their book; through this 
bookish body, they can interact with their readers in a limited way. Interaction of this 
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sort becomes impossible if we think of Tristram Shandy as a work—as a fixed 
abstraction, an eternal, static text looking down on us from Plato's heaven of forms. One 
cannot interact with an eternal form, since it will never change in response to our 
actions. However, we can interact with the physical book, manipulating it and 
transforming it through our reading practices. If we read the physical book backwards— 
if we skip every other chapter—if we reread the sixth volume three times—then we 
have no longer read Tristram Shandy the Platonic form, but we have still read Tristram 
Shandy the book. And unlike Tristram Shandy the Platonic form, Tristram Shandy the 
book changes when we read it differently, responding in its own modest way with a new 
text, a new work—a new Platonic form—every time its reader turns its pages to and fro. 
Tristram Shandy explores this possibility by fictionalizing it and incorporating it 
into its narrative, including imagined readers as characters. At the beginning of one 
chapter, Shandy accosts an imagined reader with the provoking claim that she has 
misread the previous chapter: "—How could you, Madam, be so inattentive in reading 
the last chapter? I told you in it, That my mother was not a papist." Most first-time 
readers would probably sympathize with the female reader's response: "—Papist! You 
told me no such thing, Sir" (1:64). Shandy, however, remains firm: 
—Madam, I beg leave to repeat it over again, that 1 told you as plain, at 
least, as words, by direct inference, could tell you such a thing.—Then, 
Sir, I must have miss'd a page.—No, Madam, you have not miss'd a 
word.—Then I was asleep, Sir.—My pride, Madam, cannot allow you that 
refuge.—Then, I declare, I know nothing at all about the matter.—That, 
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Madam, is the very fault I lay to your charge; and as a punishment for it, 
I do insist upon it, that you immediately turn back, that is as soon as you 
get to the next full stop, and read the whole chapter over again. (1:64-65) 
Having thus banished her, Shandy continues as if he were speaking to another person 
who remains in his audience; to this other reader (identified later as male), he explains 
her banishment more fully: "Tis to rebuke a vicious taste, which has crept into 
thousands besides herself,—of reading straight forwards, more in quest of the 
adventures, than of the deep erudition and knowledge which a book of this cast, if read 
over as it should be, would infallibly impart with them" (1:65). 
This passage has proven difficult to interpret. Some critics have seen evidence 
here and elsewhere that Sterne's novel seeks to mock and exclude certain naive reading 
practices, which it genders as female; other critics have seen in these and other 
moments evidence of a liberated reader whose resistance is fundamental to the novel's 
construction of meaning. The stark contrasts between these positions suggest that 
Shandy's treatment of its imagined readers is genuinely ambiguous, and I do not hope to 
dispel that ambiguity, but rather to heighten it. The debate between these readings has 
often been framed as a dispute over whether or not we can distinguish Shandy's attitude 
1
 Ruth Perry and Barbara Benedict offer exclusionary readings, arguing in different ways that Sterne's 
novel genders naive, unreflective reading practices as feminine through its references to the female 
reader. See Barbara M. Benedict, '"Dear Madam': Rhetoric, Cultural Politics and the Female Reader in 
Sterne's Tristram Shandy," Studies in Philology 89 (1992), 485-98 and Ruth Perry, "Words for Sex: The 
Verbal-Sexual Continuum in Tristram Shandy," Studies in the Novel 20 (1988), 27-42. For examples of 
liberatory readings, see Leigh A. Ehlers, "Mr. Shandy's 'Lint and Basilicon': The Importance of Women 
in Tristram Shandy," South Atlantic Review 46 (1981), 61-75, and especially Helen Ostovich, "Reader as 
Hobby-Horse in Tristram Shandy," Philological Quarterly 68 (1989), 325-42. Ostovich's discussion of 
the conversation between Shandy and his imagined readers provides a starting point for my reading of the 
novel. Finally, Paula Loscocco offers an excellent synthesis of these two extremes in "Can't Live without 
'Em: Walter Shandy and the Woman Within," The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation 32 
(1991), 166-79. 
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toward the female reader from Sterne's. Shandy's position certainly appears to be critical 
of the female reader, since he excludes her, insisting that she leave the "room," and then 
carries on conspiratorially with another apparently male reader while she is gone. To 
this male reader, he characterizes his action as "punishment" designed to "rebuke a 
vicious taste." If we take Shandy's words at face value, then he is surely mocking what 
he sees as feminine reading habits associated with unprestigious genres such as 
romance. 
When we recognize that Shandy is himself the object of satire in this passage, 
however, other readings become available. Following passages reveal just how far-
fetched Shandy's self-interpretation is. Shandy sees himself as having said that his 
mother was not Catholic, and has suggested that his "Madam" reader will encounter 
"deep erudition and knowledge" if she rereads the previous chapter. However, the 
payoff he offers her (and us) after her return is intentionally confusing, pompous, banal 
and deceptive. When the female reader returns, Shandy pedantically instructs her "to 
ponder well the last line but one of the chapter, where I take upon me to say, 'It was 
necessary I should be born before I was christen'd.' Had my mother, Madam, been a 
Papist, that consequence did not follow" (1:65). This self-interpretation takes literally a 
statement that, placed in context, reads more readily as a metaphor expressing the 
notion that Shandy needed to describe his birth before describing his christening: "if it 
was not necessary I should be born before I was christened, I would this moment give 
the reader an account of if (1:64, italics mine). Shandy is referring to an account of his 
mis-naming, which, if he is to preserve narrative unity, must follow his account of his 
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birth. To deduce that Shandy's mother was not Catholic, one must thus misread the 
original passage, or at least read it against its grain. 181 Furthermore, the information 
necessary to make such a deduction isn't presented until after the female reader returns: 
Shandy then offers a footnote summarizing and reproducing in full a tedious and 
legalistic decision by a French ecclesiastical council establishing that an unborn child in 
danger of death could be baptized by syringe. Hence the female reader's excursion 
served no purpose, and Shandy's so-called "deep erudition and knowledge" arrives in a 
straightforward way—that is, in a way perfectly amenable to "reading straight 
forwards," the habit Shandy purports to rebuke.182 Even Shandy's claim to provide 
"deep erudition and knowledge" here is suspect. The inference Shandy wished his 
female reader to draw was based on an obscure and superficial technicality of Catholic 
orthodoxy, a minor quibble that provides few moral or theological insights of any depth. 
These observations all suggest that our laughter should be directed not at the 
female reader, but at Shandy as he flails comically in his own bombast; Shandy appears 
to be the object of Sterne's satire, just as the female reader is the object of Shandy's. In 
181
 Leona Toker makes a strong case that Shandy's self-interpretation is "underhand" (Leona Toker, 
"Narrative Enthymeme The Examples of Laurence Sterne and James Joyce," Partial Answers 4 2 (2006), 
167), and I follow her reading here However, other readings of this passage are possible Toker's 
argument relies on the commonsense notion that the facts of Shandy's birth will not change if he narrates 
them differently, her argument thus assumes that we can make a strong distinction between Shandy's life 
and his account of it Since Shandy often toys with the idea that we cannot, that assumption may not hold 
If it does not hold—that is, if Shandy and his book are one and the same—then his description of his birth 
is identical with his actual birth, and the tact that his mother is not Catholic becomes not an a postei IOI i 
truth about his mother, but an a pi ion truth that arises directly from the structure of the nairative itself In 
this latter case, the literal and metaphorical interpretations of his statement would be compatible, because 
if Shandy had narrated his christening before his birth, then his mother would have been Catholic by 
logical necessity Furthermore, if we insist that the order in which we read matters more than the oider in 
which Shandy wrote then we can lead his text out of order and transform his mother into a clandestine 
Catholic' 
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 Paula Loscocco makes a similar obseivation, pointing out the staid literal-mmdedness of Shandy's 
"insight " which he presents in a remarkabl) straightforward way, all things considered (171-172) 
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that case, the female reader is correct to resist Shandy's claims, and a strong case 
appears for identifying with her in her resistance. And yet such a reading neglects the 
possibility that Shandy means to parody himself, and that he knows his claims are 
ridiculous. If that is the case, then do we ridicule the female reader for resisting claims 
that were never meant to be taken seriously? Do we extend the same presumption of 
self-consciousness to her, reading the conversational exchanges between her and 
Shandy as a series of conspiratorial winks and nods? Or do we step even further back 
and read the female reader as a model of "safe" resistance designed (by Sterne) as a 
distraction from more unruly ways of reading the novel? Tristram Shandy makes each 
of these readings available, along with many more, depending on our conclusions about 
who is in on the joke. 
The ambiguity of this passage is further heightened by Shandy's use of a 
comment by Pliny the Younger about reading. As Shandy puts it, the reading mind 
should be accustomed to make wise reflections, and draw curious 
conclusions as it goes along; the habitude of which made Pliny the 
younger affirm, 'That he never read a book so bad, but he drew some 
profit from it.' The stories of Greece and Rome, run over without this 
turn and application,--do less service, I affirm it, than the history of 
Parismus and Parismenus, or of the Seven Champions of England, read 
with it. (1:65) 
Here again, Shandy's claims remain deeply ambiguous. "A book of this cast," he has 
said—but what cast might he mean? Initially it seems as though he is claiming to have 
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written a book containing "deep erudition and knowledge," which his book, "if read 
over as it should be, would infallibly impart." According to this interpretation of his 
claims, Tristram Shandy caters to an exclusive group of discerning readers, who are 
able to decipher its subtle and profound hints. But Pliny speaks above specifically about 
reading "bad" books; a good reader (like Pliny) can profit from even the worst books, 
those most devoid of wisdom or value. We could therefore just as easily read Shandy as 
having aligned his book—consciously or not—with unprestigious works of literature 
such as The Seven Champions of Chnstendom,\83 the 1735 edition of which promises 
on its title page "Tilts, Justs, Tournaments for Ladies" and "Combats with Giants, 
Monsters and Dragons." In this alternative reading, a work of Tristram Shandy's cast 
must be read discontmuously to have any value at all, since according to Pliny's 
statement, any book, "if read over as it should be," has some value. 
Through these ambiguities, the satire in this passage is directed at all parties, 
even Pliny the Younger, since Shandy has subtly suggested that Pliny would have 
happily read romances and tales of knight-errantry, had they been available. But what of 
the other reader, the male reader to whom Shandy speaks while the female reader is 
gone? An exclusionary reading of this passage might argue that this male reader is part 
J
 As Melvyn New obseives in the notes to the Florida Edition, Sterne's reference to "The Seven 
Champions of England" could be a distortion of the title of The Seven Champions of Chi istendom (3 433) 
by Richard Johnson first published around 1640 It could also be an echo of a line from William 
Wycherle>'s The Plain Dealei (London James Magnes and Rich Bentley, 1677, rpt in Early English 
Books Online), in which a young, naive male character asks to see '"Saint George for Christendom' or 
'The Seven Champions of England'" (44), the character has accidentally commingled the titles The Seven 
Champions of Chi istendom and Saint Geoigefoi England under which seveial popular works and 
ballads were published in the seventeenth century The question of whether Shandy is in on the joke thus 
extends to Sterne himself Is he self-consciously quoting Wycherley's play, or is he making the same error 
Wycherley's character did7 In any case, Wycherley's example demonstrates that, by the time Sterne was 
writing, such works had long been associated with naive, uninformed leaders 
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of Shandy's "in" crowd, and that because we read alongside him while she's away, we 
are all conscripted to join them in their mockery of the female reader. Even Paula 
Loscocco's canny navigation of this passage argues that, as readers, we are unavoidably 
drawn towards a static, literal reading of the passage. 184 But I would argue that even 
here, ambiguity remains. Shandy carries on with the male reader while the female 
reader is "away," seemingly excluding her; but if right reading is fragmentary reading, 
then by the end of the episode, the female reader has become a model of right reading, 
while the male reader, to whom Shandy speaks while she is away, has become a model 
of wrong reading: one who reads "straight forwards" through the passage. Furthermore, 
if we read continuously along with the male reader, then we too have read wrongly; we 
ought to have followed the female reader's circuitous path through the text, and there 
was nothing to prevent us from doing so apart from the conventions of everyday 
reading. If Sterne's novel does create a gendered hierarchy of reading styles, then that 
hierarchy is quite unstable. 
Through that instability, Sterne levels all hierarchies of reading practices. 
Certainly Shandy expresses certain norms about reading; but the hierarchy that results is 
a self-destructive one. By sending his female reader back to the previous chapter, 
Shandy—perhaps inadvertently—illustrates a method of reading oneself out of such 
hierarchies. Perhaps it is true that when read straight through, the "stories of Greece and 
184
 Loscocco argues that Shandy's pedantic footnote "compels the literal or 'concupiscent' reading that 
Tristram has just professed to abhor" (J 72), and that we therefore cannot escape being cast by the novel 
as naive, unreflective, literal-minded readers. This argument does not recognize the full extent of the 
paradox; for by reading so literally, we actually disrupt the most unreflective, most straightforward 
reading of the phrase "It was necessary I should be born before 1 was christen'd": the reading of that 
phrase as referring to narrative order rather than theological doctrine. 
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Rome" have more value than simple romances, and thus occupy a higher place in the 
hierarchy of texts; but even so, discontinuous reading—conversational reading— 
enables readers to profit from any text. Sterne does draw on the stereotypical view of 
romances as "womens' reading," but not to reinforce it; rather, he shows how "womens' 
reading" and woman readers can escape the hierarchical orders of reading. 
Yet at the same time, the ambiguities of this passage ensure that, whether we 
follow the male reader's or the female reader's path through the text, the joke remains on 
us. The satire in this passage is so multivalent that finding a clear satiric norm is 
difficult, and I would argue that Sterne's novel offers no unambiguously correct reading 
strategy. Instead, the novel turns even "continuous" reading into an error, in effect 
ensuring that in-order reading is discontinuous reading. This is not the result of 
authorial coercion (through the controlling figure of Shandy) but of the structural 
incoherence of the text, an incoherence that forms the kernel of Sterne's satirical 
method. Tristram Shandy is more than a text composed of "shreds and clippings of the 
rest" (1: 8), a work written in fragments—it is a book that cannot be put back together 
again. 
Furthermore, as I interpret the novel, discontinuous, conversational reading 
emblematizes reading under the regime of copyright, while reading "straight forwards" 
emblematizes reading undertaken within the patronage system. As the initial dedication 
of Tristram Shandy suggests, patrons take works. Platonic abstractions, under their 
protection, not embodied books specifically designed to be read out of order; D nor 
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 Order is also fundamental to the genre of the dedication: dedications almost always precede the text of 
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would one expect a patron to endorse a book without having at least some sense that its 
meaning is stable—stable enough, at least, not to be turned against the patron. 
Discontinuous reading threatens such stability. Sterne's dedication of Tristram Shandy 
to William Pitt pretended to offer him the fixed Platonic abstraction of a text, 
substituting a physical book at the last moment. The remainder of Tristram Shandy does 
the same for all Sterne's readers. If even in-order reading is discontinuous reading, then 
the fixed Platonic abstraction of the text remains permanently out of reach. But was it 
ever really in reach at all? As we read further into the novel, I would argue, we find that 
in-order reading, like the centering authority of patronage, has always been an 
illusion.186 
Space, Sequence, Accident 
Sterne's novel deploys other kinds of ambiguity in ways that are not as 
provocative, but are perhaps even more disorienting. These techniques have been 
grouped together by some critics under the name "spatial form," a term that Christopher 
Fanning defines as "the cross-referenced fragmentation of sequence." This compact but 
somewhat opaque definition is best illustrated by a simple example that appears during 
the work, and out-of-order reading thus interferes with their generic underpinnings 
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 In this respect, I am edging toward a reading of Sterne as an early exponent of "reader response " One 
might ask, following Stanley Fish, is there a text in Tnstium Shandy, or in any work7 However, my 
approach differs from many reader-response critics in that I am less interested in the "subjective" 
response of a socially and culturally situated reader, than I am in the objectne differences between 
reading styles—at least in so far as the term "objective" has meaning In her introduction to the essays 
collected in Reader Response Criticism. Jane Tompkins states that "the objectivity of the text is the 
concept that these essays, whether they intended it or not, eventually destroy'* (Readei Response 
Criticism From Formalism to Post-Structural ism (Baltimoie Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), x) 
However, the difference between readers is also an observable, reproducible fact manifested in the 
corporeal process of reading In other words, if you watch a reader, you will see how they turn the pages. 
and if you watch two readers, you will see how they turn the pages differently 
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a conversation between Toby and Walter Shandy about pregnancy and childbirth. Faced 
with the same evidence, they come to divergent conclusions, Toby sympathizing with 
and Walter scorning the behavior of women during pregnancy, but they both express 
their feelings in identical ways, by shaking their heads: "since the shaking of heads 
came into fashion, never did two heads shake together, in concert, from two such 
different springs." Shandy then illustrates this unusual coincidence with an idiosyncratic 
typographical move: 
God bless 
} 'em all—said my uncle Toby and my father, each to himself. 
Duce take 
Here we have an example of text that is less ambiguous in its meaning than in its 
preferred reading order. We can gather from context that Toby is doing the blessing and 
Walter the damning, but we cannot determine whether to read "God bless" or "Duce 
take" first, because they describe simultaneous events in the novel's world. At one point, 
Fanning describes the reading process called for by such formal moves as "a dance that 
perceives the structure of the space, actively moving back and forth, in essence creating 
meaning by performing these actions" (440). In other words, rather than moving 
sequentially though the text, readers scan the text as they would an image, perceiving a 
"structure," a network of simultaneous relations between distant points in the text, 
which constitutes the meaning of the text.1 7 Fanning uses the phrase "creating 
meaning," but his characterization of spatial reading as way of "perceiving" structure 
187
 Farming's account of meaning in Tristram Shandy thus draws from structuralism's emphasis on the 
synchronic aspects of language. 
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suggests something closer to the reconstruction of meaning already present in the 
"space" of the text. In the passage above, for example, we are likely to read either the 
top or the bottom line first, and then imaginatively reconstruct the simultaneous 
divergence of opinion that the text so cleverly evokes. 
However, I want to push Fanning's picture of Tristram Shandy's readers a step 
further by insisting upon the fact that, although readers may skip from point to point in 
the novel, the sense of space generated thereby is illusory. It is illusory because few 
readers could actually read multiple parts of the novel simultaneously; the experience of 
reading Tristram Shandy is necessarily fragmented, but it does remain sequential. 
Readers still proceed from one word to the next, and few would hope to read several 
different lines of the novel at the same time. The simultaneity implied by spatial 
metaphors thus remains out of reach for most readers, arguably even in the relatively 
simple case cited above.188 Furthermore, although some texts may yield the same 
"structure" regardless of the order in which they are read, Tristram Shandy does not; 
indeed, I would argue that the novel's design actively thwarts such uniform, predictable 
reconstruction. For this reason, I understand "spatial form" in Tristram Shandy not as an 
end, but as a means—Sterne uses it not simply to create space, but to create multiple 
potential entrances into and exits from the text. For whenever a given reader attempts 
(and inevitably fails) to capture a fully-spatialized reading of the text, that reader is 
likely to hit upon a completely novel way of reading it, entering, exiting and reentering 
188
 Speaking only for myself, 1 find that after first reading the two lines separately, I can imagine the 
sound of "God bless" and "Duce take" being spoken simultaneously, but I can push my reading abilities 
no further. 
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at unpredictable moments, tracing a unique path across the novel's pages. 
Sterne exemplifies this phenomenon when he sends the female reader back to 
the previous chapter: the paths of his male and female readers diverge. Their divergence 
is planned, but if Sterne's readers follow the example of the female reader on their own, 
then their readings are likely to diverge from one another in many accidental ways. 
Accidents thus play even more of a role in Tristram Shandy than perhaps has been 
recognized. Peter J. De Voogd has examined parallels between late eighteenth-century 
theories of visual aesthetics and Sterne's "use of accidents," reading the novel's 
marbled pages—each of which, in the first edition, was a unique product of a 
randomized process—as an emblem of the novel's accidental essence. Shandy's sudden 
digressions and unexpected associations certainly appear accidental, and there is little 
doubt that accidents went into composing the novel; but I would argue that Sterne's 
formal techniques ensure that accidents play just as important a role for readers. De 
Voogd only hints at this idea, noting that "it is fitting that your copy of Tristram Shandy 
is different from mine, since your subjective experience of the book is different" (287). I 
want to modify this observation by noting that if we read discontinuously, then even 
readers' objective190 experiences of the text are likely to differ. Imagine two readers, one 
of whom skips a chapter while the other reads through it. Even if we discard the 
individual biases, opinions and expectations these two readers bring to the text, their 
m
 The Works of Joshua Reynolds, 3 vols., (London: T. Cadell, 1798) 2:129-140, quoted inPeterJ.de 
Voogd, "Laurence Sterne, the Marbled Page, and 'the Use of Accidents,'"' Word & Image: A Journal of 
Verbal/Visual Enquiry 1.3 (1985), 279. 
190
 For the purposes of my argument I am adopting De Voogd's implicit assumption that a distinction 
between "objective" and "subjective" experience exists. 1 am not at all certain that such a distinction is 
sustainable; nonetheless, it remains intuitively plausible that some kinds of experience seem more 
objective than others, in so far as they seem more easily reproduced than others. 
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readings still differ in a way that any other reader can observe and directly reproduce. 
Similarly, the marbled pages of Tristram Shandy turn out to be poor emblems of 
subjectivity, since although each is unique, the differences between them are as plainly 
objective as anything could be. I thus read Shandy's marbled pages as emblems of the 
accidental precisely in so far as accidents enable different readers to encounter the text 
in objectively (as far as is possible) unique ways. 
The Owned Author 
The vision of author-reader relations that Sterne presents in Tristram Shandy is 
thoroughly anti-hierarchical; and this anti-hierarchical view shapes the novel's formal 
structure. It is a fundamental aspect of the language Sterne uses. In a world in which 
every reader participates equally in the production of meaning, literary authority 
becomes relentlessly democratic, but also wildly unpredictable; the prospect might have 
seemed, to Johnson, like something of a nightmare. But this unpredictable world is the 
very foundation of Sterne's text. The vision of the English language that Johnson 
describes in the preface to his Dictionary—a language which "has itself been hitherto 
neglected, suffered to spread, under the direction of chance, into wild exuberance, 
resigned to the tyranny of time and fashion, and exposed to the corruptions of 
ignorance, and caprices of innovation" (3)—looks just like the language with which 
Tristram Shandy was composed. 
Tike its language, the world of Tristram Shandy is chaotic and full of accidents, 
a world in which minor events have enormous consequences; causation itself in Sterne's 
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novel is radically democratized, and no patron or father-figure has the power to protect 
Shandy from the ravages of chance—from the immense destructive power of the 
ordinary. I return to one of the the images with which I began, Tristram Shandy's lonely 
embryo: 
The HOMUNCULUS, Sir, in how-ever low and ludicrous a light he may 
appear, in this age of levity, to the eye of folly or prejudice;—to the eye 
of reason in scientifick research, he stands confess'd—a BEING guarded 
and circumscribed with rights[...] and, in all senses of the word, as much 
and as truly our fellow-creature as my Lord Chancellor of England[...] 
Now, dear Sir, what if any accident had befallen him in his way alone?— 
-or that, thro' terror of it, natural to so young a traveller, my little 
gentleman had got to his journey's end miserably spent;—his muscular 
strength and virility worn down to a thread;—his own animal spirits 
ruffled beyond description,—and that in this sad disorder'd state of 
nerves, he had laid down a prey to sudden starts, or a series of 
melancholy dreams and fancies for nine long, long months together." (3). 
All because of a clock. 
This portrait of Shandy's minuscule body, deprived of the protective "animal 
spirits" that ought to have "conducted him safe" (2) to his mother's womb, brings to 
mind the etymological association between patronus and pater. The interruption of 
Walter Shandy deprives Tristram of fatherly protection even before his birth. Further 
confusion ensues during and after his birth; Walter's decision to have Tristram delivered 
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locally by Dr. Slop—who he reasons will be able to prevent Tristram's skull from being 
deformed in birth by using forceps—results in a crushed nose; and Walter also fails to 
ensure that Parson Yorick's curate christens his son with the auspicious name 
Trismegistus, which accidentally becomes distorted into Tristram—a devastating result, 
for as Tristram's uncle Toby puts it, Walter insists "there never was a great or heroic 
action performed since the world began by one called Tristram" (1:352). These and 
many other comical mishaps all heighten the parallel between Tristram's constant 
exposure to the ravages of chance, due to his father-protector's errors, and Tristram 
Shandy's status as a (relatively) unpatronized and unprotected text. 
This parallel is appropriate given the many moments in which Tristram's life is 
equated with his book. I'll focus briefly on one oft-cited example—just before the 
episode in which Walter fails to have Tristram named Trismegistus, Shandy makes the 
following observation 
upon the strange state of affairs between the reader and myself... an 
observation never applicable before to any one biographical writer since 
the creation of the world... I am this month one whole year older than I 
was this time twelve-month; and having got, as you perceive, almost into 
the middle of my fourth volume—and no farther than to my first day's 
life—'tis demonstrative that I have three hundred and sixty-four days 
more life to write just now... so that instead of advancing, as a common 
writer... on the contrary, 1 am just thrown so many volumes back... the 
more I write, the more I shall have to write—and consequently, the more 
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your worships read, the more your worships will have to read. (1:342). 
Shandy finds that he is stuck in a sort of autobiographical ouroboros, a self-reflexive 
snare in which his book and himself entrap one another. Shandy's, however, is not a 
solipsistic trap; he describes this conundrum as a problem not only for himself, but also 
for his readers. I read this passage not simply as an example of Sterne's self-reflexive 
playfulness, as many have, but as a moment in which book, author and reader are all 
entwined. This proliferating unity of author, book and reader is, I would argue, the 
fundamental conceit of Tristram Shandy. Shandy, as a book in William Pitt's hands, and 
in the hands of readers all over Britain, moves unprotected through a non-hierarchical 
marketplace, accruing new structures and meanings as readers see fit to assign them. In 
the process, readers dismember and reconstitute Shandy's body, the body of the text, 
just as Tristram's body and name are distorted in the process of his birth. Tristram 
Shandy is fecund in its materiality, Rabelaisian in its textual grotesqueries. 
Tristram Shandy's two dedications, I have argued, both transform the patrons to 
whom they are addressed into mere readers. But in a certain sense, the patron was never 
anything more than a reader—a reader with a difference. A patron was a privileged 
reader, a reader capable of dictating meanings and values with greater authority than 
other readers. From this perspective, the transformation that Sterne's dedication 
describes translates into a democratization of reading. In the (impossible, Utopian) 
absence of a privileged reader, all readers contribute equally to meaning. Furthermore, 
if it is the case that the authority of the patron to circumscribe meaning is the same 
authority that would eventually be transferred to the "author-function," then we might 
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say that, insofar as the "author-function" serves to constrain meaning, it does so not as a 
surrogate for the writer, but as a surrogate for the privileged reader. This brings to mind 
Shandy's sales pitch, as he evaluates his dedication on the painter's scale: "if I may be 
allowed, my Lord, to understand my own design"—if, that is to say, Shandy's own self-
interpretation is to be credited—then his literary authority is simply a matter of reading. 
In matters of meaning, the author is just another reader. 
Sselected Bibliography 
187 
Aarseth, Espen J. Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
Abrams, M. H. The Mirror and the Lamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953. 
Baker v. Selden. U.S. Supreme Court. October 1879. (101 U.S. 99.) 
Barbara M. Benedict. '"Dear Madam': Rhetoric, Cultural Politics and the Female Reader 
in Sterne's Tristram Shandy." Studies in Philology 89 (1992), 485-98. 
Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974. 
Battestin, Martin C. A Henry Fielding Companion. London: Greenwood Press, 2000. 
Battestin, Martin C. The Moral Basis of Fielding's Art. Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1959. 
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 Vols. Oxford, 1765-
1769. Rpt. in Eighteenth-Century Collections Online, Gale. 
Boswell, James. Life of Johnson. Ed. R. W. Chapman. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980. 
Bowers, Toni. The Politics of Motherhood. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
Brooks, Douglas A., ed. Printing and Parenting in Early Modern England. Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2005. 
Burrow, James, ed. The Question Concerning Literary Property. London: B. Tovey, 
1773. Rpt. in The Literary Property Debate: Seven Tracts 1747-1773. Ed. 
188 
Stephen Parks. New York: Garland, 1974. 
Carey, Daniel. "Hutcheson's Moral Sense and the Problem of Innateness," Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 38.1 (2000), 103-110. 
Case of the Appellants, 1751. (British Library, BM 18th Century Reel, 4065/03) 
Case of the Booksellers and Printers Stated (1638). Rpt. in English Publishing, the 
Struggle for Copyright, and the Freedom of the Press, ed. Stephen Parks. New 
York: Garland, 1975. 
Cash, Arthur H. and John M. Stedmond, eds. The Winged Skull: Papers from the 
Laurence Sterne Bicentenary Conference. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 
1971. 
Chappell, Timothy. Reading Plato's Theaetetus. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2004. 
Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. No. 87-1491. US Court of 
Appeals, First Circuit. 1988. (843 F.2d 600) 
Culverwel, Nathanael. An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature. 
London: Printed by T. R. and E. M. for John Rothwell, 1652). Rpt. in Early 
English Books Online, Gale. 
Darwall, Stephen. The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought": 1640-1740. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Davis, Philip J. and Reuben Hersh. The Mathematical Experience. New York: Mariner 
Books, 1981. 
Dawson, Hannah, "Locke on Private Language," British Journal for the History of 
189 
Philosophy, 11:4, 609-637. 
De Grazia, Margreta. "Imprints: Shakespeare, Gutenberg, and Descartes." Printing and 
Parenting in Early Modern England. Ed. Douglas Brooks. Burlington: Ashgate, 
2005. 
Deazley, Ronan. On the Origin of the Right to Copy. Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2004. 
Derrida, Jacques. Limited Inc. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988. 
Donoghue, Frank. "Laurence Sterne and the Fantasy of Individual Patronage." 
Biography. 18.2 (1995), 97-116. 
Dryden, John. The Dramatic Works. 6 vols. Ed. Montague Summers. New York: 
Gordian Press, 1968. 
Eagleton, Terry. The Rape of Clarissa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. 
English Publishing, the Struggle for Copyright, and the Freedom of the Press: Thirteen 
Tracts 1666-1774. Ed. Stephen Parks. New York: Garland, 1975. 
Erasmus, Desiderius. Collected Works, v. 24. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1978. 
Fielding, Henry. Joseph Andrews. Ed. Paul A. Scanlon. Orchard Park, NY: Broadview, 
2001. 
Fielding, Henry. Tom Jones. Thomas Keymer and Alice Wakely eds. New York: 
Penguin, 2005. 
Fitz-Adam, Adam. The World. 3rd Ed. Vol. 2. London, 1761, rpt. in Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online. Gale (CW3310679016). 
190 
Fizer, Irene. "Rags of Immortality: Clarissa's Clothing and the Exchange of Second-
Hand Goods." Eighteenth-Century Fiction 20.1 (2007): 1-34. 
Forster, Harold. Edward Young: Poet of the Night Thoughts. Alburgh: The Erskine 
Press, 1986. 
Foster, Edward E., ed., Three Purgatory Poems. Kalamazoo, Michigan: Medieval 
Institute Publications, 2004. 
Foucault, Michel. The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rainbow. New York: Pantheon, 1984. 
Fritz, Paul S. "The Undertaking Trade in England: Its Origins and Early Development, 
1660-1830." Eighteenth-Century Studies 28.2 (1994): 241-253. 
Gallagher, Catherine. Nobody's Story: the Vanishing Acts of Women Writers in the 
Marketplace, 1670-1820. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. 
Griffin, Dustin. Literary Patronage in England, 1650-1800. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
Helen Ostovich. "Reader as Hobby-Horse in Tristram Shandy." Philological Quarterly 
68 (1989), 325-42. 
Hnatko, Eugene. "Sterne's Conversational Style." The Winged Skull: Papers from the 
Laurence Sterne Bicentenary Conference. Ed. Arthur Cash and John M. 
Stedmond. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 1971, p. 229-36. 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. London: Andrew Cooke, 1651. Rpt. in Early English 
Books Online (12539984). 
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Hutton, Sarah. "Introduction." A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, 
191 
ed. Sarah Hutton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Iser, Wolfgang. The Implied Reader. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 
Johnson, Samuel. A Dictionary of the English Language. Vol. 1-2. London, 1755, rpt. 
in Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale (CB3328752484) 
Johnson, Samuel. The Lives of the English Poets. 3 vols. Dublin, 1780-81, rpt. in 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale (CW3303109318). 
Jones, Richard H. "The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law." 
Pace Law Review 10.3 (Summer 1990), 551-607. 
Kibbie, Ann Louise. "Sentimental Properties: Pamela and Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure." ELH 58.3 (1991): 561-577. 
Kibbie, Ann Louise. "The Estate, the Corpse, and the Letter: Posthumous Possession in 
Clarissa." ELH 74.1 (2007): 117-143. 
Kohus v. Mariol. No. 01-4089. US Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. 20 May 2003. (328 
F.3d 848) 
Korshin, Paul. "Types of Eighteenth Century Literary Patronage." Eighteenth-Century 
Studies 1A (1974), 453-473. 
Leibniz, G. W. Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. 
Cambridge: Hackett, 1989. 
Leigh A. Ehlers. "Mr. Shandy's 'Lint and Basilicon': The Importance of Women in 
Tristram Shandy." South Atlantic Review 46 (1981), 61-75. 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1975. 
192 
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988. 
Lockwood, Thomas F. and Ronald Paulson, eds. Henry Fielding: The Critical Heritage. 
New York: Routledge, 1995. 
Lord Coalston, Reporter, Information for Mess. John Hinton of London, Bookseller, and 
Alexander MacKonochie, Writer in Edinburgh, his Attorney, Pursuers; against 
Mess. Alexander Donaldson and John Wood, Booksellers in Edinburgh, and 
James Meurose, Bookseller in Kilmarnock, Defenders, Jan 2. 1773, p. 19. 
Mack, Maynard. Alexander Pope: A Life. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1985. 
MacKenzie, Scott R. "Homunculus Economicus: Laurence Sterne's Labour Theory of 
Literary Value." Eighteenth-Century Fiction 18.1 (2005), 49-86. 
Maus, Katharine. "A Womb of His Own: Male Renaissance Poets in the Female Body." 
Printing and Parenting in Early Modern England. Ed. Douglas Brooks. 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2005. 
McArthur, Tom, ed. The Oxford Companion to the English Language. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992. 
McGann, Jerome and Lisa Samuels. "Deformance and Interpretation." Radiant 
Textuality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
McKeon, Michael. The Origins of the English Novel. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2002. 
McKillop, Alan D. "Richardson, Young, and the 'Conjectures.'" Modern Philology, 
Vol. 22, No. 4 (May, 1925), 391-404. 
193 
Memorial for The Booksellers of Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1747. Rpt. in The Literary 
Property Debate: Seven Tracts 1747-1773. Ed. Stephen Parks. New York: 
Garland, 1974. 
Milic, Louis T. "Information Theory and the Style of Tristram Shandy." The Winged 
Skull: Papers from the Laurence Sterne Bicentenary Conference. Ed. Arthur 
Cash and John M. Stedmond. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 1971, p. 237-
46. 
More, Henry, Major Philosophical Works, ed. G. A. J. Rogers, v. 1. Dulles, VA: 
Thoemmes Press, 1997. 
Morrisey, Lee. "Re-reading Reading in Eighteenth-Century Literary Criticism." College 
Literature 31.3 (Summer 2004), 157-178. 
Odell, D. W. "The Argument of Young's 'Conjectures on Original Composition.'" 
Studies in Philology 78.1 (1981), 87-106. 
Paula Loscocco. "Can't Live without 'Em: Walter Shandy and the Woman Within." The 
Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation 32 (1991), 166-79. 
Pellicer, Juan Christian. "Dryden, Chesterfield, and Johnson's 'Celebrated Letter': A 
Case of Compound Allusion." Notes and Queries. 48.4 (2001), 413-414. 
Petition for Daniel Midwinter, William Innes, Aaron Ward, and Others, 1747. Rpt. in 
The Literary Property Debate: Seven Tracts 1747-1773. Ed. Stephen Parks. 
New York: Garland, 1974. 
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, trans. Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1921. Rpt. m Perseus Digital Library. Medford, MA: Tufts 
194 
University. 
Pope, Alexander. The second epistle of the second book of Horace. Dublin, 1737, rpt. 
in Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale (CW3316947388). 
Rawson, C. J. Henry Fielding and the Augustan Ideal Under Stress. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1972. 
Rawson, Glenn, "Platonic Recollection and Mental Pregnancy," Journal of the History 
of Philosophy, 44:2 (April 2006), 137-155. 
Regan, Shaun. "Print Culture in Transition: Tristram Shandy, the Reviewers, and the 
Consumable Text." Eighteenth Century Fiction 14.3-4 (2002), 289-309. 
Reynolds, Joshua. The Works of Joshua Reynolds. 3 vols. London: T. Cadell, 1798. 
Richardson, Samuel. Clarissa. New York: Penguin, 1985. 
Richardson, Samuel. Selected Letters. Ed. John Carroll. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. 
Richardson, Samuel. The Case of Samuel Richardson, 1753. Rpt. English Publishing, 
the Struggle for Copyright, and the Freedom of the Press: Thirteen Tracts 1666-
1774. Ed. Stephen Parks. New York: Garland, 1975. 
Richardson, Samuel. The History of Sir Charles Grandison. 6 vols. London, 1754. 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale Group. 31 October 2008. 
Richetti, John. The English Novel in History, 1700-1780. New York: Routledge, 1999. 
Rickless, Samuel. "Locke's Polemic against Nativism." The Cambridge Companion to 
Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding. " ed. Lex Newman. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Rogers, G. A. J. "Locke, Plato and Platonism,'* Platonism at the Origins of Modernity, 
195 
eds. Douglas Hedley and Sarah Hutton. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2008. 
Rogers, Pat. "Tristram Shandy's Polite Conversation." Essays in Criticism 32 (1982), 
305-20. 
Rose, Mark. "Mothers and Authors: Johnson v. Calvert and the New Children of Our 
Imaginations." Parenting and Printing in Early Modern England. Ed. Douglas 
A. Brooks. Burlington: Ashgate, 2005 
Rose, Mark. "The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of 
Modern Authorship," Representations 23 (Summer 1988). 
Rose, Mark. Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993. 
Ross, Ian Campbell. Laurence Sterne: A Life. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001. 
Ruth Perry. "Words for Sex: The Verbal-Sexual Continuum in Tristram Shandy." 
Studies in the Novel 20 (1988), 27-42. 
Sale, William M. Samuel Richardson: Master Printer. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1950. 
Sarah Hutton, "Tord Herbert of Cherbury and the Cambridge Platonists," Routedge 
History of Philosophy. Volume 5: British Philosophy and the Age of 
Enlightenment. New York: Routledge. 1996. 
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third Earl of. Characteristicks, of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times. London, 1733. Rpt. in Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online, Gale (CW3305573821), 45-46. 
Sim, Stuart and David Walker. The Discourse of Sovereignty, Hoboes to Fielding. 
Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2003. 
Smith, John, Select Discourses by John Smith. London: Rivingtons and Cochran, 1821. 
St. Clair, William. The Reading Nation in the Romantic Period. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. 
Stern, Simon. "Tom Jones and the Economies of Copyright." Eighteenth Century 
Fiction 9:4,(1997), 429. 
Sterne, Laurence. The Florida Edition of the Works of Laurence Sterne. 3 vols. Ed. 
Melvyn New and Joan New. University Presses of Florida: 1978. 
Stokes, Simon. Art and Copyright. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2001. 
Sussman, Charlotte. '"I Wonder Whether Poor Miss Sally Godfrey Be Living or Dead': 
The Married Woman and the Rise of the Novel." Diacritics 20.1 (1990): 88-102. 
Swift, Jonathan. "On the Testimony of Conscience," Three Sermons (London, 1744). 
Rpt. in Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale. (CB3332553113), 24. 
The Literary Property Debate: Seven Tracts 1747-1773. Ed. Stephen Parks. New York: 
Garland, 1974. 
Toker, Leona. "Narrative Enthymeme: The Examples of Laurence Sterne and James 
Joyce." Partial Answers 4.2 (2006), 163-74. 
Tompkins, Jane P. Reader Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 
Tonson v. Collins (1761). Rpt. in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900). Eds. L. 
Bentley and M. Kretschmer (www.copyrighthistory.com). 
197 
Tonson v. Collins (1762). Rpt. in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900). Eds. L. 
Bentley and M. Kretschmer (www.copyrighthistory.com). 
Warburton, William. Letter from an Author to a Member of Parliament, Concerning 
Literary Property. London: John and Paul Knapton, 1747. Rpt. In Horace 
Walpole's Political Tracts, 1747-1748. Ed. Stephen Parks. New York: Garland, 
1974. 
Whitefoord, Charles. The Whitefoord Papers. Ed. W. A. S. Hewins. Oxford: Clarendon, 
1898. 
Woodmansee, Martha. "The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions 
of the Emergence of the 'Author.'" Eighteenth-Century Studies 17.4 (1984), 
425-448. 
Wordsworth, William and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Lyrical Ballads. Ed. R. L. Brett 
and A. R. Jones. New York: Routledge, 1991. 
Wycherley, William. The Plain-Dealer. London : James Magnes and Rich. Bentley, 
1677, rpt. in Early English Books Online, ProQuest (Z39.88-2003) 
Yolton, John. A Locke Dictionary. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993. 
Young Edward. The Correspondence of Edward Young. Ed. Henry Pettit. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1971. 
Young, Edward. Conjectures on Original Composition. London, 1759. Rpt. in 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale (CW104998891). 
Young, Edward. The Complete Works. 2 vols. Ed. James Nichols. Hidesheim: Georg 
01ms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968 
